

The Princeton Theological Review



CONTENTS

The Ethics of the Old Testament	153
WM. BRENTON GREENE, JR.	
Alleged Development in Paul's Teaching on the Resurrection	193
GEERHARDUS VOS	
Modern Views about Inspiration—And the Truth of Scriptures	227
P. E. KRETMANN	
Primary Requisites for the Speedy Evangelization of China	245
ALBERT B. DODD	
Is Conscience a Safe Guide?	264
NEWTON WRAY	
Reviews of Recent Literature	275
Survey of Periodical Literature	304

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON

LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1929

The Princeton Theological Review

EDITED FOR

THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BY

Oswald T. Allis

Each author is solely responsible for the views expressed in his article
Notice of discontinuance must be sent to the Publishers; otherwise subscriptions will be continued
Subscription rate, Two Dollars a year, single copies Sixty Cents
Entered as Second Class Mail Matter at Princeton, N.J.

BOOKS REVIEWED

ANTHONY, H. D., <i>Relativity and Religion</i>	280
FERM, V., <i>The Crisis in American Lutheran Theology</i>	290
FIFE, R. H., <i>Young Luther. The Intellectual and Religious Development of Martin Luther to 1518</i>	289
GRANT, F. C., <i>New Horizons of the Christian Faith</i>	296
HARRIS, C., <i>First Steps in the Philosophy of Religion</i>	280
HEYBERGER, A., <i>Jean Amos Comenius (Komensky). Sa vie et son oeuvre d'éducateur</i>	288
INGE, W. R., <i>The Church in the World</i>	299
KITTEL, R., <i>Great Men and Movements in Israel</i>	281
KNUDSON, A. C., <i>The Philosophy of Personalism. A Study in the Metaphysics of Religion</i>	277
LATOURETTE, K. L., <i>A History of Christian Missions in China</i>	300
LEETE, F. D., <i>Christianity in Science</i>	275
LINEBERGER, L. O., <i>Towering Figures Among the Prophets</i>	284
ODEBERG, H., <i>3 Enoch or The Hebrew Book of Enoch</i>	285
RULMANN, J. C., <i>Abraham Kuyper, een Levensschets</i>	286
SHERMAN, C. L., <i>The Moral Self</i>	279
TENNANT, F. R., <i>Philosophical Theology, Vol. I</i>	292

The Princeton Theological Review

APRIL, 1929

THE ETHICS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT*

Any just exposition of Christian Ethics must begin with the ethics of the Old Testament. For this there are two chief reasons: its preparatory character and its permanent value.

1. Old Testament Ethics is in order to Christian Ethics. "The law," we are told, "was a schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ" (Gal. iii. 24). We cannot, therefore, appreciate the perfection that is in Him, unless we master the course appointed by Him as the preparation for it. This is as true of His ethical teaching as it is of His doctrine of grace. Even if the two were essentially different, instead of being different aspects of the same thing, this would be so. The law of Christ would be too spiritual for one who had not entered into the deep spiritual meaning of the law of Moses; and at the same time it is by contrast with the latter that the greater spirituality of the former best appears. The relation in this case is not unlike that between the text-books of the child and the scientific treatises of the man. The concrete illustrations of the former prepare for the abstract statements of the latter, and the naked truthfulness of the latter comes out most clearly when we put them alongside of the former's explanations and illustrations. These, though they make very plain certain

* In the course on "Christian Ethics" which Dr. Greene for many years gave to the students of Princeton Seminary, Old Testament Ethics as the basis of New Testament Ethics naturally received careful consideration. Since there is no subject which is to-day of more interest and even concern to the earnest student of the Old Testament than its ethics, it has been felt that a real service would be rendered by the publication of these lectures. For the privilege of doing this the Editor is indebted to Mrs. Greene.—[Ed.]

features of the truth, cannot but in doing so divide our attention. The inevitable tendency is for the thing symbolized to give way to the symbol.

2. Old Testament Ethics enters itself into the Christian's permanent rule of practice. The proof and illustration of this is the Ten Commandments. Both the basis and the summary of the ethics of the Old Dispensation, they form also the law which Christ came to establish and to fulfil. Thus they are of universal application and of perpetual obligation. They are as binding still as "the Sermon on the Mount." Indeed, one of the most important purposes of "the Sermon on the Mount" is to emphasize them anew by bringing out their spiritual meaning.

Nor is it altogether different even in the case of the Ceremonial Law. This, it is true, as well as what are called the positive requirements modifying the Moral Law, has been fulfilled and abrogated by Christ. The question whether a particular precept of the Old Testament is still in force may be determined by two inquiries: (1) Is it reenacted in the New Testament? If so, it yet binds. (2) Does it rest on a permanent reason? If so, it yet binds. For whether the particular precept continues obligatory or not, the principles that underlie it have not been abrogated.

We, for example, are not bound by the distinction between clean and unclean as respects food. Nevertheless, this distinction is not without instruction for us. We cannot study it and not see more clearly than, perhaps, we could in any other way that we ought to determine our course, even in such morally indifferent matters as meat and drink, not according to our impulses and feelings, nor merely by our own judgment, from the things themselves, but first of all by the divine law; that in the determination of what is right, now and always, what God says, if He has spoken, should prevail rather than what we ourselves may wish or think. This cannot but be impressed on us by the minute and sometimes apparently arbitrary regulations of Judaism as to food, and it is a truth which needs to be impressed on us in these days as

seldom before. The man often finds it advantageous to freshen his knowledge of what he understands by a reference to the pictorial representations of his childhood's primer; and in like manner great gain would come to the church of our time, did she study more frequently and carefully the ceremonial requirements of the Old Dispensation. There could not then fail to be less than there is of inattention to the commandments of God considered simply as His commandments and apart from their manifest inherent propriety. We could scarcely help feeling as well as theoretically believing the supreme importance of every "Thus saith the Lord." So essential, then, being the Ethics of the Old Testament, we proceed at once to its exposition.

THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OLD TESTAMENT ETHICS

These general characteristics are three:

i. It is nowhere stated, but is always assumed, that man has a moral nature and is under moral obligations; that he knows this; and that he ought to live to secure the highest good. In this respect the attitude of the Old Testament is the same that it is toward theism. The fundamental truths of both it takes for granted. Nowhere does it prove the existence of God. Everywhere it addresses men as if they believed and must believe in Him. Its positive teaching is that it is only "the fool," who says in his heart, "There is no God" (Ps. liii. 1).

In like manner, the Old Testament never undertakes to demonstrate the reality of duty, the obligation of virtue, the excellence and claim of the supreme good. It always speaks to those who recognize all this, who never question it, who could not doubt it. Nor has it any more positive teaching than that the way of immorality is the way of folly. In a word, it is as ethical as it is theistic. It is the former because it is the latter. It is both so essentially and manifestly that to prove or even state it would be superfluous.

2. The ethical system of the Old Testament is presented to us in, with, and through the religion with which it is connected. The Old Testament, unlike some ignorant enthusiasts of our own day, knows nothing of religion without morality, nothing of faith which does not issue in right life and character. Neither does it, unlike some learned philosophers of our own time, know anything of morality without religion, anything of conduct or character whose rightness or wrongness is independent of its relation to God. Hence, in the Old Testament the irreligious men are the immoral men, and the immoral men are the irreligious men. Thus Psalm xiv. 1, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doeth good." Indeed, to the Old Testament writers the two conceptions are but different aspects of the same thing. Atheism is the worst form of immorality, and immorality is practical atheism.

3. In harmony with this mode of presenting the subject the Old Testament lacks altogether the specific abstract terms of Philosophical Ethics. We are taught much concerning duty, virtue, the supreme good, motive and end; but these words are not once used. The things are there, but the scientific labels are wanting. The names employed are those of practical religion. Such are the general characteristics of the Ethics of the Old Testament; and, it should be added, they are equally the characteristics of the Ethics of the New Testament.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OLD TESTAMENT ETHICS

1. It is "a morality of hope." Like the dispensation to which it belongs, its attitude is one of expectation. It looks ever forward to its explanation and its completion in Christ. He is its key. Himself fulfilling all righteousness, He reveals the real meaning of "the righteousness of the law." Hence arises a characteristic of the Old Testament as distinguished from the New: it is undeveloped in form and incomplete in material. Its significance lies in its preparatory nature, in its

disciplinary purpose. There is no fact with reference to it of greater importance than this.

2. Old Testament Ethics is personal as regards both its ground and its subject.

a. The ground of the ethical in the Old Testament is the express commands of the absolutely holy person, God, made known by historical acts of revelation.

We should suppose that this would be so. The Hebrew is conscious that he has lost the pure image of God. Israelitish thinking is always conditioned by the terrible fact of the fall. Perhaps, *the* distinction of Jewish history is that this event, of world-wide application and of eternal consequence, is the background against which all other events stand out. To the Jew, the race is ever fallen. He could not, therefore, we should judge, justify others or even himself in "leaning unto his own understanding," in searching in his own consciousness, for the great truths of ethics and religion. In his view reason would be too subject to the bondage of corruption to be taken as a guide: the appeal would be "to the law and to the testimony," to an infallible "Thus saith the Lord": there would be the absence of abstract philosophical statement to which reference has been made; instead of it, we should have particular divine commands.

This supposition is confirmed by the facts. Throughout the Old Testament God speaks and man hearkens; and the essence of moral activity is a childlike obeying of the divine commands laid on man. There is no need of philosophical analysis or inquiry into the nature of things. The command of God to man presents itself in a strictly positive definite form: "thou shalt," "thou shalt not," "thou mayest." For any other than God's will man has no need as he has no right to ask; he is simply to obey the will of God—this alone leads him to righteousness. To personal free self-determination and maturity man is to attain simply and solely through childlike obedience to the *word* of the Father. Hence, the Old Testament conceives of duty as what God *tells* man to do; it conceives of virtue as obedience to God's expressed commands; it con-

ceives of the supreme good as perfect likeness to God and so perfect sonship with reference to Him and so perfect bliss in Him, inasmuch as these are the result of such childlike obedience. It regards idolatry as the sin of all sins; for this, since it is apostasy from God, cuts the roots of all obedience to Him. Thus, the Old Testament grounds its ethics on the definitely expressed will of the divine Person.

b. Nor is its subject less personal. Man's obeying is as free as God's commanding. Man ought, but is not compelled. It is for him to choose whom he will serve, God or Baal. On his free choice his salvation is made to depend. "If thou hearkenest to my word, it shall go well with thee" pervades the entire Old Testament. Even when God enters into covenant with man He conditions the fulfilment on man's fidelity to it. Thus, the Old Testament emphasizes the freedom of its subject no less than the personality of its ground. Its essence is man's free obedience to God's sovereign commands.

3. The Old Testament conception of God is uniquely high. His unity is affirmed in opposition to polytheism and even to henotheism; His spirituality, in opposition to materialism; His personality, in opposition to pantheism. His omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence are emphasized as in no other faith. To feel this, one has only to compare Jehovah with Zeus. He is neither a heartless deity like Zeus, nor a relentless force like the law of gravitation. On the contrary, He is "longsuffering and gracious." He is a god of infinite feeling as well as of infinite power.

More important yet, and even more characteristic, is the realization in the Old Testament of God's holiness. The deities of the nations, with scarcely an exception, participate in the imperfection of the nations; whereas Jehovah is "of purer eyes than to behold evil or to look upon iniquity." As is true of no other god, He is holy; and His great command is, "Be ye holy, for I am holy." As Neander has well said, "The apprehension of God came out in Judaism as it could not in surrounding religions." Here we find the secret of its ethical purity and power.

4. God's claim on man as expressed in His commands to him is all-comprehensive.

a. Human society is of God in all its essential relations and institutions. Hence, the family, which is the unit of society, must be kept pure; and so comes the importance attached in the Old Testament to family ethics.

b. Man's responsibility to God extends also to his relations to the inferior creatures and even to the soil. He has received dominion over the creation; but only to use it lawfully, in the fear of God and for His glory. This dominion of man over the creatures is bounded always by the commands of God in the case and by the demands of nature. One's cattle may not be worked on the Sabbath; for this is contrary to God's Fourth Commandment: but they may and should, even on that day, be led out to water; for this their divinely given constitution requires. In a word, while Old Testament ethics does not, like Buddhism, pay more heed to sick beasts than to sick men, it does secure to all inferior creatures the rights inherent in their nature. If it condemns the maudlin sentiment that would squander fortunes on homes for stray or sick cats, it affords the sure warrant for "The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals." In this respect, as in all others, it is distinguished by a regard for proportion.

c. Man's treatment of himself, both body and spirit, comes within the sphere of ethics. So far from being his own, he is God's; and he ought to use himself accordingly. Hence, sins against the body are denounced. In every way the health of Israel is to be guarded. Cleanliness is made a consequence of godliness. Sanitation becomes a religious duty. The result is that to this day the Jews are remarkable for their health and longevity. Nor are sins against man's spiritual nature forbidden less emphatically. For example, indolence and pride are prohibited; and these, as neglect of the body or physical vices, become sins because they are regarded, not so much as against ourselves as against Him who made us, who owns us, and who will be glorified in us. Thus the Old Testament protects man from his evil self and demands the care and culture

of himself. Because God's, he is bound to make the best use of himself for God.

d. The divine claim extends even to "the thoughts and intents of the heart." The law of Moses requires not merely the outward work, but above all and essentially also a pious disposition. It bears in contradistinction to the later Jewish outward legality, a very positive character of inwardliness. The basis and essence of all morality is the requirement that man should "love God with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his might" (Deut. vi. 5, x. 12, xiii. 3); he is to take the divine law to his heart, and observe it with his whole heart and his whole soul (Deut. v. 29); God desires not merely the external work, He requires our heart (1 Chron. xxii. 19, Prov. xxiii. 26); the saint not only fulfils the law, but "his delight is in the law of the Lord" (Ps. i. 2, cxix. 24, 35, 70); all obedience is simply joyous thankfulness for God's gracious guidance (Ex. xx. 2, *seq.*, Deut. iv, v); and, therefore, not merely the sinful act, but equally also the lust to evil, is sinful and damnable (Ex. xx. 17, Prov. vi. 25). In this intense inwardliness of its ethics Judaism differs radically from all other religions. Only Zoroastrianism really resembles it.

5. God's concern for the ethical life just considered is shown:

a. By provision for man's moral culture and education. Left to himself, sinful man mistakes impulse for law, the agreeable for the obligatory, present excitement for permanent good. God, however, is represented as coming to his help, as teaching him what his moral relations are, as quickening and refining his moral sense. God's personal rule is put in the place of impersonal law. Conscience speaks with the authority of His voice.

b. By new and peculiar sanctions to duty. Man is not left to be attracted to duty or deterred from wrong simply by conscience. As just intimated, right actions are represented as securing the approbation of God as well as of conscience. Indeed, it is the former to which attention is directed. "God's favor is life, and His loving kindness is better than

life," and these are shown to those who "fear Him and keep His commandments." Man is taught, too, that God's memory is ever enduring. He will not fail to reward the righteous; and He "can by no means clear the guilty."

c. By provision against hero-worship. Other nations deified their great men, and in doing so they made them less moral, if more intellectual and powerful than they had been as men. Israel, however, was not permitted to regard even her good men as moral ideals. Their righteousness and piety were not denied or unappreciated. Enoch and Noah are revered. The faithfulness of Abraham shines forth typically even into the New Covenant. Yet these, and others like them, are never presented as absolutely holy types of morality. On the contrary, the inspired records relate, even of the most revered characters, manifold sins, and sins which the Israelites unquestionably regarded as such; as, for example, Abraham's deceptions, Jacob's meanness to Esau. Of Judah, the ancestor of the Kings, there is recorded scarcely anything but evil. Moses resists faintheartedly the divine call, subsequently wavers in his faith, and is, for that reason, shut out from the land of promise. Even David and Solomon, courageous and wise though they were, were not represented as ideals. The Israelites were permitted to know of only *one* Servant of God who was perfect; viz., the longed for Anointed of the Lord. They were not suffered to look away from God as the ultimate ground and sole norm of the ethical. As His express commands determined their obedience, so His character was to be their sole standard.

6. Not only does God thus bring Israel into the closest personal relation to Himself, but He represents Himself as sustaining a unique relation to them. They are His peculiar and spiritual people because He is their covenant God. They believe on Him because of His covenant to be their redeemer. Indeed, it is out of this covenant relationship that their moral life is developed. Set apart unto God as a kingdom of priests, they were bound thereby to a life of the strictest moral purity.

a. This is the gist of the promise made to Abraham and

through him to the faithful of whom he was the spiritual father.

b. Indeed, the covenant of the law rests on the covenant of promise. The revelation of law was the gift of grace and revealed a relationship of grace. It was regarded as a crown of rejoicing, even a matter of boasting. "Blessed is the people that know the joyful sound: they shall walk, O Lord, in the light of Thy countenance." It was the rule whereby the gracious provisions of God's covenant promise were to be realized; and His grace was made known in nothing more truly than in this, that He had revealed to them so clearly because objectively the law which, as regards all others, He had written only on the heart.

c. This covenant promise and objective statement of the law, though given to Israel, were for the world. We cannot emphasize this too strongly. God places before Abraham at the very start, not a merely personal, but a world-historical goal: "In thee shall *all* the families of the earth be blessed," and He repeats this promise again and again in progressively more definite features. As in Adam all die, so in Abraham are all nations to be blessed and to be brought to the Accomplisher of salvation. For the first time in the history of humanity we find here, and in contrast to all heathendom, a definite world-historical goal of the moral life. Not an individual, not even a nation merely, but the whole world God would redeem from all iniquity and purify unto Himself as a spiritual people zealous of good works. Nothing less than this universal issue is the purpose of the particularism of the Old Dispensation. It elected Israel for unique ethical training that it might establish through them the reign of righteousness universally.

d. The blessing of this covenant, while characteristically temporal, is usually conceived of as essentially spiritual. From the very beginning it is intimated that mere material blessings do not constitute the full or the true reward of ethical living. Even in the first promise to Abraham there beams out through the earthly good a gleam of the heavenly one: "In thee shall

all families of the earth be *blessed*." Abraham is to be, not merely by his example of faith, but also really, by his family, the beginning of a kingdom of God for all humanity. That is, to be himself in this kingdom of blessing and this kingdom in him, this is, for him, the highest good. Exactly similar promises of spiritual blessing in temporal goods, God gives to Isaac and to Jacob (Gen. xxvi. 3-5, Gen. xlvi. 4, etc.) ; Isaac's blessing upon his son Jacob relates, it must be granted, primarily only to temporal good (Gen. xxvii. 28, 29), but, nevertheless, with reference to the higher good (Gen. xxviii. 3-4). It is true that temporal well-being, and a continuance in the land, and long life are very often presented, —not, indeed, with reference merely to the individual, but also to the nation, as a divine blessing for pious fidelity,—as a high good and end; but as early as at the time of the conclusion of the covenant of God with the *people* on Sinai, the highest good appears as of a spiritual character: "If ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation" (Ex. xix. 5, 6); the highest blessing is the peace of God (Num. vi. 26, Ps. xxix. 11), the love of God, the compassion of God, and His covenant with men (Deut. vii. 9, 12, 13, xiii. 17, 18) so that they "may live long" (Deut. v. 33) and that God may be their "righteousness" (Deut. vi. 25); and in the First Commandment: "I am the Lord thy God. . . . Thou shalt have no other gods before me" the objective phase of the highest good is definitely expressed; anything else, save God, that man might regard as the highest good is, in fact, but a worthless idol; and, hence, the rejection of the covenant of grace works an everlasting rejection of him who rejects it (1 Chron. xxviii. 9).

e. As already implied, this conception of the highest good in Israel is seldom that of the individual's good. The modern theory of individualism had not taken possession of the Hebrew mind. Morality depends, not so much on the individual conscience as on the collective conscience of the na-

tion. It is a national deliverer rather than a personal redeemer for whom the saints hope. "Even when, as often in the Psalms, we hear the cry of some lonely penitent heart after purity, along with it the voice of righteous indignation against God's enemies is also heard, speaking in national rather than in individual tones." This may throw some light on the striking fact next to be alluded to.

f. While the Old Testament is characterized, as we have seen, by a spiritual conception of the highest good, the thought of existence after death is not directly brought to bear upon the moral life. Future eternal rewards are not presented, as is so commonly done in the New Testament, as motives of action or as a phase of the highest good. Several considerations render this peculiarity striking:

(1) The belief in immortality was so general throughout heathendom that the Israelites could scarcely have been ignorant of it.

(2) The high value which they put on personality, their constant emphasis of the freedom of the individual, would dispose them toward the general belief in existence beyond the grave.

(3) Such could hardly have failed to be their faith in view of the fact that they had lived for four centuries in Egypt, and that Moses had been educated in all the wisdom of this country, where precisely this thought of immortality most powerfully shaped the entire moral and religious life.

(4) Moreover, that such was the actual belief of Israel many passages indicate. For example: Gen. v. 24, xv. 15, xxv. 8, xxxvii. 35, Deut. xxxi. 16, xxxii. 50, 1 Sam. xxviii, Job xix. 26, 2 Kings ii, Ps. xvi. 10, xl ix. 15, Prov. xv. 24. Nor may it be said that we are incorrect in our interpretation of these texts. Our Lord, who is the one infallible expositor, so understood them. At least, He represents belief in immortality as belonging to the faith of those who had only the Old Testament for their guidance. The question, then, why the eternal rewards of the future did not enter into

the Old Testament conception of the highest good becomes both interesting and important.

The following suggestions towards its solution may not be out of place:

(1) As has been already pointed out, the people of Israel was a world-historical one as was no other ante-Christian people. The entire hope and striving of the nation was directed toward the ultimate salvation of the human race. Thus both their highest goal and their supreme good was the coming of the world's Messiah. Now this messianic thought, at first feeble, yet constantly growing more definite, could not but throw temporarily into the background the individual's interest in his own future life. The prospect of the advent on earth of the world's Deliverer would be so comprehensive and so glorious as to absorb his attention, as to tend to exclude all thought of what would come to him himself after death.

(2) The Redeemer had first to appear before the future life could have real worth for the individual saint or be his highest good. Before this event the existence beyond the grave was a beclouded one, not only for the consciousness, but also *per se*. Many passages show that it was not conceived as a truly blissful life in the presence of God: "In death there is no remembrance of thee: in the grave who shall give thee thanks?" (Ps. vi. 5); "The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence" (Ps. cxv. 17); "For the grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee: they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth" (Is. xxxviii. 18), etc. As Abraham rejoiced that he should see the day of the Lord, so also longed Abraham's seed for this day, only from which time forth they would seem to have thought that the life after death could be a truly blessed one. And we can see why this was. The New Testament clearly teaches that the bliss of heaven is to "be at home with the Lord." Now the Lord is not simply God; He is rather God incarnate, who "died for our sins and was raised again for our justification," and who "bone of our bone and flesh

of our flesh," as well as "the same in substance, equal in power and glory" with the Father, "ever liveth to make intercession for us." It is His infinitely sympathetic presence that will constitute heaven for us. Not, however, until Christ ascended victor over death and hell was this presence in heaven. It may not be wondered at, therefore, that it was the historical advent of the Messiah, the incarnate God, rather than the eternal rewards of the life to come that appealed most strongly to the Israelites of old. Christ's coming was necessary, not only to guarantee these rewards, but to give to them definite meaning and value.

(3) Though for the redeemed Christian the thought of a future eternal reward is a powerful and ordinarily a safe motive, for the not spiritually enlightened man there is in the same considerable danger. This will be that of selfish reward seeking, of a narrow-hearted striving after personal well-being rather than the salvation of humanity. Now, though the saints of the Old Covenant participated in many gracious gifts and so may not be regarded as merely natural men, still, they were not as yet fully enlightened. They would, therefore, be exposed to the danger referred to as the saints of the New Dispensation would not be. Moreover, because of the number and minuteness of the legal requirements to which they were subject, they were in greater danger of regarding their future salvation as a reward for their good works. The subsequent rise of Pharisaism evinced this. It was from this danger that God preserved the Israelites, in that, while He indeed promised them a gracious reward for their fidelity, He yet presented as such reward, on the one hand, only such temporal goods as most evidently could not be for the pious the highest good, and on the other hand, world-wide redemption, so that they were necessarily brought to the consciousness that the highest good was not the reward of their own at best poor works, but was the fruit of a future divine act of grace. These three considerations may explain, at least in part, the striking absence from Old Testament ethics of motives drawn from

the future life; why it is that its motives, even when most spiritual, are characteristically temporal.

There is a suggestive analogy between the attitude of the Old Testament toward personal immortality and that of the New Testament toward reunion with our friends in heaven. As emphasis on his own immortality would have taken the mind of the Israelite off of the coming of the Messiah, which after all was the chief thing and included also the other; so to put the emphasis for the Christian on his reunion with his dear ones in glory would take his mind off of union with Christ, which is the chief thing for him and involves his reunion with his dear ones who are in glory with Christ.

g. God can be truly obeyed only when His covenant promise which we have been considering is accepted. That is, the essence of Old Testament virtue is *faith*. From the nature of the case it could not have been otherwise. When God enters into covenant with any, confidence in Him must become their first and chief obligation. Under such circumstances, in view of what He is, the most self-sacrificing service would be only an insult, if He were not trusted absolutely. Hence, the covenant people of God trace their line back to him who was called "the father of the faithful" and "the friend of God" because at the divine call he hesitated not to leave his country and his kindred and his father's house, and, though not knowing whither he went, to go out in quest of a land that God had promised to him. So, too, as the people of God they named themselves, not Hebrews from their natural descent, nor yet from Abraham their spiritual father, nor from Isaac, nor indeed from Jacob's first name, but from his later God-given name, Israel, which he received after he had wrestled with the Angel and prevailed. Thus was intimated the sublime truth, not only that their ethical life, their obedience, was rooted in faith, but that their very faith was the gift of God. Their ability to do and to be what they ought to do and to be was not natural; it was a spiritual and gracious blessing. Jacob their progenitor is not regarded as such in his earlier self-willed and self-confiding life, but solely in his spiritually

transformed life, after that, in self-denying humility, having put off all self-righteousness, he had thrown himself in child-like faith at the feet of God and confided all his well-being to His blessing. Their true bearing toward God must be that of Jacob when he exclaimed: "I will not let thee go, except thou bless me." They must divest themselves of all mere naturalness and depend absolutely on their relation to God and His blessing on them. This was symbolized by the covenant-token of the people with God; viz., circumcision. The sign to them of the promise of the Messiah, it meant that their true life came, not from themselves, but from God.

h. Hence, as Old Testament Ethics begins by exalting God, so it ends by dignifying man. If it makes God absolutely supreme so that His mere word is the highest law, it bestows unique honor on man in calling him to be God's friend, to live by faith a life of constant communion with Him. Its conception of man, therefore, is that he is made in the divine image. Had he not been so created, the gift of faith could not have been given to him. Even God could not make a beast His friend; for the beast could not continue a beast and trust Him. The demand, therefore, made by God on man for faith presupposes in man by nature capacities like God's.

Nor is this conceived as true of Israel only. While the brotherhood of man appears less clearly in the Old Testament than in the New, it is, nevertheless, the fact that, more than the scriptures of any other religion, the Old Testament represents God as having "made of one blood all the nations of the earth." In at least three ways is this manifest:

(1) The origin of the race is ascribed to one pair, and propagation after the deluge is connected with a single family.

(2) The duty of sympathy and charity is based, not only on the fatherhood of God, but on the brotherhood of man, both in the Law and the Prophets. "Is it (the fast that I have chosen) not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked that thou cover him; and that thou hide

not thyself from thine *own* flesh?" (Is. lviii. 7, cf. Gen. ix. 4ff.).

(3) The reach of God's redeeming purpose embraces all families, as seen in the promise to Abraham already considered, and in the prophecies concerning the Gentiles. These, as Is. lvi. 6, include "the sons of the stranger" with the people of the Lord.

Thus, if the ethics of the Old Testament involved the conception of the Israelites as made in the divine image, it implied also that this is true of the race as such. Indeed, it is to the Word of God that we must go, if we would see most clearly the unique dignity of man. No greatness can equal that involved in his capacity of depending absolutely on the Most High.

i. The characteristic duty under the Old Testament is repentance. This means the "turning to God with grief and hatred from one's sins with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience." It is the necessary consequence of the Old Testament's conception of man as fallen. In such a condition, and even if no hope of salvation were held out, it would still be his first duty sorrowfully to acknowledge his transgression and earnestly to strive to amend his ways. Hence, it is that the last and greatest of the Prophets, he who sums up the Old Testament, could not have come otherwise than saying, "Repent ye." Even had he not heralded Him who is the propitiation for our sins, this must have been his characteristic message.

Such, then, in outline are the fundamentals of the Ethics of the Old Testament. Could we enter on its systematic exposition, we should find a development as beautiful and as significant as in the case of dogma. We should see, too, that while the ethics of the Pentateuch proceeds rather from the standpoint of law and duty, that of the Prophets starts out from the idea of goods; and that in Proverbs and the Wisdom Literature in general the controlling thought is of righteous expediency.

Nor would the progress and diversity of Old Testament

ethics be all that should claim our attention. The summary of the Moral Law in the Ten Commandments ought to receive extended and particular treatment. Especially should its application to the various ethical questions of modern life be discussed fully. What is meant by keeping the Sabbath holy? what is the honor due to parents from their children? how does the Sixth Commandment bear on capital punishment, on war, on suicide? what is the relation of the Seventh to divorce and to the social evil? what is the significance of the Eighth as regards property, communism, etc.? what constitutes a lie, and how far is mental reservation allowable? what has the Tenth Commandment to say to the modern multimillionaire? —these are but a few of the many practical and vital questions which even a partial discussion of the Decalogue must consider. Our limits forbid the consideration of them in this connection.¹

THE OBJECTIONS TO OLD TESTAMENT ETHICS

These appear in a variety of forms. They are presented sometimes courteously, sometimes offensively. For motive they have at one time the disparagement of the morality of the Old Dispensation in order to the exaltation of that of the New; at another, the exhibition of the God of the Bible as unethical and, therefore, false. Unbelievers make much of these objections. They dwell on them. They exaggerate them. For example, Mr. Mill says, "The Old Testament morality is barbarous, fit only for savages." Nor may it be denied that these difficulties often seem only too real to believers themselves. They find it hard to explain them away so as to satisfy others. They find it as hard, perhaps, so to explain them as to satisfy themselves. Dr. Geo. T. Ladd endorses the statement:

¹ The following books may be consulted:—Bruce: *The Ethics of the Old Testament*; Hodge: *Systematic Theology*, Vol. III, Chap. XIX, "The Law"; Boardman: *Lectures on the Ten Commandments*; Plummer: *The Law of God*; and especially so much of the "Longer Catechism" of *The Westminster Confession of Faith* as relates to the Ten Commandments.

"The Black Man of some shivering communistic savages is nearer the morality of our Lord than the Jehovah of Judges."² For these reasons, at least, these objections demand serious and candid consideration.

i. Before enumerating and discussing them separately, the following general principles, because involved more or less in the solution of most of them, should be stated, illustrated, and vindicated:

a. Every difficulty in the Old Testament, as elsewhere, ought to be considered in the light of its context. That is, an event which may seem to indicate a low ethical standard must be estimated, not as it is seen in its isolation, but as it appears when regarded as one of the long series of historical events to which it belongs. For example, if we were to read without any explanation that on a certain day in the city of New Castle in the state of Delaware a man had been seized, stripped to the waist, tied to a post in a public place, and given twenty-five lashes with a whip having nine lashes with three knots on each lash—if we were to read and consider only these particulars, we should be very likely to conclude that an act of outrageous cruelty had been committed and that the people of Delaware were decidedly barbarous. This judgment, however, would be reversed, when it was brought to our notice that this flogging was inflicted by a sheriff duly appointed, in accordance with an order of the court, and for the maintenance of justice; and especially when we were told that the man whose publicly inflicted suffering had so called forth our sympathy and our indignation was himself a bully and a sot who for years had amused himself with beating his wife. In view of all these facts, his scourging would be felt to be far from cruel, would be recognized as strictly just; and instead of denouncing the people of Delaware as barbarous, we should commend the vigor of their administration of justice.

Precisely so, there are many acts recorded in the Old Testament which impress us as inexpressibly cruel. When, however,

² *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 226.

we observe that these are performed by "the chosen people" as the servants of God, in accordance with His explicit commands, and for the vindication of His law; and especially when we reflect that these acts of punishment were called out by centuries of the most unrestrained and revolting wickedness,—we can scarcely fail to think differently, we are constrained even to exclaim, "The Lord is righteous in all His ways and holy in all His works." What would have been a great ethical difficulty, if viewed only by itself, is seen in the light of the context to uphold a high ethical standard. This principle is self-evidently just; and it cannot be too thoroughly grasped, too tenaciously held, or too frequently applied. It is the key to, perhaps, the majority of the difficulties in the ethics of the Old Testament.

b. That must not be regarded as immoral in the direct revelation of the Old Testament which would not be so regarded in the indirect but equally divine revelation of providence. The essential difference between the two cases is that in the former God is represented as acting immediately and personally; in the latter His action is through agents and instruments. In the Old Testament, for example, God is commonly set forth as Himself effecting or at least commanding the work of destruction. *He* brings the plagues upon Egypt, *He* overthrows the Egyptians in the midst of the Red Sea, *He* fights for Israel and destroys for them the Canaanites. Such things as these, however, take place again and again in the ordinary course of providence. Pestilence decimates peoples; tempests overwhelm fleets and thus, as in the case of the Spanish Armada, decide the destiny of nations; great kingdoms are stamped out as terribly as were the petty sovereignties of Palestine. In a word, essentially the same things are recorded in the Old Testament as in the book of providence. The difference is that in the former God either effects or commands them Himself or is represented as Himself controlling immediately the forces by which they are effected; whereas in providence His connection with the effect is not exhibited. This, however, does not warrant the inference that

there is not such a connection. On the contrary, we know that the forces of nature are the ministers of God, always under His control, ever doing His bidding. So far as accomplishing His sovereign purpose is concerned, it matters not whether He works naturally or supernaturally, mediately as in providence or immediately as He is so often represented in the Old Testament. In both cases, and in both equally, "He doeth according to His will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth." Must not, then, the responsibility of God be the same in the one instance as in the other? It is an old and a true saying, "Qui facit per alium facit per se." So far as the relation of God to events is not merely permissive—and certainly His relation to a large part of the events of providence is efficient—He may be said to be as truly the agent of the terrible works of providence as of the terrible works recorded in the Old Testament as His. If, therefore, immorality may be charged on it because of these works, must not the course of providence itself be regarded in like manner as immoral? And if, because of our theistic faith we do not regard, and, as a matter of fact, because of the constitution of our nature, cannot normally regard the course of providence as immoral, how can we view the essentially similar action of God described in the Old Testament?

c. In the sphere of all that is above reason as distinguished from what is contrary to reason, what God is observed to do in the course of providence rather than what we may think that He ought to do should be the test of morality or immorality in the Old Testament as elsewhere.⁸ This is not so much a new principle as the positive aspect of the one just stated. For example, it seems to many iniquitous that the innocent family of Achan, who stole of the spoils of Jericho, should have been stoned and burned; and it appears to them to convict God of immorality that this was done by His command. Indeed, the natural judgment of man is that every one should stand or fall on his own merits only. This, however,

⁸ *Vide* Origen, Berkeley, Butler.

providence shows, is not the only basis on which God deals with us. The race has been so constituted, and has been so constituted by Him, that we cannot but be largely affected and our destiny materially influenced by our family relations. There is no drag on a good man so terrible as a bad family. His existence with such an incubus upon him will be a living death. There is no advantage to a bad man so great as that of a good family. Because of them he will escape in this life many of the natural consequences of his evil deeds. It has been appointed, therefore, that to a considerable degree men shall prosper or suffer, not merely according to their own merits, but according to their family relations ; and this appointment, inasmuch as it is that of providence, we may not question, is also that of God.

Again, society has been so constituted, and has been so constituted by God, that we cannot but be largely affected and our destiny materially influenced by our national relations. The idle and vicious, though utterly undeserving, share the prosperity of the nation to which they belong. The good citizen, though abhorring and resisting the corruption in the administration of his government, suffers equally with the bad from the consequences of it. The nation, like the family, has, then, a life of its own ; and the individuals who make up the nation participate in its life and stand or fall, not merely on their own merits, but also as the nation fulfils its mission or fails in it. In the life to come each individual will, we are taught, be rewarded strictly "according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad," but we see that in this life the reward is determined largely by family and national relations. We see, too, that these relations, since they condition character and conduct now, must affect indirectly even the reward of individual character and conduct hereafter. Nor may we question that the appointment that all this should be so, inasmuch as it is that of providence, is also that of God.

However unjust, therefore, it may seem to us that the innocent family of Achan should have shared his punishment, this is only what we observe taking place constantly in the

ordinary course of providence. The most virtuous are again and again destroyed by the sins of their family and overwhelmed in the ruin of their nation. We do not understand the nature of the family or of the national bond sufficiently to say why this is so, it is above reason; but we know that it is so, and that God has appointed that it should be so.

Now what we would make plain is that it is by these clearly divine because providential appointments that we should test the morality or immorality of the appointments alleged in the Old Testament to be divine. We should, for example, decide that, so far from there being anything immoral in the Old Testament's representing God as commanding that the innocent family of Achan should share his punishment, this is only what should be expected from the fact that the observed and undoubted providential government of God is evidently being administered on the same principle. That is, what we see that God is doing, and not what we think that He ought to do, should be the test of what He ought to do; His action rather than our moral sense should give the standard of right; unless our view of His providence can be shown necessarily to contradict our fundamental moral judgments as implanted by Him and as shaped by reflection on His own declared nature, the former should determine our moral judgments rather than the latter sit in judgment on His providence. In a word, in the large domain of all that is above reason, for example, the family bond and the national relation, as distinguished from what is contrary to reason, what we *see* God doing rather than what we ourselves or ourselves think that He ought to do should determine our moral judgment. That is, our intuition of goodness is concrete and objective. It is an intuition of God Himself. Goodness is what God is. For this there are the following sufficient reasons:

(1) The analogy of Dogmatics. If we would reach truth in it, we may not ask, What do we feel that God must be? nor even, What does reason say that He must be? On the contrary, we shall go hopelessly astray, unless we begin our inquiry by asking honestly, What does the infallible Word

of God say that He is? or, if we do not believe in special and written revelation, What have the works of creation and providence to declare as to the character of their Author? Then we may begin to infer and so develop our knowledge of God's character out of these particular manifestations of Himself in special revelation or in nature; but to reason out *a priori*, as so many do, as we are all disposed to do, what God must be, is simply to make for ourselves a god out of ourselves and no better than ourselves.

Now why should this be true in dogmatics and not be true also in ethics? These are not two independent sciences; but Christian Ethics is a department of Christian Theology. Though differing widely in subject-matter from the other department, Christian Dogmatics, it is identical with it in this, that the subject-matter in both is determined ultimately by the nature of God. The duty which He requires of us, the subject of ethics, depends no less on what God is than does what we are to believe concerning Him, the subject of dogmatics; and the one involves the other. Indeed, in one sense, the dependence of the former is more absolute, if we may be permitted the expression. The depth of God's nature, the essence of His essence, is the ethical. As Dorner says: "The ethical principle is the ultimate reason for the fact that God eternally wills Himself, or is the ground of Himself in all His attributes."⁴ Now, as it is of this that the duty which He may require of us is the practical expression, it will follow that these requirements which mark the sphere of ethics, are and can be determined only by that which in a special sense is most fundamentally unique even in God. More, therefore, in ethics than in dogmatics even must what God is seen to do test what is affirmed of Him in written revelation, must His requirements as observed in providence decide the morality or the immorality of the appointments alleged to proceed from Him by the Old Testament.

(2) The justice of this principle becomes more evi-

⁴ *Ethics*, p. 65.

dent in view of the perverting and blinding effect of sin. Even if by nature man had the ability to say what God might require of man, he could not but have forfeited this right when he fell; for in his fall he lost the ability on which the exercise of the right must have depended. Could it have been otherwise in view of the facts, that sin darkens the intellect—man has not now that clear perception of truth that the un-fallen Adam had; that sin gives a bias to the will against the truth—even when it is accurately perceived there is an endeavor to get rid of it unless it be agreeable; that sin weakens the power even of intuition itself—hence, first principles, though innate, often continue quite undeveloped and unnoticed; and that it is a part of the punishment of sin that God frequently withdraws for a time common grace—thus there may be little or no attention to ethical truth? For a sinner, therefore, to let his own corrupt moral sense determine that an alleged appointment of God involves God in immorality simply because he himself does not approve of the appointment and in spite of the fact that other observed and acknowledged similar appointments of God vindicate the divinity and morality of the former, is irrational. It is as absurd as if one with a perverted aesthetic taste were to affirm that a given statue could not be by Phidias because he himself did not like it, and that, too, though another statue which he admitted was by the great Athenian revealed the same characteristics, and particularly the same offensive ones.

(3) The necessity as well as the justice of the principle under consideration appears in this, that the ultimate standard of right is, as we have seen that it must be, the divine nature. It being this, God's action cannot but be a more trustworthy interpretation of it than our opinion. In all other cases we would reason thus. We should decide that a man's life and works should determine our estimate of his character rather than that our judgment of what his character ought to be should do so. In a word, so long as the standard of right is objective to us, any revelation that it may make of *itself* will have more authority than any judgment of ours as to the

kind of revelation that it ought to make. This is due to the necessity of the case.

(4) Nor is there force in the objection which at first seems to be pertinent at this point; viz., that if we cannot trust our intuitions to tell us what God ought to be and to require of us, neither can we trust them, as we have done, to make known to us the divine nature as the ultimate standard of right. Because a faculty cannot do everything, it does not follow that it cannot do anything. Because your untrained eye cannot discern and appreciate the particular beauties of the Parthenon, it does not follow that it will not single out the Parthenon as the most glorious object at Athens. In like manner, because, in consequence of the infinitude of God, even if not in consequence of the deterioration of our faculties through sin, we cannot "find out God unto perfection," cannot harmonize His attributes, cannot explain His providence, cannot feel the ethical consistency of all His actions—it does not follow that we cannot perceive Him at once and of necessity to be the God of the world and the norm of the whole ethical creation. Just because of His infinitude and in spite of the deterioration of our powers, He must be this and we could not fail to discern it; and just because He is this, the very intuition which revealed Him to us as such must, it would seem, reveal Him also as one who could be known fully and accurately only so far as, before us and in forms level to our apprehension, He should Himself illustrate His attributes. Is it not thus in common things? How often do we feel that what impresses our senses most so impresses us largely because it is seen to be beyond our own comprehension. Again and again, the very faculties which make known to us the *existence* of a mystery make it known to us *as a mystery*. Why, then, may it not be so in the case of our innate idea of God? Because we may not from it reason out by ourselves His character and what He may require of us, it does not follow from this that we should distrust it as the basis of our belief that God exists, of our judgment that His nature is the ultimate standard of right.

Beyond this, it should be observed that our intuitions themselves *are* as trustworthy in what they tell us of the nature of God as in the assurance that they give of His existence. It is not the fact that they are to be depended on as to the latter, but doubted as to the former. They make known only necessary truth, truth which, if known at all, must be known truly. Even sin, therefore, has not perverted their discernment. What it has done is greatly to lessen it. What is recognized as really self-evidently, necessarily, universally, and persistently true is true, whether it relates to the existence of God or to the nature of God or to the constitution of things. The difficulty is that, because of sin, much less of such truth is discerned, and much of what is discerned is not appreciated. The real state of the case is, not that intuition deceives us as to what should be expected from providence, but that genuine intuition seldom now contemplates the details of providence. The objection under consideration derives its force, therefore, only from confounding intuition with what is not strictly intuition, that faculty on which we base our belief in God with mere inference or feeling that is radically distinct and much inferior.

d. The moral precepts of the Old Testament, as of the New, differ radically as to their ground, and any just estimate of the morality of either dispensation will depend fundamentally on the appreciation of these differences.

(1) There are laws which are founded on the nature of God directly. To this class belong the commands to speak the truth, to love God supremely, to be just, to be merciful, to be kind, etc. In these laws God requires us to be what He Himself is and because He Himself is so; and inasmuch as He is and must be "the same yesterday and to-day and forever," these laws can never cease to bind and can change in no respect. Their criterion is that they are absolutely immutable and indispensable. Any variation in them would imply a change in the nature of God, in that which is essentially immutable. Hence, truth always and everywhere must be obligatory; love always and everywhere must be a duty; justice al-

ways and everywhere must bind ; pride, envy, and malice always and everywhere must be evil. And "always" and "everywhere" in this connection are taken in their widest application. They embrace eternity as well as time; heaven and hell, the universe, as truly as the earth. The laws that I have been describing always have bound and always will bind all rational creatures, angels and devils as really as men. Could God Himself wish it otherwise, which is impossible because of His nature, He could not have it so : His same immutable nature would stand in the way. Any representation of God, therefore, as countenancing a lie, as approving pride or envy, as calling on men to act from a malicious or cruel spirit, are not only immoral, but absurd. They represent God as doing what He cannot do just because He is *God*. Consequently, if the Old Testament did set forth God in any such light as this, it would be vain to try to defend its morality, nay, we should have to admit its absurdity.

(2) A second class of moral laws includes those which are founded on the permanent relations of men in their present state of existence, or, as it is often put, on "the constitution of things." Such are the moral as opposed to statute laws concerning property, marriage, and the duties of parents and children, of superiors and inferiors. A moral law is one which is binding in its own nature ; that is, one which, because of what it is, ought to be a statute, and which would bind whether it were made a statute or not. A statute law, on the other hand, is one which binds only because it has been enacted by competent authority and which would cease to bind at any time if repealed by competent authority.

Now these laws which we are considering, like those under the first head, are moral. Their authority is in themselves. They do not bind us primarily because they have been enacted ; but if they had not been enacted, it would be obligatory on us to observe them and to enact them. Though they concern us only in our present state of being, they are and must be permanent so long as the relations which they contemplate continue. So long as there is the distinction of sex, they will and must bind

men as men and women as women. So long as there are parents and children, they will and must bind parents as parents and children as children. So long as man is what he is, so long as his divinely appointed development depends on his having what is exclusively his own, the right of property will exist and ought to be recognized. These laws, therefore, though not founded, like those considered under the former head, on the essential nature of God, are like them moral, or in themselves binding, because founded on the nature of things; that is, on the constitution which God has seen fit to ordain. On the one hand, consequently, they are not necessarily eternal or eternally immutable. God need not have ordained the constitution He did ordain; and if He had not, the right of property, for example, would not have existed. We have no reason to believe that the constitution of all worlds is the same as that of ours, and so there may be worlds in which there is no such thing as property. We know that the constitution of our world will be changed at the coming of the Lord, and, perhaps, we ourselves may look forward to a time when the distinction of mine and thine will be no more. But on the other hand, these laws are moral and so in themselves binding so long as the present constitution of things continues. Unlike His own nature, God can change it; but until *He* does change it, those that live under it must be bound by the laws that are implied in it and grow out of it. This is only another way of stating the self-evident principle that everything should be true to its own nature and so should be determined by it, inasmuch as God is the author of its nature.

Between these precepts and those discussed under the former head there is, however, as has just been implied, a difference of great importance if we would estimate aright the ethical character of the Old Testament. The former, those grounded on the nature of God, even He may not, as we have seen, set aside or change. Were He to be represented as doing so, the representation would be both immoral and absurd. For example, to set forth God as commanding untruth would be to

set Him forth as commanding what would be both wrong and in His case impossible; for He is essentially immutable truth. The precepts, however, which are now under consideration, those founded on the existing constitution of things, such as the moral laws of property, of marriage, of obedience to parents,—these, though they may not be set aside by us, may be set aside by the authority of God. Thus it was not wrong for the Hebrews to spoil the Egyptians or to dispossess the Canaanites, because He whose is the earth and the fulness thereof authorized those acts. He had a right to take the property of one people and give it to another. The extermination of the idolatrous inhabitants of the promised land at the command of Joshua was as much an act of God as though it had been effected by pestilence or famine. It was a judicial execution by the supreme Ruler. In like manner, although marriage as instituted by God was and is an indissoluble covenant between one man and one woman, yet He saw fit to sanction under the Mosaic law, within certain limitations, both polygamy and divorce. While that sanction continued those things were lawful; when it was withdrawn they ceased to be allowable. That is, while the existing constitution of things must in and of itself bind those living under it just because it is God's order of things, God, inasmuch as He ordained it, can and may modify it and release from its implications when He pleases, provided always that He does this in consistency with His own immutably holy nature: that circumstances may arise in which and because of which the very righteousness of God may demand a modification of the requirements of the constitution of things appears in the fact that sin has entered into it and changed its conditions: and, therefore, the many passages in the Old Testament which represent God as modifying the requirements of the constitution of things are not immoral. This is only saying that the author of a constitution has authority over it.

e. As is implied in what has just been said, what would be wrong if done on one's own authority may become right when commanded by competent authority. For example, to kill a

man intentionally, unless in self-defense or war, is murder ; but when the sheriff, in accordance with an order of the court, hangs a man, he does not commit murder, he simply does his duty. In like manner, though it would be murder if the church of to-day were to put heretics to death, it was not murder, but a clear performance of duty, when Samuel hewed Agag to pieces before the Lord. And the reason is that whereas the Christian magistrate now has no authority forcibly to suppress idolatry and false religion, *God* required him to do this under the Old Dispensation. Nor may it be urged that God had not the right to make this requirement. Though, as we saw under the last head, human life ought to be regarded by us as sacred because its sacredness is involved in the existing order of things, God, the ordainer of this constitution, is not bound by it. On the contrary, the giver of life, *He* may recall it when and how He pleases, provided only that He act consistently with His holy nature. This is what He does in the case of the death of every one. It is a right which He is constantly exercising and of which, therefore, even were there no other reason, we should, in accord with our third principle recently expounded, say that He ought to exercise it.

f. We should never forget the preparatory character and disciplinary purpose of the ethics of the Old Testament.

(1) This does not mean that, as some apologists have claimed, God might do or command or sanction what was wrong. Though the Old Dispensation was essentially preparatory and disciplinary, this might not be. Even we would not think it right to lie or to approve thieving or to enjoin cruelty, in our intercourse even with children. Indeed, just because they were children and so were in training, would we feel ourselves under special obligation to set examples of rectitude and to require it. How much more, then, must God, even in the earlier dispensation, and we may say particularly in it, reveal Himself as absolutely perfect and as satisfied only with what is strictly right. As Dr. Vos has well said : "The truth of revelation, if it is to retain its divine and absolute character at all, must be perfect *from the beginning*. Biblical

Theology deals with it as a product of a supernatural activity, and is therefore bound by its own principle to maintain the perfection of revealed truth in *all its stages.*⁵ The objection, consequently, that the morality of the Old Testament is low and barbarous is not answered by saying, as so many do say, that such morality was all that was called for by a low and barbarous age. God cannot be other than "righteous in all His ways and holy in all His works," and to admit that He can be is to undeify Him.

(2) The preparatory character and disciplinary purpose of the ethics of the Old Testament do, however, imply:

(a) That it need not be and, indeed, may not be *complete*. The most righteous father does not expect his little children to be and to do all that he is and does. On the contrary, because they are little children and he would train them in virtue, he sets before them at first only so much of his standard as they as children can hope to reach. He does not, because of their immaturity, lower his own standard, but he does refrain from directing their attention to those features of his character which are too high for them to appreciate. He insists that the principle of their conduct shall be the same as his, but he does not look for nearly so wide and extended an outworking of the principle.

Now why should it be otherwise in the case of the absolutely holy Father of us all? While He may never reveal Himself as other than perfectly righteous, why may He not in the childhood of our race emphasize only those features of His righteousness which would be more readily understood and imitated? He must always be the God of love; but why may He not at first so reveal Himself as to call attention chiefly to His love for His chosen people, a form of love the most easily appreciated by them and so the best fitted to prepare for its higher because universalistic manifestations? He must always insist on a righteousness which extends, as we have seen that that of the Old Testament does, to "the thoughts

⁵ In his "Inaugural Address."

and intents of the heart"; but why may not His earlier precepts, as is also true of the Old Dispensation, relate mainly to external conduct?

Nor may we reason from analogy only. Progressive revelation our Saviour declares to be the divine method of making known the truth. "I have yet," said He to His disciples, "many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when He the Spirit of truth is come, He will guide you into all truth." Moreover, though we had not this explicit statement, the Bible as a whole would bear the same testimony. It is a development from beginning to end. If, on the one hand, we are bound to maintain the perfection of revealed truth in all its stages; on the other, it is evidently set forth with ever increasing clearness and fullness. That is, there is constant advance in revelation; and this advance, in the words again of Dr. Vos, "resembles the organic process, through which out of the perfect germ the perfect plant and flower and fruit are successively produced." Thus, full truth is not given until the end, and it is prepared for by the elemental truth made known at the beginning. Now if this be true of dogmatics, why should it not be of ethics also? It must be. Dogmatics and ethics are equally parts of the one revelation of God. They must, therefore, be controlled alike by the same principle. Not only, consequently, does analogy suggest that the divine preparatory and disciplinary revelation of ethics would properly be elementary and so incomplete, but this progressive character is of the very essence of divine revelation. We may wonder why this should be. It may seem strange to us that God should not have created the world fully developed, or that He should not at once make men "perfect in holiness"; but inasmuch as it has pleased Him to accomplish His eternal purpose gradually, to a large degree naturally, generally through ordinary means, we may not question the wisdom or righteousness of there being preparatory and disciplinary dispensations or of the revelation in these of ethical as well as of dogmatic truth being elementary and, consequently, incomplete. Only thus can there be progress. In a word, only

thus can the method which God has chosen of administering the universe be followed out. Indeed, the objection that the Old Testament can not be from God because its morality is elementary and incomplete, necessitates the objection that the scheme of nature cannot be from Him because it looks forward to special revelation and is entirely inadequate without it.

(b) That the ethics of the Old Testament is preparatory in character and disciplinary in purpose implies also that ethical principles may express themselves truly, though in the rudest forms, and that God may and should call for such rude but true expressions of virtue when higher ones are not possible. Thus the sacrifice of Isaac was a splendid exhibition of faith on Abraham's part. It is so referred to in Scripture. It was a conspicuously magnificent performance of the first duty of one who would be "the friend of God." Yet it was at the same time a barbarous performance. It shocks our better feelings. We cannot conceive of God as tolerating it now, and still less as commanding it. Nor would He do so to-day. In view of what we have come to know of Him through His progressive revelation of Himself, He would not now require what He did demand of Abraham. To do so would be to contradict His own revelation. This, however, does not affect the real nature of Abraham's act. Though the thing attempted was barbarous, the attempt expressed sublime faith. It was, moreover, an expression of faith which it was right for God to require. Otherwise, we must admit that He may not command virtue unless He can secure a complete manifestation of it. The fallacy of this principle, however, is evident. Were it sound, a father might not tell his child to show his love for him by destroying a certain valuable plaything. Because the right of property does not include the right of destruction, it is true that the father in calling on his child to show his love for him and confidence in him by destroying his property would be calling on him for an expression of virtue so rude as to deny the right of property. It would, however, be an expression of genuine love and

confidence, and it would be a legitimate one. It would be so because it was the highest of which the child was capable. What has he been told of property rights? How much could he understand with reference to them, had he been instructed? An expression of love and confidence, therefore, without reference to these rights is the highest that he can make. Is it not one, therefore, that he ought to make? Is it not one that he ought to be called on to make? Is not the father bound at every stage of his child's development to insist on the highest manifestation of virtue on the part of the child of which the latter is capable? Will not the very primitiveness and defectiveness of the child's conceptions only make it the more the parent's duty to call for such love, such confidence, such other virtue, as the little one, in spite of his ignorance and even by means of it, can render?

It is not otherwise in the case that has been cited, that of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. In devoting his son to death at the command of God, Abraham acted as if he had absolute power over his boy and so might do with him precisely as he chose. Here is the key to this very difficult narrative. Abraham shared in the views of his age; and these were totally lacking in any true idea of the individuality of man, any adequate conception of him as an independent person—a substantial being in himself whose life was his own. "To the ancient, man always figures as an appendage to somebody—the subject to the monarch, the son to the father, the wife to the husband, the slave to the master." Abraham, therefore, in common with the men of his day, felt that he had the right to sacrifice his son; for he owned him. He felt, too, that God had the right to demand this sacrifice of him; inasmuch as it was one that he had the right to make. In view of his time and environment he could have known no better. Had God revealed to him the sublime truth of the personality of the soul, it is questionable whether he could have appreciated it. It has taken thousands of years of divine discipline and revelation to develop the consciousness of this fact, and even yet it is far from being universally or completely developed. The

question, therefore, comes down to this: Should God have let Abraham's faith and love go unexpressed and so undeveloped because, in consequence of the ruling ideas of his age, he could not in the expression of the virtues just named, duly regard the rights of personality; or should he not rather have called for the expression of these virtues, and so have caused even Abraham's ignorance of these rights to praise Him by becoming the occasion of a sublime act of consecration? It is thus that He does in the case of the sinful wrath of men. History illustrates this as clearly as revelation declares it. Much more, then, may He not and should He not do so in the case of the innocent ignorance of His devoted children? Nor may it be replied that God might have called on Abraham for the sacrifice of something that he had the right to sacrifice. This, however, in the case under consideration, would not have answered the purpose. God's design was to call forth the highest expression of faith and love of which His servant was capable, and so one that could be typical of the life to be lived by the innumerable multitude of the faithful who should be blessed in him. Such an expression, however, could be made only with reference to what was most precious to Abraham. Now this was his son Isaac, his heir, he in whom was to be fulfilled the covenant promise. Circumstanced, therefore, as Abraham was, no other sacrifice than that of Isaac would meet the divine purpose; and yet this sacrifice was one that would not have been made and would not have been demanded but for the ignorance of that age of the rights of personality. In demanding this sacrifice, therefore, God was simply requiring the highest praise to Himself of which innocent ignorance was capable; and this, as we have seen, He ought to do.

Why He should leave men for ages in ignorance of the rights and duties involved in the constitution of society,—this may be mysterious; but inasmuch as He has, in His infinite wisdom, done this, then, so long as He does not, as in this case He does not, violate a moral precept founded on His own essentially immutable nature, He is bound to work even the

ignorance for all that it is worth. Only thus, it would seem, things being as they are, could ignorance be dispelled, men be developed, their ruling ideas be elevated, the coming of the Messiah be prepared for, the race be redeemed, the counsels of eternity be fulfilled. In a word, it is essentially involved in the divine plan that ethical principles may express themselves truly, though in rude forms; and that God may and should call for such rude expressions of virtue when higher ones are not possible. *This is the condition of the higher becoming possible.*

Let me sum up in the words of Canon J. B. Mozley: "Never again, indeed, while the world lasts, can that act be done within the Church of God: but that it has been done is the wealth of the Church and of mankind; and is the fruit of the spiritual policy of that Great Being who has educated the world, and who has worked to the highest advantage every step in the moral progress of mankind."⁶

(c) As would seem to be contained in what has just been said, that the ethics of the Old Testament is preparatory in character and disciplinary in purpose implies, further, that the *kind* of obedience which God ought to require now He need not and, indeed, should not have demanded under the earlier dispensation.

This does not mean that the standard of right and so the divine nature changes. It does mean that it is eternally and immutably right that the demands made on a person or on an age by the standard should be proportioned to the development of the person or of the age. The Sabbath can be kept holy only by being devoted strictly to sacred as distinguished from secular uses. This is the unchanging law. Surely, however, a wise parent would not expect his child to keep the Sabbath in the same *way* in which he does. While he would feel that the law bound his child just as much as it did himself, he would feel, too, that sacred did not mean for the child just

⁶ *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages* (1877). Lecture II, "The Sacrifice of Isaac" (pp. 62f.).

what it did for himself; that the little one's observance of the day might be holy, though not nearly so spiritual as his ought to be; that because of the difference in their development it would be wrong for him to expect of his boy in this particular what he would and should exact of himself; and that were he to do otherwise, he would give his son a false impression of the beneficence and blessedness of the Sabbath law and thus, so far from securing developing regard for it and an ever more comprehensive observance of it, would make it either a "yoke of bondage" or a dead letter.

Now God is the best of fathers. He is infinitely wiser than the wisest of parents. May we doubt, then, that His treatment of us will be similar to that outlined above? Of course, right is right the world over and the same in one age that it is in another. Of course, too, however, the quality as well as the extent of its claim must depend on our capacity to appreciate the claim. That cannot be a duty for us which we are not sufficiently developed to be able to feel to be a duty. In like manner, as we saw, God might not blame Abraham for not recognizing Isaac's rights as a person; for Abraham lived in an age of such low attainments that he could not be expected to have discerned these rights. Just so, the sanctity of marriage ought to be insisted on always and everywhere. Nor is this done less emphatically in the Old Testament than in the New. The form, however, in the two is different. In the New Testament monogamy is invariably required. Men had then been developed up to an appreciation of this as the perfect relation. In the Old Testament a regulated polygamy was at times sanctioned. Men were not able then to bear the higher teaching of the New Testament on this subject. Nor would they ever have been able to bear it, had it been imposed on them without exception from the beginning. The claims of right must be urged gradually as men develop, if they are to be developed so as to meet its claims fully. Things being as they are, it would be the destruction of practical morality, were the right to be insisted on from the first in all its spirituality, or even, as we have seen, in all its comprehensiveness.

In a word, law is always and everywhere the same: but it means more to the man than it does to the child; and if it is to mean to the man what it ought to, it may not be expected to mean to the child what it does to the man.

Nor is this reasoning liable to the objection that it opens the way for lowering the standard of right. It has no reference whatever to raising or lowering it. It insists, on the contrary, that the standard is always the same, and that perfect conformity to its demands is invariably the requirement. It claims only that no one may be expected to realize that in the standard which he cannot, so far as his mental *capacity* or his *opportunity* is concerned, appreciate; and the only legitimate conclusion from it all is that, while we should hold up the same standard, we ought not to try to exact from all the same spirituality of conformity. This is only saying that the light in which it is given to men to see the standard ought to determine our estimate of the claim on them of the standard. That is, as Julius Müller has shown in his great work on *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*,⁷ law and duty are not synonymous. The former is immutable; the latter varies according to capacity and opportunity.

g. Commendation of a character need not imply commendation of every element of that character. Because we admire Daniel Webster it does not follow that we approve the intemperance in drink into which he sometimes fell. Why, then, should it be otherwise in our interpretation of the Old Testament? Because David, one of its most glorious figures, was guilty of adultery, what right have we to claim that it sanctions adultery? Because it exalts Abraham as "the father of the faithful" and he was guilty of deception, what right have we to say that it approves deception? Should we not rather infer that it calls attention to his faith, notwithstanding his deception? Are we not bound so to interpret a book which declares strongly and formally against both adultery and deception? Otherwise, we make it contradict itself, and

⁷ Vol. I, p. 67.

the presumption always is that of two interpretations that which maintains consistency is the more probable. Indeed, the principle that we are justifying would seem to be self-evidently true. It amounts simply to this, that a character or an action may be mixed; and because there is bad in it, it does not follow that the good cannot be discriminated or should not be praised.

h. We should not expect to resolve everything mysterious in connection with the ethics of the Old Testament. Less even than in the case of the evidences of Christianity may we hope to remove all difficulties. In the last analysis, God must always be, not only unknown, but unknowable. This is the latest utterance of science. It is the highest conclusion of philosophy. It is the positive teaching of revelation. All unite in asking: "Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know" (Job xi. 7, 8). It must be so. God would not be God, were He not the Infinite; and He could not be the Infinite, were He not, and must He not be, forever beyond the comprehension of the finite. Inasmuch, then, as the ethical is the very essence of His essence, should we not expect that in the revelation which He has made of His ethical nature there should be and should always be difficulties which we could not explain? And because ethical truth is so much more practical and, therefore, touches us so much oftener and so much more closely than dogmatic truth, as, for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity, should we not anticipate that the difficulties involved in the former would oppress us more than those arising out of the latter? Indeed, it would be a far greater difficulty, a much deeper mystery, were it otherwise.

Princeton.

WM. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

(TO BE CONCLUDED)

ALLEGED DEVELOPMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING ON THE RESURRECTION

The recent intense occupation with the significance of the Spirit for the structure of the Pauline eschatology has in many respects enriched our knowledge of the subject. At the same time, and offsetting as it were this benefit, it has given rise to certain efforts from the critical side to work out a scheme of development for the Apostle's convictions and expectations as to the resurrection. The resulting views are so radical and deep-cutting, as to have modified in the mind of their supporters not only this one important point but the entire organism of the Pauline teaching. Into these theories and their supposed basis this article proceeds briefly to look.

As just intimated, the idea of the Spirit is made the starting-point and the propelling power of this evolution both in its particular and in its general aspect. Once adopted it is then turned into a search-light throwing its luminous beams on all the high mountain tops of the Apostle's world-view. It de-Judaizes and to not a small extent Hellenizes his Christian thought. The development thus assumed is not, however, like the normal progress that might have been expected in one who once testified concerning himself: "When I was a child I spake as a child . . . now that I have become a man, I have put away childish things" (1 Cor. xiii. 11). It is rather welcomed as a development consisting in the elimination of error, each successive stage of belief contradicting the preceding stage, and in turn being superseded by the following one. The stages in this evolutionary construction and the forces back of them are counted as follows:

The *first* stage of this development is found by these critics in the First Epistle to the Thessalonians.¹ It contains an as yet purely-Jewish form of eschatological belief, differing from the Jewish only in being centered around the Person of Jesus. Like *Apoc. Bar.* 1. 2 it assumes that God will raise the dead,

¹ 2 Thess. is not taken account of in this theory on account of its assumed unauthenticity.

nihil immutans in figura eorum. Paul, we are told, at the time of writing this Epistle, and during his previous preaching, believed that the bodies would be brought up from the grave in the same condition they had when laid therein. The main purpose of his preaching this doctrine to the Thessalonians was to reassure them that those who had recently died would be on the same footing with themselves at the moment of the parousia. Hence nothing is said about the change in the living at that point. The fact of the decomposition of the body in the grave did not trouble Paul, because he took for granted that the time until the parousia would be very short!

The *second* form of the development is represented by the First Epistle to the Corinthians. If the Thessalonians-stage can be called pre-pneumatic, this next one is characterized by the influence exerted by the *pneuma*-idea. Here the pneumatic eschatology begins. Paul now expects the resurrection to bring about a vast change in the rising body, and expects its occurrence at the very moment of rising. The pneumatic-transformation-idea virtually becomes a part of the resurrection-idea itself. Nor was this conception made possible only by the introduction of the *pneuma*-factor; it became inevitable so soon as the *Pneuma*, whose very function consists in transformation, was closely joined to the event of the resurrection. The Spirit would have denied his own nature, as in very essence a transforming agent, had He been contented with the purely objective task of bringing forth the dead, without effecting a creative change in the somatic substance, which in the resurrection He operates upon. Further, the new man consisting as to his essence in spirit, and the *sarx*, the very opposite of spirit, having its seat in the body, the prime necessity for such a fundamental act as the resurrection can from the nature of the case consist in nothing else than the elimination of the "sarkic" body. This, of course, means the cutting off in reality of all connection between the present body and the body of the resurrection, although it is admitted that this last consequence of the modified view is not in so many words drawn by Paul. Although on such a view the

real continuity lies in the *pneuma*, and no longer in the body, the Apostle nevertheless continues to assign the resurrection to the moment of the parousia. This, we are told, was an instance of inconsistency. It fitted only into the mechanical system of Judaism as exhibited in his own previous position of 1 Thessalonians. The inconsistency necessarily led on to the development of the third position.

This *third* position is based on the observation on the part of Paul, that the Spirit being present in the believer from the beginning of his Christian life, there existed in reality no ground, why his crowning work should be postponed till the moment of the parousia, which, no matter whether Paul thought it distant or near, involved an element of objectionable retardation. The moment of resurrection was now placed at the believer's death. Be it noted, however, that the resurrection placed at that moment savored in no respect of the diluted modern spiritualisation so largely favored in certain circles. It was not to his mind the mere entrance upon a superior incorporeal state, but the entrance upon a better *embodied* state, as refined and spiritualized as that expected during his second period, only no longer postponed till a later point, but immediately accorded in *articulo mortis*. There is, then, no discarding of the resurrection-idea here, but only the remodelling of it on a new basis. This third conviction is found reflected in the remarkable passage, 2 Cor. v. 1-8. It also finds recognition in certain statements of Romans and Colossians. Apart from the logical motivation above stated the impulse towards embracing it arose from the Apostle's experience of the danger of death he had repeatedly incurred in his missionary labors. Hitherto he had believed in such an acute nearness of the Lord's coming as to afford reasonable hope for a life prolonged to that point. Now reckoning seriously with a previous death, he had to reconsider his resurrection-belief in adjustment to it. And it was under the emotion aroused by the thought of the pre-parousia-death, and particularly the inevitably ensuing interval of "nakedness," i.e., the existence of the soul without a covering body, that he found refuge within

this new construction of things. Nakedness could be prevented, if at the very moment wherein the old body slipped off a new somatic garment were produced and put on in order to take its place. It seemed even possible to add to this view the belief in the preëxistence of the new body, as held ready antecedently in heaven, and put to its predestined use at the very moment of the believer's death. In accordance with this new construction he speaks, we are told, in Rom. viii. 19, not of the glorification of the sons of God, but of the *revelation* of the sons of God, an expression adapted to suggest that the glory of God's children already exists and waits only to be manifested. Similarly in Col. iii. 4 the statement occurs that when Christ, who is our life, shall be manifested, the Colossians also shall be *manifested in glory*.

Still a *fourth* standpoint is attributed to Paul, according to which he in certain connections implies the genesis and development of a somatic organism *within the believer* during the course of the *present* life, whilst the earthly body is still upon him. This, however, differs from the preceding stages enumerated in that it does not follow them as something attained in chronological sequence replacing a belief held before. It occurs in Epistles which at the same time reflect one or the other of the previous standpoints. According to 2 Cor. iv. 17 the "weight of glory" is wrought for the believer while he is still in the present state, and according to iii. 18 in the same context, the "transformation into the image of the Lord from glory to glory" takes place gradually here and now as the words themselves suggest. Consistently carried out this would, of course, have led to a considerable modification of what the new exegesis finds in v. 1ff., as above formulated. Not even at death would the draping with a new body have, on such a theory, been rendered necessary. The new body having been already formed within the old body previously to death, all that remained to happen was the slipping off of the old which had hitherto hid the new from view, so that it might be manifested from within.

It will not be necessary to review this scheme of develop-

ment in each of its steps. Only in so far as it involves a deviation from the traditionally accepted doctrine of the resurrection, so largely received from Paul, need we enter into the questions involved. The alleged second stage, that found in 1 Cor. xv, agrees in its broad outlines with the common Christian faith. It is different with the remaining three phases. To these we therefore append some critical remarks.

As regards the first stage the point in question is the absence of the pneumatic factor. It is true that the Spirit is not here explicitly named either as the author of the resurrection-act or as the substratum of the resurrection-life. Does this reveal non-acquaintance on Paul's part with such a circle of ideas? We must not overlook that the absent features did not bear directly upon the purpose of Paul's exhortation. Not the nature, but the fact of the resurrection required stressing. The point that the living should not anticipate the previously dead on this joyful occasion was the point in need of emphatic affirmation. Such Paul affords explicitly. It were, however, foolish to infer from this, that he could not have told his readers much more about the nature of the event, had it been expedient. Indirectly the Epistle shows clearly enough that the idea of the pneumatic character of the resurrection was not unknown to the author, whatever might be the case with his hearers. In iv. 14 the certainty of the readers' resurrection is based on the fact that Jesus "died and rose again." The ground of the certainty can not lie in this, that Christ is now alive, and therefore able to serve as the instrument of resurrection for the others. For in that case there would have been no reason to emphasize that Christ not only rose but "*died and rose again.*" The real nerve of the argument is that because in his life their experience had been prefigured, the phase in question must be likewise reproduced in them. Now everywhere in the Pauline teaching the Spirit is the mediating factor, whereby the reproduction of the experience of Christ in believers takes place, and there is no reason to assume that the idea has any other than this same pneumatic background here. We meet even with the phrase "dead in Christ." This

does not apply to any particular class of "dead," e.g. to such alone as had died for Christ's sake; the words do not suggest this, and there is no evidence of early cases of martyrdom in Thessalonica. The phrase "in Christ" can have no other meaning than belongs to it elsewhere. It describes the fundamental, mystical union between the dead and Christ. The phrase "in the Spirit" undoubtedly lies back of it.

In regard to the *second* stage a few brief words may suffice. The main point to take issue with here relates to the assertion that on the view developed by Paul, and taken over from him into the Church's creed, the real continuity between the original body and the resurrection-body is broken off. To be sure, this is more in the nature of a dogmatic contention than of an exegetical finding; it means that to Paul's modified standpoint and for his un-spiritual followers the trend of belief in this direction was leading to that. They were on the point of losing something that had always been precious to their imagination, to wit the recovery of the identical body here possessed. Not now enquiring into the metaphysical or physical or biological elements of the issue but confining ourselves to the purely-exegetical question what Paul's words about the subject may mean, the answer need not be over-difficult nor dubious. To be sure, the figure of "sowing" (*σπείρειν*), which plays so large a rôle in the argument, does not suffice of itself to vouch for Paul's belief in a real continuity (which is still different from complete identity) between what is deposited in the ground and what is raised. Nevertheless by way of implication this idea seems to underlie the word and figures used. Only a mistake has often been made through over-estimating the purport of the representation. Paul did not adopt or frame the figure to the *sole* or even *main* end of stressing the continuity between the two bodies. The argument, in which it lies enclosed, is an argument for the truth of the resurrection in general, and not for this one special point. The idea of "sowing" forms, within the argument as a whole, a means to an end; it is not the end in itself. Hence it gives no information as to the *modus quo* of the

intermediate process between the figurative "sowing" and "harvesting." Its meaning is confined to the twin poles of the mysterious process, its beginning and end. We are sure Paul could and would have felt like the man in the parable, who *knew not* how the growth was brought about. What the actual purpose of the use of the figure was we can only ascertain by carefully considering the course of Paul's argument. It is necessary to go back to vs. 35. Here Paul formulates the two principal objections raised in Corinth, probably first by pagans, but later likewise by Christians, on whom the cavillings of the others had not failed to make some impression. The formulation is as follows: "But somebody will say: how are the dead raised, and with what kind of body do they come?" This, be it observed, is not one question presented in two forms for the sake of emphasis or clearness. Two *distinct* grounds for scepticism are plainly distinguished. The first, "How are the dead raised," ridicules the phantastic folly of believing in the return to life of a dead body. The whole thing was considered as lying beyond the sphere of arguable possibilities. The second objection is contained in the second part of the verse: "With what kind of body do they come?" This second question relates to the indeterminableness or unimaginableness of the form. The Apostle proceeds to deal with these two questions in due order of sequence.² The answer to the former is given in vs. 36; to think that what is "dead" (*νεκρόν*) cannot be raised is in flagrant contradiction to the facts of experience: "what thou sowest is not made alive except it have died." Death, so far from being an obstacle to quickening, is its very prerequisite. Here the figure of "sowing" is already present; it serves the purpose of pointing to a common law of nature. Quite different is the use to which Paul turns it from vs. 37 onwards. Here the second (or

² The two questions, while logically distinct and recognized as such by Paul in the order of treatment, are not entirely independent, and therefore merged somewhat in the double interrogative sentence: the unimaginableness was in reality a part of the more largely conceived impossibility.

secondary) objection, "With what kind of body do they come?" is met. The objectors found it impossible to frame a concrete conception of the nature of the resurrection-body, that is of its form and appearance. It is important to note that the question of *substance* does not seem to enter into either of the two stages of the argument. What the doubters felt perplexed about, concerned the *quality* of the new bodies, viz. their *external* quality. Perhaps it is not irrelevant here to remember the peculiar mentality of the average Greek (not now including the philosophers). The Greek would want above all in such things the convincing force of vision and imagination. To be unable to form a concrete image of something was of itself an invitation to doubt. In accordance with this Paul speaks throughout the sequel of the discourse (up to vs. 50) of the present and future bodies in terms of quality and appearance. The way of introduction of the substance-question in vs. 50 indicates of itself, that there a new aspect of the mystery is for the first time touched upon.³ Previously to that point the figure of "sowing" served merely to answer the second objection raised, viz. that no concrete visualisation of the body to come could be formed. Paul meets this with an appeal to the richness of God's resources in the bestowal of form, and to his sovereignty in choosing from the available forms in each individual case what seems fitting to Him: "And that which thou sowest thou sowest not the body that shall be, but a bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or some other kind; but God gives it a body even as it has pleased Him, and to every seed a body of its own."⁴ The form, the appearance, that characterizes what comes out of the ground, is not to be limited to a replica of what was put into the soil. The grain, the seed-kernel, is "naked," that is unclothed with foliage or flowers. The dress, the envelope, are given by

³ "Now this I say, brethren, that *flesh and blood* can not inherit the kingdom of God."

⁴ The Past Tense in the Greek "as it pleased Him," might seem to suggest a reference to the creative appointment of the "bodies" of things. But in connection with the Present Tense "gives" this is little likely.

God. No observation of a seed-grain could have taught, without previous experience, what the appearance of the sprout or plant issuing would be like. What right then has a man to argue from the impossibility of pre-vision and pre-imagina-tion, to the presumptuous conclusion that the forthcoming of a new differently-shaped and differently-appareled body is *a priori* an absurdity?

It is evident that this feature, the intent of bringing out the non-resemblance between seed and plant governs Paul's entire treatment of the comparison. That in this explanation we have correctly diagnosed the Apostle's intent, is borne out likewise by the subjoined argument of vss. 39-41. Here Paul elucidates the principle at stake from two other spheres, passing over from vegetable to animal and astral existence. This, of course, excludes the possibility of every attempt at genetic explanation, which in the foregoing, where sowing and reaping came under review, might still have seemed to be possible. What here remains of the argument is solely the variety of somatic condition in the groups named as a *static* fact. Naturally the group of animal creatures as standing nearest to man is first drawn upon for illustration. After that the astral world comes under review. The point at issue, however, remains the identical one dwelt upon before. The variety, existing *de facto* as a constant phenomenon, though differentiated in its multiplicity, removes the right of doubting the possibility of the resurrection on the sole ground of a differently complexioned body being inconceivable. Let us briefly follow the progress in the reasoning. Its structure is carefully and skilfully framed through the alternate employment of the two adjectives *ἀλλος* and *ἕτερος*. Unfortunately the precise difference between these two, and, in consequence, the full force of the argumentation, are lost to the English reader. The clearness of difference could have been retained only through a pedantic alternation between the philosophic phrases "generically different" and "specifically different." Paul calls attention to the differences appearing both in the sub-human and in the superhuman realms between single species. He likewise calls attention to

the generic, fundamental difference between the realms taken comprehensively." $\Delta\lambda\lambda\sigma\varsigma$ marks the difference among the species included in one and the same genus, whilst $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\varsigma$ marks the difference between the genera. Between the flesh of mankind and beasts and birds there is specific difference only; as to genus they belong in common to the same animal world; hence in vs. 39 $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\sigma\varsigma$ is used: "there is one flesh of men, *another* of beasts" ($\kappa\tau\eta\nu\hat{\omega}\nu$), etc. When, however, all these are taken together, and the heavenly bodies placed over against them a heterogeneity results: "the glory of the celestial and the glory of the terrestrial are $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota$." But among the heavenly there is again a specific difference: "another ($\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta$) is the glory of the sun and another is the glory of the moon, and another is the glory of the stars, for star differs from star in glory." Here again it is at once seen that the reasoning revolves not about the substantial make-up of these bodies, but about their kind, their quality, their appearance. This follows further from the fact that the close of vs. 38 links on closely to vss. 39-41, and there, as shown above, the reference to plant-clothing in foliage and flowerage is unmistakable. The same observation can be made by noting carefully the word here chosen by the Apostle to express the aspect in regard to which the variety exists. It is a variegation in "glory" ($\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$), and "glory" is primarily a term of outward manifestation. Again, the same conclusion may be drawn from the manner in which Paul, returning to the figure of sowing, immediately resumes the terminology of the qualitative. He contrasts the two bodies ("sown" and "rising") as possessed of corruption (*vs.* incorruption), dishonor (*vs.* glory), weakness (*vs.* power). In keeping with all this we shall have to understand the word *sarx* in vs. 39 not of "flesh" as so much animal matter, but of the ordinary somatic instrument for revealing certain traits or a complex of appearances. *Sarx* is simply in this connection a synecdochical designation of *soma* from this qualitative point of view (cp. vss. 38, 40). When Paul says: "another is the *sarx* of men, another is the *sarx* of beasts, another the *sarx* of birds, another the *sarx* of fishes," he

means nothing else than that a cognate somatic organization in each case defines the limits of the species. Earthly bodies can be thus differentiated by the term *sarx*, because *sarx* is in them the most conspicuous feature, one of these elements after which the language is wont to give names to things. But, coming to "celestial things," the difficulty arises that such celestial entities possess no *sarx*, after which they could be synecdochically denominated. Yet, although *sarx* was excluded, the word *soma* in the sense of medium of appearance, above defined, continued to admit of use. It is somewhat difficult to determine, when Paul speaks of *σώματα ἐπουράνια*, whether the word "body" is used in the sense of physics or of biology. That sun, moon and stars are named as instances of heavenly bodies would seem to favor the former. This is held by others to be non-decisive, because, following a prevailing belief, both Jewish and pagan, Paul might have looked upon these celestial balls as inhabited by angels. In that case their glorious outward appearances might have been considered as a radiance of angelic inhabitants. Whatever one's exegetical choice between these two opinions may be, the conclusion to be drawn is, in this instance as before, that the resurrection-body will differ greatly from the kind of body we now possess in its eradication of glory. It will be a case of *heteros* and not merely of *allos*. What will be the attributes from which this difference in manifestation results is stated in vss. 42, 43. Four contrasts are distinguished. These four, however, are not simply coördinated. On either side the three first named are thought of as the product of the last and fourth. That the earthly body consists in corruption, dishonor, weakness is in some way connected with its being a *σῶμα ψυχικόν*. In the same manner the heavenly body is characterized by incorruption, glory, power, all three of which result from its being a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. The only difficulty thus remaining unsolved is how Paul could connect as inevitable consequences with the psychical body, which is according to the following context the body of creation, the unfallen body, these three ugly predicates of corruption, dishonor, weakness. One might

suggest that what he connects with creation is not the actual existence of these qualities, but the possibility of their emergence: the "psychical body" would then be a body, not infected by, but nevertheless not immune from either corruption, dishonor, weakness, whereas the pneumatic body is lifted above all invasion of these. It must be admitted, however, that this is dogmatic construction, so far as our passage is concerned. Taking into account Paul's teaching as a whole, we believe it to be a quite justifiable construction; only the principle is not here expressed in so many words. Still there is even here one phenomenon lending favor to the view suggested: Paul seems intentionally, in characterizing the body of the First Man, to avoid the adjective *sarkic* and the noun *sarx* to which it belongs. From both words in the ordinary Pauline vocabulary the notion of sinfulness, moral corruption, is inseparable. The introduction of such words as *ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός*, *χοϊκός*, vss. 47-49, where on the ordinary terminology *sarx*, *sarkic* would have been indicated, proves to our minds that the avoidance was intentional, and not for the sake of stylistic variation only. In vs. 50, on the other hand, where the body of man's sinful estate is indisputably spoken of, the term *sarx* immediately emerges.⁵

We now have the facts with sufficient completeness before us. The question is in order, whether in this context, so full of mysteries, there is actually present, as the evolutionary pneumatology would have it, such a powerful influx of the pneuma-principle as would overbear everything else, and even exclude the factor of the erstwhile earthly body from the process described. The answer must be in the negative. Let it be observed that so far as the act of raising is concerned, the Spirit does not receive the prominence we should expect Him on the new theory to acquire or possess. It is God, as elsewhere, who raises. No doubt He does it through the Spirit, but pointedly stressed this is not. Where it does come to expression the form is Christological, that of the Lord having become a *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* (vs. 45). This concerns the *act*

⁵ "Flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God."

of the resurrection, strictly so taken. It does only through inference teach that in the subsequent resurrection-*state* we shall bear the Spirit-image, or live in the Spirit-atmosphere (vs. 49). As to the presence and operation of the Spirit in the intermediate state, preparing the dead for the issue of the resurrection, nothing whatever is stated; we are here thrown back on the scanty phrase "dead in Christ" from 1 Thessalonians. If the last-mentioned idea could be legitimately drawn from the passage, then, the importance of the Spirit would be greatly enhanced; but even then, with the mystery thus increased, it would contribute nothing to the problem of how the body buried can retain continuity with the body raised. The Spirit were in that case no more than the gradual preparatory agent for bringing about the event of the resurrection. On one view only could a measure of light seem to fall on this mystery of all mysteries, viz. if in any way the Spirit could be conceived as so identified with the body sown as no longer to form the Actor but the object acted upon, no longer the Sower, but in some sense the seed sown. For in that case the continuity and identity of what is sown and what rises at the end would be absolutely assured, since the Spirit is according to the judgment of Paul the absolutely Unchangeable One. This suggested solution brings us face to face with the unsolved, and perhaps unsolvable problem of the relation between the Holy Spirit *ad extra* and the Holy Spirit *immanently* considered as part in the make-up of the believer's person. Whether solvable or not, the problem, even if it promised elucidation in general, would from the terms employed in the context here be plainly eliminated as a true solvent. This will appear straightway, if once more the several elements entering into the figuratively formulated transaction be recalled. The term "naked grain" is assumed as the starting-point for this construction. This "naked grain" is explained as carrying in itself a germ, a nucleus of life, and on the same principle the body buried would have within itself the Holy Spirit as the principle or potentiality of a requickened life. Unfortunately Paul in working out the figure makes no distinction between *germ*

and *seed* in such a way that the presence of the former could serve as a guarantee of the identity of the rising with the buried body. On the contrary he affirms that that which is *sown* is quickened, and precisely what is *sown* dies. The subject is the same in both propositions. And moreover, in vs. 37, instead of picturing the connection between seed and plant in terms suggested by the interpretation offered, he passes over to a totally-different train of thought. After stressing the necessity of dying previously to the possibility of quickening, the argument turns to the variegated exhibition of external clothing in the plant-world. On the theory advocated attention ought to have been immediately called to the fact that the dying is but a partial one in which the Spirit-kernel is not actually involved. Nothing of the kind is done. Neither do the terms subsequently employed fit into the theory under discussion. If the Spirit is sown as residing within the seed, then it can no longer be affirmed that what is sown is naked, for on such a view the Spirit-kernel is precisely clothed upon with the seed. Of what is sown it is emphatically affirmed that it undergoes this process in corruption, dishonor, weakness. All these and such-like things are utterly unpredictable of the Spirit, no matter, whether He be taken objectively as a divine entity, or subjectively as immanent in man. Thus, whichever way one turns, the proposed explanation proves impossible and futile. It is better to leave the matter where it is and to commit the working out of the mystery to God, who can bring about things unsearchable to the mind of man. The resurrection belongs with many other objects of eschatological faith to the region "which eye saw not, and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man."

We proceed to the discussion of the alleged third stage in the evolution of Paul's resurrection-belief. This is the stage in which the Apostle is supposed to have moved forward the endowment with a new body to the moment of *death* in case the death of his earthly body occurred before the parousia. This view is not ascribed to Paul as a firmly established conviction, but as a more or less contingent eventuality, which

none the less he seriously reckoned with. The passage on which it is chiefly based is 2 Cor. v. 1-8, a context extremely difficult of interpretation, partly as a result of some uncertainties in the text, which, however, may themselves have arisen from a desire through emendation to remove exegetical or doctrinal obstacles. The best method of dealing with the passage seems to be to give first a cursory exegesis of the successive clauses, paying particular heed to their syntactical coherence, and then to sum up the results obtained in a brief paraphrase. In order that the exegesis may be conducted with the greatest degree of discriminateness, it will be desirable to place clearly before our minds the traditional understanding of the words, which was common up to the time when the modern exegesis took hold of them. This old view interpreted as follows:—Paul felt himself in uncertainty as to whether he was destined to survive till the parousia or die previously to that point. If the former happened the eagerly desired heavenly body would become his immediately, and that without any strange, fearsome process of first stripping off the earthly body now clothing him. In both respects this mode of transformation appeared to him the more desirable. There would be no delay, and there would be nothing of the dread ordinarily associated with death. But in case the other alternative happened through his dying before the coming of the Lord, both of these advantages would not only be lost, there would in addition ensue the far more serious detriment of having to spend the interval between his death and the parousia in a disembodied state, a state of “nakedness” as he calls it. Confronted with these two possibilities and their differing implications, he gives voice to a strong desire for obtaining the former and escaping the latter. With the idea of a *tertium quid*, viz. that the new body could possibly become his immediately upon death, he did according to the old exegesis in no wise reckon. That which on the modern exegesis formed the very pivot of the movement of his hope, did according to the ancient exegesis never enter his mind. He had before him a maximum and a minimum; the former he preferred, but with true Christian resig-

nation expressed himself contented with the latter, should the Lord have that in store for his servant. He could be thus contented with fulfilment of the lesser hope, because after all it had in common with the higher desire the assurance of being with Christ immediately after death, even if the supreme satisfaction of entering upon that blessedness *in the body* were denied him.

Proceeding now to our cursory exegesis of the complex of thought, we observe that the opening statement in vs. 1, when read in the A.V. has perhaps more than aught else in the passage given rise and encouragement to the modern interpretation: "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle *were dissolved* (*καταλυθῆ*), we have a building from God," etc. This subjunctive "were" injects into the statement the thought of the improbability of its happening after the manner the sentence describes: *Even if it were*,—but it is *not likely* to happen. This rendering at the outset pre-judges the Apostle's state of mind as to the outcome, and is in no wise required by the Greek text. The conjunction "if" (*εἴναι*) with the Aorist Subjunctive not infrequently has the force of a Future Perfect. The correct rendering accordingly would be: "We know that *in case* our earthly tent-house *shall have been* dissolved, we have a building from God," etc. The inaccuracy has been corrected by the R.V., which reads: "For we know that if the earthly house of our tabernacle *be dissolved*" ("be" instead of "were"), etc. Through this correction of the rendering the impression is made less obtrusive, as if Paul in these words reflected upon the availability of a new body for himself in the very moment that the less desirable event of his pre-parousia death should occur. All that the words, strictly taken, mean is that the loss of the earthly body will be made up for (sooner or later) by the supervening of a wholly-differently complexioned body pertaining to another sphere, but of the time-point when this certainty shall enter into actuality, nothing is said. Nor do the words, taken by themselves, contain an intimation as to whether the "dissolution" is near or not. But, it will be asked, does not the

Present Tense "we have" (*ἔχομεν*), when joined to the foregoing, imply that the new body must be in possession of the Apostle, *when* he dies; how otherwise could he declare that at the extreme moment of his earthly life he *has* it? There is more than one way to meet this difficulty. The verb "we have" can be given the sense of *assured possession*, carrying a title *de jure* to something that may or may not as yet be in existence. Or "we have" might be a case of imaginative projection into the world to come. The closing words of the verse (*ἐν οὐρανοῖς*) favor the latter, for they do not, of course, describe where the body now is or has been from the first. That would be a formal avowal of the preëxistence of souls, and could hardly in the Apostle's view have been confined to souls, when once embraced with regard to them. What the phrase really means is that heaven is the place in which the body, when received, will be permanently possessed, in which it will exist and move and live; that such is the correct interpretation can be verified from the corresponding phrase "earthly" (*ἐπίγειος*), applied by way of contrast to "tent-house" (*οἰκία τοῦ σκήνου*). Further, that the term "house" (*οἰκία*) which is the object of "we have" is used from the standpoint of the actual and permanent possession in the heavenly life, appears from the difference between it and the term "building" (*οἰκοδομή*) used just before. In the latter the emphasis rests on the origin of the body: it is a *building*, something constructed, hence the added words *ἐκ θεοῦ*; it is a building provided by God, of his own making. In the former the emphasis rests on the existence of the body as a finished product, a "house." Vs. 1, therefore, leaves it undecided when this body will be received, and in no way implies its preëxistence. The characterization of the new body as "eternal" only intends to set it off against the frail and collapsible "tent-house," serving as a figure for the earthly body. A contact for the idea of preëxistence has further been sought in the closing words of vs. 2, "our habitation from heaven." But this "from heaven" is simply another form of statement for what is called in vs. 1 "from God." The resurrection-body is from

heaven because it is in a special supernatural sense from God. Heaven is the seat and source of the Pneuma by which the resurrection-body is formed.⁶ On the other hand the word ἐπενδύσασθαι in this second verse is distinctly unfavorable to the view that Paul looked forward to or weighed the possibility of receiving the new body at or immediately after death. Ἐνδύσασθαι means "to put on," and ἐπενδύσασθαι signifies "to put on one garment over another garment"; it is the preposition *ἐπί*, that effects this plus in the meaning. The latter word expresses the same thing which in 1 Cor. xv. 53 Paul calls ἐνδύσασθαι, because there the subject of the act is the present earthly body: "this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." Here in 2 Cor. v, on the other hand, the subject is the *self*, the incorporeal part of the believer, conceived as already clothed upon with its present body-garment, and desiring to put on over this, as some over-garment, the eschatological body. Now, how did or could Paul conceive of the realization of this desire? The answer seems plain. He could hardly conceive of it as taking place at death, for death is precisely the putting off of the first garment hitherto worn. On such a supposition room would remain for an ἐνδύσασθαι only, no longer for an ἐπενδύσασθαι. It yields an utterly fantastic thought to assume that the Apostle expected at death to carry over, were it only for a moment, the earthly body, and then to slip on over it the new body. In such a case there would have been no real death, nothing would have remained for burial. The only way in which we can intelligibly construe for ourselves this ἐπενδύσασθαι is that it takes place at the parousia, and then, in those to whom the parousia takes place before death. Under these circumstances alone Paul would still be wearing the old body, and therefore able to put on over it the habitation from heaven. Vs. 2, therefore, is utterly irreconcilable with the modern exegesis of a reception of the new body at death.

⁶ Cp. 1 Cor. xv. 47: "the second man is (by virtue of the resurrection) from heaven." Notice also the difference between *ἐκ οὐρανοῦ* (*singular*) relating to origin and *ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* (*plural*) of locality in vs. 1.

Vs. 3 we wish to pass by without comment for the moment, because it is exceedingly obscure, owing in part to the uncertain reading of two words, and thereby incapable of yielding any definite conclusions on the question before us. We shall revert to it presently, when endeavoring to paraphrase the passage as a whole.

Coming to vs. 4, we notice several points entirely inconsistent with the idea that Paul is thinking of something to happen at death. He declares: "We that are in the tent do groan being burdened, because we would not be unclothed, but be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life." Here an alternative is formulated by Paul and a preference expressed. The alternative is between the two experiences, *first* of being unclothed, and *then* being clothed anew, and *second* of being clothed upon *immediately*. And he prefers the latter. The preference is a strong one. Under the influence of the uncertainty of its decision Paul groans. Now the question arises: Does this situation fit the case of the bestowal of a new body at the moment of death or the case of the bestowal of it at the parousia? In answer let us make clear to ourselves that the groaning and the strong preference become entirely unintelligible, if we conceive Paul thinking of both members of this alternative as attached to the moment of death. For, how could the resolution of such an alternative *in articulo mortis* become to him a matter of burdensome uncertainty? It would have certainly been regarded by him as pertaining to the formalities of getting into the proper apparel for a solemn occasion; in both cases the outcome would have been precisely the same. If once it were fixed that the new body comes immediately, it certainly, in comparison with that tremendous fact, must have appeared a matter of slight importance, whether it immediately (with the smallest of intervals between) shall succeed the old body, or shall, casting a veil over all that goes on beneath, swallow up the old body, absorbing it, as it were, into itself. For one who was assured that death without fail would bring with itself the new body, it would seem pusillanimous to groan on account of the trifling

question whether the instantaneous occurrence should take place one way or the other. Paul was, with his entire perilous and painful life-experience behind him, hardly the man to let his thoughts be distracted to the point of groaning fear over such matters. All this vexing uncertainty and painful weighing of a small issue must have lacked real importance for a man of his temperament. The fear of death *per se*, as a momentary experience we have no reason to ascribe to him. It follows, therefore, that the strong sense of uneasiness and the strong preference expressed must have revolved around another, far more serious and solemn question, viz. would there be or would there not be awaiting him in the near future a *protracted* state of being unclothed, that is "naked" between his possible death and the arrival of the parousia? The uncertainty, therefore, arising from this can not stand in direct contradiction to the "we know" in vs. 1; in other words "we know" can not, consistently with what follows, carry the meaning: we know that we receive a new body at the time of death. Such a conviction would from the outset have rendered all subsequent burdensomeness and groaning out of place. The simple sense of the verse is, as above intimated: in a general way Paul affirms that instead of the tent dissolved a new structure will be received, but he does not indicate here when or how it will be given.

It is said that vs. 5 proves the "being clothed upon" to be in Paul's view the common lot of all believers, because of the statement "He that wrought us for this very thing is God." The plural "us" is on this view understood of all Christians. Likewise the further words "who gave us the earnest of the Spirit" are taken to bear out this exegesis, since all Christians are recipients of the Spirit and must consequently share in what this gift is the pledge of. He could not have affirmed these things, had he confined the "being clothed upon" to those found alive at the parousia. To this our answer is that from the "us" and the statement concerning the gift of the Spirit as an earnest, no such conclusion can be legitimately drawn. Even if Paul does not use "us" here as a rhetorical

plural, but actually includes all believers, this simply shows how he lived in the expectation, that the parousia might still find the great majority of the Christians of his day alive, and looked upon the cases of those who died in the interval as exceptions. After all, he could just as well say of believers in general, that they had been prepared by God to be "clothed upon," at the last day, as he could on the hypothesis under review affirm of his readers collectively, using the word "us," that they had been prepared of God for investment with a new body *at death*, for on every view he must have been aware that some would be found alive at the parousia, whom God could not have prepared for that peculiar experience, and to whom He could not have given the Spirit as an earnest for such experience. We have answered this argument on the assumption, that "this very thing" (*αὐτὸ τοῦτο*) in vs. 5 actually refers to the "being clothed upon," as excluding the "being clothed" of vs. 4. Of course, the affirmative answer brings us face to face with the difficult question, how Paul could so positively affirm that God had prepared the majority of the then living believers to survive till the parousia, then to be changed in the way indicated by "being clothed upon." For this reason we feel inclined to give the "this very thing" another reference. For the present, however, it suffices to have shown, that the usual interpretation of vs. 5 does not compel us to place the "clothing upon" at death.

Finally, vss. 6-8 are said to demand the modern exegesis. Here Paul declares himself of good courage, because immediately after death he will be with the Lord: to be at home in the body is to be absent from the Lord, whilst to be absent from the body is to be at home with the Lord. And this goal of his desire which he expects to reach at death is taken as identical with what is described in vss. 2 and 4 as the "being clothed upon," because by means of "therefore" it is connected with the foregoing: "Being *therefore* always of good courage," etc. Hence the conclusion drawn runs as follows: the being at home with the Lord is effected through the "being clothed upon" at death. To this we reply as follows: Paul's

good courage in view of the fact that to die means to be at home with the Lord attaches itself to the preceding context in the *general import* of the latter, a general import that found clearest expression in iv. 17, 18 and v. 1. The *general* proposition, in regard to which Paul felt absolute assurance, was that after the present affliction, or in reward for it, there is eternal glory in store for the believer, and more specifically that, after this earthly tent-body shall have been dissolved, the believer will be put in possession of an eternal heavenly body. As to the *secondary* question, whether this consummate state of glory would be reached with or without an intervening period of nakedness of death, as to this Paul felt no conviction, either one way or the other, but only a desire and a preference. Hence he contents himself with expressing this preferential desire as growing out of a strong dislike of the state of nakedness. Now, inasmuch as his assurance on the general question far outweighed the uncertainty on that one particular point, Paul could, notwithstanding the unresolved doubt of vss. 2, 4, proceed in vs. 6 with the declaration, that he was always of good courage. Of course, he had to put the ground of his good courage under the circumstances in the form of the *minimum* of what he felt sure about; he could not say: we are always of good courage, because to be absent from the earthly body means to being put immediately in possession of the heavenly body. His uncertainty as to whether he would survive till the parousia forbade him that. Therefore he says only as much as he could with full certainty profess: to be absent from the body is to be at home with the Lord. Even in case that happened which appeared to him the less desirable, he would still be contented, because in this being with the Lord everything else was potentially given. Looking at it closely, the words of vss. 6-8 even seem to disparage the idea of the new body being given at death. He speaks here of death as meaning absence from the body. Of course, he means the *earthly body*; yet he would scarcely have expressed himself thus indefinitely, had he meant that immediately another body would be substituted, for the state in

such a new body would hardly be describable as the state of one absent from the body. And likewise the phrase "to be present with the Lord" is so general that Paul, had he had in mind the presence with Christ in the new glorified body, would in all probability have chosen a more definite mode of expression in contrast to that of "being absent from the body." Our conclusion, therefore, is that vss. 6-8 do not favor the exegesis under review.

We must now look for a moment at the passage as a whole, and in connection with this at the difficult vs. 3, in order to grasp the import of the entire section, and thus to gather in the fruit of our somewhat laborious exegesis. The passage connects with iv. 17, 18 by means of "for" (*γάρ*): "For we know that in case our earthly tent-house shall have been dissolved, we have a building from God," etc. Chapter iv. 17, 18 affirm that the "affliction" in the body works out an eternal weight of glory, likewise to be enjoyed in the body, since there, in the body, the "affliction" was borne. The future body thus appears from the outset as the bearer of an eternal weight of glory. The knowledge that such a new body shall be ours is basic for the hope of possessing and enjoying the certainty of this eternal glory. Without such a center the glory could not exist. Especially the description of this new body as a "house" admirably fits into this train of thought, because a house is not a mere place of shelter, but has attached to it the aesthetic conception of a center of manifestation for the glory of its inhabitant. The next verse joins to this, by means of "*καὶ γάρ*," as a further basis of the conviction expressed in the "we know" of vs. 1, the circumstance that "we groan desiring to be clothed upon with our habitation from heaven."⁷ Such an ardent, groaning longing affords a particularly strong ground for the assurance that a heavenly body must be appointed for us. This would not follow, of course, if the longing were of the nature of a purely-subjective sentiment or aspiration. In the present case it *does* follow, because, being

⁷ *Kαὶ γάρ* is stronger than the simple *γάρ*: "for verily."

worked in the believer by the Spirit, it becomes divinely prophetic of what is actually in store for him. The idea is that the Christian is so eagerly desirous of the succedence of the heavenly body, if possible, without the intervening of any period of bodiless existence, as to justify the conclusion that the Spirit's hand is discernible in this. The ardency and eagerness of the desire are guarantees of its divine origination. Paul continues, "in this we groan." Some render by "in this (tent)" referring back to vs. 1. This construction is somewhat favored by vs. 4 where the same thought is expressed as follows: "for we that are in this tent do groan." It is quite possible, however, to render: "*in this respect* we groan, that we long to be clothed upon."

The foregoing brings us to the difficult vs. 3. There are two points of uncertainty in the reading of this verse: (1) the conjunction introducing the sentence is in some MSS. *εἰ γέ* (or *εἰ γέ καὶ*), in others *εἰ περ*; (2) the participle following this conjunction is read in some authorities *ἐνδυσάμενοι*, in others *ἐκδυσάμενοι*. The evidence seems to be in favor of *εἰ γέ καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθησόμεθα*. But it is extremely difficult, on any view taken of the passage as a whole, to fit these words into the context with an intelligible result. The modern exegesis above criticized would take it as follows: the verse assigns the reason for the longing to be clothed upon at death: having put the (new) body on we shall not then be found naked. For in that case there will be no interval of disembodied existence. So far as thought is concerned, and taken by itself, this would yield appropriate sense. The fatal objection to it is that it takes *ἐνδύσασθαι* in the same sense as belongs specifically to *ἐπενδύσασθαι*. Now the latter is used vss. 2 and 4 with pointed emphasis upon the *ἐπί*, so as to compel the express understanding that it is not identical with *ἐνδύσασθαι*, but rather its opposite, if not in result, yet surely in method of procedure. This being so, we may say that Paul, in order to express the thought attributed to him by this new exegesis, would in all likelihood have repeated the word *ἐπενδύσασθαι* in its participial form; he would have said "we

long to be clothed upon, since *having been clothed upon* we shall not be found naked." The verb which has but one prepositional prefix is distinguished from the doubly compound one in this very vital respect, that it does not imply the guarantee for the avoidance of "nakedness," inasmuch as it does not fix the point for the "putting on" as coinciding with the moment of death. We are bound, therefore, to take ἐνδυσάμενοι as different from ἐπενδυσάμενοι. But what the clause means, if the distinction be insisted upon, as we believe it must, appears difficult to tell. Under these circumstances we prefer, instead of wrestling with the text in order to extract from it some sort of meaning, such as will at best induce half-belief, to try how far the difficulty admits of relief by adopting the other reading with ἐκδυσάμενοι instead of ἐνδυσάμενοι.⁸ With this combined with either εἰ γέ καὶ or εἰ περ ("although"), we can reach comparative clearness. The sole ground always for changing the text, either by pure emendation, or through adoption of some other, perhaps less-strongly attested, reading, is the discovery that the adopted modification suddenly lets in light where before darkness prevailed. Such is the case here. "Εἰ γέ καὶ ἐκδυσάμενοι yields "if so be that *also*, having put off this body (i.e., having died), we shall not *in the end* be found naked, our "being clothed upon"

⁸ Of course, it is not impossible for a skillful exegete, who finds himself in an impasse of this kind, to extort from the text some tolerable sense, sacrificing all naturalness of expression to the one desire of making the words say anything at all. As an example of this sort of exegesis the following might be offered: We long to be clothed upon through reaching the parousia alive, thus avoiding the interval of nakedness, since also, after having "put on" at that point, we shall not henceforth be found naked at our entrance upon the eternal state. In other words, since such is our ultimate destiny in any event, even though we may have to attain unto it through death, and subsequent nakedness and ultimate putting on of the body, rather than by instantaneous putting on of the new over the old, nevertheless we can not help continue longing for the *ante mortem* parousia-investment, because that reaches the eventual goal in the shortest and easiest manner. This exegesis, it will be perceived, separates the *καὶ* from the *εἰ γέ* and joins *καὶ* closely to *ἐνδυσάμενοι*. It certainly is ingenious; but is it not too ingenious to invite confident acceptance?

taking place at the general resurrection. Taking the other conjunction *εἰ περ* we obtain the following rendering: "although even having put off this body (died) we shall not ultimately be found naked."⁹

Vs. 4 takes up vs. 2 again, elaborating further the same thought there expressed, whence in the same manner the verse is introduced by *καὶ γάρ*. The groaning, though it be a groaning caused by uncertainty as to the how or when, nevertheless conveys assurance so far as the simple fact of ultimate attainment is concerned. The "being burdened" here by no means excludes the "we know" of vs. 1, as it would do on the modern interpretation.

In connection with vs. 5 we encountered a difficulty, left for the time to one side. Here is the place to consider it. It consisted in the problem, how the "this very thing" could be referred to the immediately preceding "clothed upon"?¹⁰ How could Paul so objectively affirm that God had purposed and prepared him and his readers for "being clothed upon," if at the same time he continued in uncertainty, as to whether he was to attain it or not? That for which God prepares believers can scarcely be considered a matter of doubt, and conversely, if the point was subject to doubt, Paul could scarcely affirm that God had prepared him and the others for it. We suggested at the previous point a removal of the difficulty by making "this very thing" refer back not to the immediately preceding "clothed upon," but to the general thought dominating the whole preceding context, viz. that *in one way or another* the Christian is sure to obtain a new body. The question remained, however, whether "this very thing" is not too pointed and emphatic for reference to this general idea. For

⁹ The conjunctival combination *εἰ περ* has in older Greek (Homer) not infrequently the sense of "although." Occasionally it retains this force in later Greek also.

¹⁰ The difficulty here considered is, it will be observed, a difficulty which the old and the new exegesis equally encounter. Both must admit that in vs. 4 Paul expresses a *doubt*, and seek some reconciliation with the "we know" of vs. 1.

this reason we now offer for consideration the reference of these words not to the "being clothed upon," but to "we groan." The "groaning" is on this view to be taken as the very thing for which God has prepared the believer, which He causes to issue from his heart, whence also it has a prophetic significance, becomes a confirmation of the assurance that he shall obtain the heavenly body.

We have now at some length discussed the chief passage supposed to contain the proof that Paul had undergone a change in his eschatological outlook, and have found it inadequate, nay implausible at many a point. The other passages to which appeal is made for the same purpose are less involved and consequently more easily disposed of. In Rom. viii. 19 Paul declares: "the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing (*ἀποκάλυψις*) of the sons of God." What will happen at the end is here called a "revealing" of the sons of God, not because their somatic glory preëxisted, and hence needed no more than a momentary flashing forth into light. The reason is a quite different one. It is none other than that their status as sons of God with all privileges attached, such as freedom and heirship, existed before, but had not been openly demonstrated. Not their celestial body, but their supreme sonship was in hiding. It is this *status* that will be revealed, and this revelation will be accomplished, by laying upon them the glory, the medium for whose manifestation, to be sure, is the body of the resurrection. For doing this, however, the body needed no previous existence. Paul does not even say that the glorious body will be revealed, but that the sons of God will be revealed, or, what amounts to the same thing, that the glory will be revealed "to us" (vs. 18).¹¹ Because the resurrection is a revelation of sonship (not of a hitherto hidden body), it can be also called the "adoption of sons" (*νιόθεσία*). That not merely the bringing to light of an already existing body, but its real formation is referred to follows from the coincidence of the redemption of the body

¹¹ Notice the preposition *εἰς ἡμᾶς*, not *ἐν ἡμῖν*.

with the deliverance of the whole creation from the bondage of corruption. Still another passage appealed to (Col. iii. 3, 4) speaks of the life hid with Christ in God, and of the manifestation of believers with Christ in glory at the time of Christ's own manifestation. "Life" does not here necessarily imply somatic existence so that the hidden presence of a body for each believer in Christ would be affirmed. It is true the manifestation of believers together with the manifestation of Christ Himself in glory presupposes that they will, when manifested, possess a body to make them manifest *as Christ will be manifest through his body*. But it by no means follows from this that they possessed this body previously, simply because Christ possessed his previously to the joint-manifestation. The contrast between the hidden state and the manifested state has not the body for its subject, but the life of the believer. This life is first hid with Christ, because it is a disembodied life; at the last day it will become manifest through union with the eschatological body. For in the world to come all things are manifest and provided with the proper organs for being so.

In addition to the foregoing we note that the advocates of the modified resurrection-doctrine are compelled to admit an inconsistency on Paul's part even during the stage of development assumed for this third period. In this very chapter the Apostle speaks of the fact that all believers must be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ. The manner in which this is referred to shows that it contemplates a collective manifestation. We have already seen that in the preceding context the Apostle speaks of his conviction, that God, who raised up the Lord Jesus, will also raise him (Paul) up with Jesus, and present him together with the Corinthians. We may further compare Phil. iii. 20, 21: "For our commonwealth is in heaven; whence also we wait for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, according to the working whereby He is able even to subject all things to Himself." This last passage also sug-

gests an answer to the question, why, if the new body is a product of the Pneuma, the believer should have to wait for it until the parousia, which the Pneuma is his already during the present life. The Spirit's work in the renewal of things proceeds according to a fixed, systematic method, in certain distinct stages. First it takes effect in the sphere of the inner man. Its laying hold on the outward man has to wait till the bodily appearance of Christ on earth. The "working whereby He is able to subject all things to Himself" will then draw within the sphere of its operation that whole visible external realm to which the body belongs. Consequently there is nothing arbitrary in the postponement of the transformation of the body till the parousia, nothing that could be called inconsistent with the Pauline doctrine of the present possession by believers of the Spirit.

There still remains to be looked into the fourth and most revolutionary extreme supposed to have been reached by Paul in his concept of the resurrection. This is the stage in which he is claimed to have reached the idea of an actual preformation of the new body within the believer during the course of the latter's earthly life. This lies so much on the line of the construction built on 2 Cor. v, that it must create wonder that the Apostle did not, once having reached this novel concept, consistently adhere to it, but fixed soon after upon the moment of death as the proper point for bringing the new body into existence. For it is chiefly in Chap. iii of the same Epistle that this extreme view is found. There is surely a *hysteron-proteron* here. The words which in Chap. iii are believed to speak of the mystical process in question are found in vss. 17-18: "Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty. But we all with unveiled face beholding as in a mirror (or reflecting as a mirror) the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit," with which are to be compared the words in vs. 16 of the next chapter: "Wherefore we faint not; but, though our outward man is decaying, yet our inward man is renewed day by day." In

judging of the exegesis imposed upon these statements, it should not be forgotten that the uniform testimony on the time-question runs squarely athwart such an opinion as is thus ascribed to Paul, for everywhere he excludes the earthly life-course from the resurrection-process, even there where according to some he places it at the moment of death. His tenses in speaking of the supreme event are throughout future; cp. Rom. viii. 11; Gal. vi. 8; 1 Cor. xv (*passim*); 2 Cor. v. 1-10; Phil. iii. 20, 21. If now in the context of 2 Cor. iii and iv a different conception of such a radically reversal type actually confronted us, the utmost we could say would be that the Apostle in these isolated moments, in a fit of rapture, as it were, had been raised to such a mystical height, as in this case to be swept entirely out of the consistency of a uniform doctrine. But even to assume this involves considerable difficulty. The assumption would lead us to expect that Paul would have from this point onwards at least made consistent progress along the line indicated. If between First and Second Corinthians he advanced sufficiently to move the point of the resurrection backwards from the parousia to the death of individuals, and then at certain moments by a flash of pneumatic illumination was given to believe that the formation of a new body is now already imperceptibly going on within the Christian, then we would surely expect that between the latter and Philippians he would have made still further progress, and attained the last result of this development as an assured possession. As a matter of fact we find the very opposite. Philippians would suffice to disillusion us in this respect for it proves that the Apostle did *ex hypothesi* not only halt in his development, but surrendered the newly-gained ground by most distinctly placing the transformation of the body at the parousia. For this reason it is unlikely that even as isolated extreme modes of statement the passages cited can bear the interpretation put upon them. 2 Cor. iii. 18 speaks of the glory into which believers are changed by beholding as in a mirror (or, according to another rendering, "reflecting as mirrors") the glory of the Lord. This

glory into which they are transfigured is meant to be set in contrast to the glory that shone upon the face of Moses, when descending from the mount of God. Now, inasmuch as with Moses this was a visible, bodily glory, it might be thought that with reference to believers it must be of the same nature, the more so, since "glory" (*δόξα*) has in most cases eschatological associations relating to the body. None the less the context shows that in the present case Paul attached a different meaning to the word, viz. the idea of an inward glory of illumination by the Spirit of God. It was not the body of Moses as a whole that shone but his face, the organ of vision. Christians likewise receive this glory through beholding it; it is the face which is the organ of its absorption. This takes place "with uncovered face" (ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ). To speak more literally, it is the *Gospel* by which this mysterious process is mediated, whence the Apostle calls it in iv. 4 "the gospel of the glory of Christ." The *Gospel* corresponds to the veiled countenance of Moses, so far as the perishing are concerned, in whom the god of this world (Satan) has blinded the minds of the unbelieving. At his conversion God shined into Paul's heart" in order that *the Apostle by his preaching might impart to others the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ in the face of Jesus Christ.*" This beholding of the glory through a mirror is something that belongs, dispensationally speaking, to the present state, for in 1 Cor. xiii. 12, Paul pointedly distinguishes between the vision "in a riddle" (ἐν αἰνίγματι) and the vision "face to face," which latter is reserved for the end, with which further agrees 2 Cor. v. 7, according to which believers walk through the land of faith, not as yet through the land of sight. All this points to the conclusion, that in the context of the passage under examination a peculiar turn is given to the concept of "glory," a turn by which it is placed in the sphere of "knowledge" (*γνώσις*). This is confirmed by the fact that iii. 7 names as one of the concomitants of the state in which the transfiguration takes place "liberty," which "liberty" also in Rom. viii. 21

appears connected with the "glory." If the above interpretation be correct, we may conclude that the "glory" spoken of in our passage has nothing to do with the body, but is an inward state, specifically belonging to the sphere of supernatural knowledge.

Even less ground is there to find in the verses 2 Cor. iv. 16-18 the idea of a present transformation of the body within, while the old earthly body still continues to drape the inner man. Here the resurrection is in the context explicitly placed at the end, vs. 14: "knowing that He who raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also, and shall present us with you." What has misled many here is that in the preceding context Paul speaks of the manifestation of the life of Jesus in his mortal flesh, i.e. his body. But his speaking in terms of *sarx* suffices to show that he can not have meant thereby the transformation of the body, since that could come about only through the putting aside of the mortal flesh, and could never be called a "manifestation of life in the flesh." What the Apostle hints at by these expressions is the preservation of his life in the midst of the deadly perils spoken of in vss. 8, 9. He describes these in vs. 10 as an "always bearing about in the body the dying (*vékrwosis*) of Jesus." While it would be a mistake to identify this sustaining operation of divine power with the body-forming operation of the Spirit, there appears, nevertheless, and this is the element of truth in the fantastic view propounded, a real connection between the death-curtailing experiences of the Apostle's labors and the ultimate resurrection. In vs. 14, in the closest dependence on the register of persecution and affliction written in the foregoing, Paul declares: "Knowing that He that raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also with Jesus." What is the mysterious connection here obviously implied? It must be sought on the negative, not on the positive side. The process of resurrection from its inherent nature has two sides, the stripping off of the flesh and the endowment of the believer with a pneumatic *soma*. From the negative point of view it could be truly affirmed that the resurrection-process

was in operation: room was being made for the new body through the gradual removal of the old. But this is something far different from the assumption of the development of a new body within the old. On its negative side the disintegration of the old structure could also be interpreted as a prophecy of the rearing of the new building appointed to take its place. From the actual erection of the latter, however, this remains different. In this negative sense only the Apostle could say to his readers: "So then *death* works in us but *life* in you." The bodily life God sustained in Paul was the same life that enabled him to labor for the Corinthians. And he labored for them, certainly not by means of a mysterious invisible, embryonic corporeity built up within, but in no other way than by means of the present natural life of the body, in which he was undergoing hardships for their sake. Nor do the statements of vss. 16 and 17 compel us to think of a present bodily glory inwrought in Paul: the outward man, he declares, is decaying, the inward man is renewed day by day. For "the inward man" does not signify here a composite human person, consisting of the *pneuma* and the new body. It stands for the Spirit as distinguished from the present fleshly body. If the other view were correct, if ὁ ἔσω (or, ἔσωθεν) ἄνθρωπος meant spirit and body combined, then its opposite ὁ ἔξω ἄνθρωπος ought likewise to signify the natural spirit and body combined, whereas the context shows that it does stand for the bodily life alone. In the other two passages where ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is spoken of (Rom. vii. 22; Eph. iii. 16), there can be no doubt about Paul's referring to the inner spiritual part of man by itself and not including a new body. But this renewal of the inner man mentioned in vs. 16 is the beginning of the eschatological glory in its future sense. That here the future glory must be meant follows from the manner in which the light affliction is spoken of as lasting but for a moment; its momentariness is contrasted with the eternal character of the glory, and this contrast involves the contrast between present and future. On the principle of gracious recompense the affliction here endured works out for

the eternal world, a superabundant weight of "glory." For the present, therefore, he speaks of the renewal of the inner man only. When speaking of the weight of glory comprehensively it is in contrast with the present, as of something that does not exist at the moment of speaking, but which is being laid up (not actually *in preparation*), something which the present tribulation creates the title for.¹²

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

¹² Along another line of approach the present preparation of the resurrection-body might be, and actually has been, postulated from what in two contexts the Apostle says concerning the "sowing" of the old body and the new body to be harvested from it (Gal. vi. 7, 8 and 1 Cor. xv. 36ff.). It is plain that in Galatians the figure has nothing to do with internal bodily metamorphosis, but with ethico-religious conduct determining the eschatological issue on the principle of reward, not by physical nexus. As to 1 Cor. xv. 36ff., here the extreme end of earthly life (the burial) is spoken of, and for a previous extensive process of preparation there is no room. Only by making (like Calvin) the sowing cover the entire preceding life could the desired inference of an earlier fashioning of a new body within be drawn. The whole theory of present pre-eschatological formation of a body within a body savors of the fantastic. It reminds curiously of what was the primitive Greek conception of the soul, viz. not that of a spiritual entity within a material one, but that of a complete somatico-pneumatic interior entity within the exterior entity, a whole man within a whole man (cp. the description of primitive Greek psychology in Rhode's *Psyche*). From that to Paul's refined psychology, there is, of course, a far cry. It must be admitted, however, that, considering the question from the standpoint of pure exegesis, Calvin may claim support from the representation in 1 Cor. xv. The sowing precedes the dying in the plant; vs. 36, "is not quickened, except it die." But it by no means follows from this that the inseparableness of the two involves in the corresponding spiritual process the same chronological sequence requiring a sowing on the part of man prior to his death. The correspondence, when put to such use, also halts in this point, that the requisite dying in the plant is not a momentary thing as the death of man is, but a gradual process of decomposition in the ground. Fixing the starting-point of before and after thus, it is no longer self-evident, that man must sow his resurrection-body before his death and burial. It must further be conceded that the qualities enumerated in vss. 42-44 favor somewhat a "sowing" during life. At least "dishonor" and "weakness" do. "Corruption" is more neutral because it can be said no less of the living body than of the dead body. What most favors Calvin's view is the phrase *σῶμα ψυχικόν* which can hardly apply to the dead body, but can be quite properly said of the living body before death.

MODERN VIEWS ABOUT INSPIRATION—AND THE TRUTH OF SCRIPTURES

Modernism is not very modern, to be sure. For who was it that said, in an account that describes an incident at the very beginning of human history: "Yea, hath God said!"? We are familiar with the ever-recurrent phrase in the Scriptures of old, in one form or another: "Hath the Lord indeed spoken only by Moses? Hath He not spoken also by us?" As for the New Testament, Theodore of Mopsuestia, in the attempt to combat the allegorical interpretation of the Alexandrian school, opened the way to liberalism. More than one exponent of Scholasticism, in the attempt to make the Christian religion agree with the vagaries of Neoplatonism, followed in his steps. And the subjectivism of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, fertilized and nourished by the rationalism of Kant, Leibnitz, and Wolff, stimulated by deists, atheists, and agnostics like Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hume, Voltaire, Paine, Ingersoll, Hubbard, and scores of others, brought the movement to fruition in a strange offshoot of legitimate Higher Criticism, namely in the Modernism of the last half century, with its emphasis on the so-called Social Gospel, to the detriment of absolute knowledge and truth based on the one infallible source of doctrine and norm of life, the Holy Scripture.

Right here lies the crux of the whole difficulty, for all those who, during the last century and a half, have enlisted under the banner of subjectivism, particularly the Modernists of our day, are characterized by their attitude toward the fact of verbal and plenary inspiration, as set forth by the Bible itself. All the volubility of such men, in particular the exponents of the Social Theology, in praising the Bible as a wonderful book, even as the most marvelous and amazing book ever written by men, will not conceal the fact that they have constructed their own little house of an inspiration which agrees with their own reason and suits their own convenience, but is far removed from that infallibility which Holy Writ clearly sets forth in its own behalf and insists upon with un-

varying emphasis. The definitions and explanations which set forth the modernistic conception of revelation and inspiration represent every possible shading from a virtual denial of anything like true inspiration to a vague idea as to what might be accepted in the text of the book without actually declaring the Bible to be the Word of God.

Let us first list a number of expressions by men who paved the way for Modernism and such as have been influenced by the anti-Biblical attitude of such rationalistic tendencies during the last century. The selections must, of necessity, be limited, because there is much repetition and irrelevant argumentation. The following list may serve to give a picture of the notions held by men who have denied the position of Scriptures in the premises.

KAHNIS: Since we were obliged to assume a human coefficient in the case of the prophets and apostles, even when they received the revelation, so we could not possibly conceive of a conceptual digestion and presentation of this material without the coöperation of the human peculiarity and could simply point to unknown facts. . . . The word of revelation, which was imparted within the kingdom of the Old and the New Covenant, can be understood only in connection with history.¹

This must be understood in the light of the following statement:

The Same: The story of the origin of the canon proves that its present form does not rest upon divine right. . . . *Inspiration does not concern the divine content*, but the divine origin of Scripture. . . . The testimony of the Holy Spirit guarantees only the divinity of the content of Scripture, insofar as it is a revelation of salvation, and for the spiritual origin of the Holy Scriptures as a whole, but *not the inspiration of Scripture in the specific meaning of the word*.²

LUTHARDT: The Scripture is not in itself the revelation, but *only a report of the revelation*.³

v. HOFMANN: 2 Pet. 1, 21, is according to the immediate meaning of the words, not even said of all individual parts of the Old Testament Scriptures, much less of their collection in a unified whole.⁴

The Same: Not to individual statements wrought by God (*gottgewirkte Aussprüche*) do Jesus and the apostles refer, but to the Scripture. . . .

¹ *Lutherische Dogmatik*, Vol. I.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, 659, 660, 662, 663.

³ *Zeitschrift f. Prot. u. Kirche*, Vol. 43, 176.

⁴ *Schriftbeweis*, I, 576.

The totality of Scripture is the only word of God for His congregation. . . . It is such as a whole.⁵

VOLCK: I confess that the Bible is not the revelation, but the account of the revelation.⁶

The Same: Thus the Bible is divine and human; divine, because it originated through the self-activity of the Spirit of God and gives the stamp of God's thoughts; human, because written by men and expressing the human thinking, willing, and feeling of its authors. But since the Bible is a work of God written by men, its relative errancy follows.⁷

THOMASIUS: The operation from within—namely that of the Holy Ghost in producing the Scripture—one must try to think of according to the analogy of the Holy Ghost's work in the regenerated, namely in this manner . . . that He influences them to a free self-activity.⁸

HARNACK: There is . . . a conception which looks upon the Bible as a means of grace ordained by God. . . . This conception contradicts the Holy Scripture itself as well as the testimony of the Old Church and that of the Reformation, as also that of Christian experience.⁹

ISRAEL: Omnipotence was not connected with inspiration, for inspiration does not remove the limitations of human observation, so that, for example, the story of the resurrection is told differently, because every one tells it as he has seen and observed it.¹⁰

BACHMANN: Inspiration . . . is the designation for the operation of the Holy Spirit with regard to the Church of redemption (*Heilsgemeinde*), whereby He enabled her to perceive the spirit of life and truth in the literary monuments of the early Christian era and to bring them together in a unit, a book normative for herself.¹¹

DRIVER: That both the religion of Israel itself, and the record of its history embodied in the Old Testament, are the work of men whose hearts have been touched, and minds illumined, in different degrees, by the Spirit of God, is manifest; but the recognition of this truth does not decide the question of the author by whom, or the date at which, particular parts of the Old Testament were committed to writing. . . . No part of the Bible, nor even the Bible as a whole, is a logically articulated system of theology: the Bible is a "library," showing how men, variously gifted by the Spirit of God, cast the truth which they received into many different literary forms, as genius permitted or occasion demanded. . . . None of the historians of the Bible claim supernatural enlightenment for the *materials* of their narrative: it is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that these were derived by them from such human sources as were

⁵ Quoted in *Lehre und Wehre*, XXI, 323. Cp. here John x. 35; Gal. iii. 16, and the many quotations of the Old Testament in the New!

⁶ *Inwieweit ist der Bibel Irrtumslosigkeit zuzuschreiben*, 13.

⁷ *L.c.*, 14.

⁸ *Christi Person und Werk*, III, 451.

⁹ *Ueber den Kanon*, 6.

¹⁰ *Evang. Dogmatik*, 13.

¹¹ *Grundlinien der systematischen Theologie*, 107.

at the disposal of each particular writer; in some cases from a writer's own personal knowledge, in others from early documentary sources, in others, especially in those relating to a distant past, from popular tradition. . . . There is a human factor in the Bible, which, though quickened and sustained by the informing Spirit, is never wholly absorbed or neutralized by it.¹²

J. F. CLARKE: The curious fact in regard to this theory of verbal inspiration is that the Bible itself makes no such claim. . . . Inspiration means the descent of some higher truth into the soul by vital processes, not merely logical or mechanical.¹³

G. B. SMITH: The Bible is valued today because of its actual power to quicken our religious and moral ideals rather than because of any particular theory concerning its origin.¹⁴

WILLIAM DE WITT HYDE: Reverent appreciation of the Bible as our ultimate literary expression of the life of the Spirit does not compel one to accept blindly or to interpret literally every narrative or statement it contains. Here, as in all ancient history and literature, criticism has a great sifting process to perform.¹⁵

BEST: The power of the Bible—its worth, its right to speak to human souls, its conveyance of the message from God—do not depend on inerrancy and are not vacated when the student of the Scriptures abandons the effort to show that the Bible is a book of no mistakes. . . . The Bible by no means needs to be inerrant in order to be infallible. . . . Memory and record . . . have failed to preserve for us the knowledge of what exactly God said when He spoke out of the clouds of Sinai to the awed Hebrew tribes massed in the plain below. . . . If God had ever intended to stake the reputation or the authority of the Bible on a superhuman accuracy in minor and incidental facts, He would certainly have taken care to make that extraordinary exactness an unmistakable phenomenon. There is no evidential value for inspiration to be drawn from the sort of inerrancy which to a cursory reader is so little manifest that he thinks he sees quite the opposite—the same kind of harmless inexactitude that he would expect in all story-telling and history-writing by average honest men.¹⁶

GOEBEL: The Bible of Christianity, the Holy Scripture of the Old and the New Testament, nowhere and in no manner makes the claim that its origin, its authorship, is to be based upon a wonderful immediate divine act. . . . In spite of emphatic agreement in all great points there is a series of dark places, of uneven accounts and discrepancies of reports. . . . It is clear that all writings, the human written productions, came into being in a human manner. . . . The entire book in every way is

¹² *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, ix. ff.; quoted in Keyser, *Contending for the Faith*, 32 ff.

¹³ *Common Sense in Religion*, 87, 90.

¹⁴ *Socialism and the Changing Theology*, 217.

¹⁵ *Social Theology*, 192.

¹⁶ *Inspiration*, chapter on "The Mirage of Inerrancy," 68 ff.

human, a human monument of human philosophy of life. . . . The concept of inspiration must be enlarged, with reference to the Bible, in such a manner that it includes the sum total of the widely varying divine influences and takes them together, under whose power the origin of the Bible took place. . . . According to this conception of Bible inspiration we cannot assume, in a general way, to insist in every respect, on an absolute inerrancy for the word of the Bible. . . . In the measure in which the material of the Bible, the statement of numbers, names, dates, or other data belonging to secular history, or to geography, but in fact any human connection of thought, expressions of emotions, and forms of presentation have no significance for the purpose of the Bible as monument and key of the revelation of God in Christ and therewith as the norm of Christian faith and life, in that measure the universal fallibility of human authorship has retained its plan, also under the specific inspiring influence of God.¹⁷

In other words, Goebel is willing to concede absolute divinity to those portions of the Bible in which matters of faith, of doctrine, and of life are set forth; in all other points he wants human fallibility recognized and acknowledged. He fails to tell us how and where we human beings are to find a criterion according to which we are to make a distinction which will be acceptable to all those who profess the Christian faith.

To this collection of statements many more could be added, but those given are fairly representative of the various theories held by men who, at least for the most part, still desire to give the Bible at least some recognition as a source of doctrine and norm of life. Let us now, for the sake of better and more rapid orientation, make a list of the various theories advanced, analyzing them according to some outstanding characteristic :

The Intuition Theory.—This holds that inspiration is but a higher development of that natural insight into truth which all men possess to some degree, a mode of intelligence and a devotional attitude of mind which is the product of man's own powers. (Pelagian, rationalistic.)

The Theory of Divine Direction and Assistance.—This holds that a distinction must be made between inspired and

¹⁷ *Allg. evg. luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1926.

non-inspired material in the Bible, so that the activity of the Holy Spirit is more in the nature of suggestions, in many cases merely of assistance and direction. (Nestorian: Calixt.)

The Illumination Theory.—This regards inspiration as merely an intensifying and elevating of the religious perceptions of the Christian, of the same kind as, though greater in degree than the illumination of every believer by the work of the Holy Spirit in conversion. (Arminian; Coleridge; J. F. Clarke; Robertson; Curtis; Ladd.)

The Dictation Theory.—This holds that the holy writers were mere passive instruments or automatons, and, in its extreme form, that even the Hebrew vowel-points were inspired, although these were invented long after the canon of the Old Testament was closed. (The two Buxtorfs; John Owen; the Swiss Formula of Consensus of 1675.)¹⁸

The Dynamical Theory.—This overemphasizes the human element in the authorship of Scriptures, as receiving merely a high degree of spiritual power, so that the holy writers were constantly in conscious possession of this power, which was merged with a most exalted exercise of their own powers of intellect, emotion, and will; it states that the Holy Spirit has given the Scriptures to the world by a process of gradual evolution, and that this process did not guarantee inerrancy in things not essential to the main purpose of Scripture. (Strong.)

The Theory of Subject Inspiration.—This holds that the subject-matter or the material used by the holy writers alone was inspired by God, the entire choice of form and words resting with them. It is the theory which at the present time exerts the widest influence with men who still profess to believe in the inspiration of the Bible.

The Theory of Partial or Limited Inspiration.—This holds that only certain parts of the Bible, such as the New Testament alone, or the Old Testament only in part, were given by

¹⁸ See Horton, *Inspiration and the Bible*, 8; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 209.

inspiration; whereas difference of manner or kind of inspiration may be assumed, but not of degree, for the orthodox view holds that it makes no difference, in the product, whether the hidden things of God were revealed and given to the writers outright, word for word, or whether the information they possessed was so filtered in the process of inspiration as to eliminate all errors of information and memory and to make every word the absolute truth.

The Theory of Progressive Revelation.—This holds that there was an evolution in the revelation of the truth, culminating in the Christian religion, whereas, so we hold, the Bible speaks of only one revealed way of salvation, one which held for the patriarchs before the Flood as well as for the believers of the New Testament. There is a difference in the degree of clearness with which the message of salvation was written, but there is no progressive revelation.

The Theory of a Wider Conception of Inspiration.—This is the notion advocated by Goebel, according to which inspiration includes the entire influence of God upon all the faculties of the holy writers as they were employed in producing the Holy Scriptures, the final result being still subject to error except in the parts pertaining to faith and doctrine. This theory, as we have seen, denies the inerrancy of the Holy Scriptures.

We note that there is a degree of overlapping between some of the theories here analyzed, but that the list will serve for a basic analysis of views held by writers to whom reference has been made. The list could be further extended if we should want to enter upon the various more subtle distinctions observed by the various writers. We might also call attention to the subjective position taken by certain theologians with regard to certain books of the Bible, a position which rests, in most instances, upon a false conception of inspiration. As for alleged mistakes and discrepancies, believing theologians from the time of Pfeiffer (*Dubia vexata*) to our own days, with the books by Arndt (*Does the Bible Contradict Itself?*) and Hassold (*Difficulties Solved*), have defi-

nitely disproved the charges of unbelief to the full satisfaction of all reasonable people.

Over against all the vague, faulty, misleading, and false statements and explanations which are listed and analyzed above we cling to the Bible's own estimate of itself and its precious contents. For the Bible is to us a definite entity, the only book which properly bears the name. All other so-called bibles or sacred books, the *Koran* of the Mohammedans, the *Vedas* of the Hindus, the *Tri Pitaka* of the Buddhists, the *Granth* of the Sikhs, the *Agamas* of the Jainists, the books of wise sayings of Confucius and of Laotse, the *Isis Unveiled* of the Theosophists, the *Book of Mormon* of the Latter Day Saints, *Science and Health* of the Christian Scientists, all these are books conceived by the minds of men, made by men, with a man-made way of salvation. It is practically an insult to Holy Scripture even to compare these books with the one revelation of God given to mankind in the Bible.

There can be no mistake about the Book with which we are dealing. It expressly calls itself *Scripture* or *the Scripture* (John vii. 38; x. 35; Acts viii. 32; Rom. iv. 3; Gal. iii. 22; iv. 30; James ii. 8; 1 Pet. ii. 6; 2 Pet. i. 20), also in the plural, *the Scriptures* (Matt. xxi. 42; xxvi. 54; Mark xi. 49; Luke xxiv. 27; John v. 39; Acts xvii. 2, 11; xviii. 24, 28; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4), *the Holy Scriptures* (Rom. i. 2), *the prophetic Scriptures* (Rom. xvi. 26), *the Scriptures of the prophets* (Matt. xxvi. 56), also *the Holy Writings* (2 Tim. iii. 15), *the oracles*, or words, *of God* (Rom. iii. 2; Heb. v. 12; 1 Pet. iv. 11). It is interesting to note, also, that the sacred writings as they existed at the time of the prophet Isaiah, are called *the Book of Jehovah* (*Sefer Jehovah*, Is. xxix. 18; xxxiv. 16), the Greek translation offering the word *biblion*: the Bible of Jehovah.

There was also no confusion in the minds of the early teachers of the Church concerning the one revealed truth of the Lord, the book which is His message of salvation to mankind. We find, in writings of the early Church, such names as: the *Divine Writing* or *Scripture*, the *Lord's Scriptures*,

God-breathed Scriptures, Heavenly Writings, the Sacred Library (Jerome), *the Books* (Chrysostom), in the Greek *ta biblia*, the expression which is the basis of our present word *Bible*.

This Bible consists of the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments. The word *canon* is also Greek, but with a Hebrew derivation. It was used to designate a rule, a measuring-rod, a yard-stick, a scale beam, or anything that was a measure or a rule for other things. In the derived sense, in the field of ethics, we find the word used in such expressions as "canon of good," "canon of what is just." Compare Gal. vi. 16: Mercy upon all those that walk according to this canon; 2 Cor. xiii. 13-16: The measure of the canon which God hath distributed to us. In agreement with this linguistic development, canonical books are those which belong to the rule of faith, as they were most likely included in the lists furnished by the bishops during the early centuries. "Were any one in doubt about a given book, he could beg the bishop to tell him whether or not it stood in the list or canon. . . . It is in every way probable that the books of the Old Testament at first, and then later also the books of the New Testament at an early date, came to be called canonical in the sense that they contain that which is fitted to serve as a measure for all else, and in particular for the determination of faith and conduct. . . . It was in connection with both meanings, but especially with the latter, that the thought of a totally finished and closed up collection of books was attached to the word, and that this thus limited series of writings was called the canon as the only external and visible rule of truth."¹⁹ In the word *canon*, then, and therefore also in the word *canonical*, we have the connotation both of historical evidence and of doctrinal basis, the idea which the orthodox teachers have always associated with the term.

We accept the *canonical books of the Old and the New Testament* as the inspired Word of God. We disregard the

¹⁹ Gregory, *Canon and Text of the New Testament*, 20.

resolutions of the Roman Catholic sect as found in the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent, whereby certain apocryphal books of the Old Testament are made a part of the canon. These books, according to the clear testimony of the Jewish Church and of the New Testament, are not a part of the revelation of God to men, but are merely human products (Book of Judith, Wisdom of Solomon, Book of Tobith, Ecclesiasticus or Book of Jesus Sirach, Book of Baruch, Books of Maccabees, Portions in Esther, Story of Susannah and Daniel, etc.). And while we recognize the difference between *homologumena* and *antilegomena* in the New Testament (the latter: Hebrews, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, James, Jude, Revelation), we declare the difficulty to be connected with the historical support given these books more than any other single factor, and we feel that the doctrinal objections against these books (including those of Luther against James) have been pretty well removed.

These canonical books, as they make up our Bible, we declare to be the inspired Word of God. The sixty-six sacred books are not merely an historical document; they are the inerrant Word of God, His message of salvation to the whole world. We have the Bible's own testimony for this fact. This argument has been assailed as a *petitio principii*, as an *argumentum in circulo*, with a reference to John viii. 13; "Thou bearest record of Thyself; Thy record is not true." But everywhere in the world the principle is recognized that a document is ordinarily to be taken at its face value, unless there are weighty reasons to assume, *a priori*, that, by its nature and purpose, it is liable to abuse along the lines indicated. But the nature of the Bible record, the very form of its testimony, its high ethical standard with the emphasis upon truth and honesty, precludes such a suspicion from the outset. Its testimony concerning its authorship is incidentally woven into the warp and woof of its fabric. Even Lessing must concede the weight of the force lying in the naiveté of the evangelists.

Let us list a few of the passages which tell us what the

Bible states concerning its origin and nature. From the books of the Old Testament we pick, almost at random, the following statements:

Ex. xvii. 14. "And the Lord said unto Moses, *Write* this for a memorial in a book and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua."

Ex. xviii. 4, 7. "And Moses *wrote* all the words of the Lord. . . . And he took the *Book of the Covenant* and read it in the audience of the people. And they said, All that the Lord hath said will we do and be obedient."

Deut. xxxi 24. "And it came to pass, when Moses had made an end of writing the *words of this Law in a book until they were finished.* . . ."

Josh. xxiii. 6. "Be ye therefore very courageous to keep and to do all that is written *in the book of the Law of Moses.*"

Is. viii. 20. "To the *Law and the testimony!* If they speak not according to *this Word,* it is because there is no light in them."

Is. xxix. 18. "And in that day shall the deaf hear *the words of the Book,* and the eyes of the blind shall see out of obscurity and out of darkness."

Is. xxiv. 16. "Seek ye out of the *Book of the Lord* and read."

From the New Testament the following passages will suffice to show that the documents of the Jewish Church, as collected in their canon, were acknowledged as the Word of God:

Luke xvi. 29-31. "They have *Moses and the prophets;* let them hear them. . . . If they hear not *Moses and the prophets.* . . ."

Luke xxiv. 27. "And the beginning at *Moses and all the prophets,* He expounded unto them in the *Law of Moses and in the prophets and in the psalms* concerning Me. . . . Then opened He their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures."

2 Pet. i. 20. "No prophecy of the *Scripture* is of any private interpretation." Cp. v. 23.

To this testimony we must add that of the men who wrote the various books of the Bible, who recognized God as the real author of their writings and thus testified to the divine origin of the Bible.

Rom. iii. 2. "Unto them (the Jews) were committed *the oracles of God*."

1 Pet. i. 25. "But *the Word of the Lord* abideth forever. And this is *the Word which by the Gospel is preached unto you*."

1 Cor. xiv. 37. "If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are *the commandments of the Lord*."

1 Pet. i. 11. "Searching that or what manner of time *the Spirit of Christ* which was in them did signify *when it testified* beforehand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow."

Here we must add another group of passages, namely those which expressly state that it was the Lord that spoke through the inspired men, that God is the real author of the Bible.

Matt. i. 22. "Now, all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was *spoken of the Lord* by the prophet." (Cp. ii. 13, 17, 23; iii. 3; iv. 14; viii. 17; xii. 17; xvi. 14, 35; xxi. 4; xxvi. 56; xxvii. 9, 35.) : "Thus saith the Lord. . . . He saith unto Me."

Matt. xxii. 31. "But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was *spoken unto you by God?*"

Rom. i. 1, 2. "Called to be an apostle, separated unto the Gospel of God, which He had promised afore *by His prophets in the Holy Scriptures*."

Heb. iii. 7, 8. "Wherefore, as *the Holy Ghost saith*, Today if ye will hear His voice, harden not your hearts, as in the provocation, in the day of temptation in the wilderness." Cp. x. 15, 16.

These witnesses are sufficient for us, who accept the Bible as the truth. But there is also testimony of a different sort, extraneous, historical, archaeological evidence which sup-

ports and corroborates the Bible and speaks for its divine origin. Consider only the following points: the universal instinct for worship, which is found even in those tribes that stand lowest in the human family (cp. Acts xvii. and Rom. i); the moral constitution of man and his alienation from God (cp. Rom. i. and ii.); the tradition of the lost Golden Age (cp. Gen. i. and ii.); the extra-Biblical traditions of the Fall; the account of the Deluge; the table of nations (cp. Gen. x.) and the two families of language, the Aryan and the Semitic; the distribution of nations and the primitive monuments; the political relation of Israel with the surrounding nations; the fulfilment of prophecy.

We mention, at least in passing, a third argument for the Bible as the inspired Word of God, and that is its influence in the history of the world. It will suffice for any one but to pick up and glance over the pages of such books as Brace, *Gesta Christi*, and Dennis, *Christian Missions and Social Progress*, in order to be most deeply impressed with the divine power of the Word in the history of all nations which have in any manner come in contact with the message of the Gospel. Even the experts in the field of comparative religion, who pride themselves on their unbiased approach to the question of the relative worth of the various religions of the world, such as Clarke, Robinson, Moore, Hume, and others, have been obliged to concede, on the basis of reasonable deductions based on internal value and outward influence only, that the Bible and Christianity are the strongest moral power in the world. The inspiration of the Bible, and therefore the power of God inherent in its message, alone can account for the superiority of the Christian religion.

This leads us to the next point of our discussion, namely to the question: What, then, do we mean by inspiration? The answer is: By inspiration we understand the process by which God (specifically the Holy Ghost) impelled certain men, chiefly prophets and apostles, at certain times, to write down His message of salvation to men.

Let us here, first of all, list some of the chief passages telling us what God means by the process of inspiration:

2 Tim. iii. 15-17. "And that from a child thou hast known the *Holy Scriptures*. . . . All Scripture is given by *inspiration of God*."

2 Sam. xxiii. 1, 2. "Now, these be the last words of David. David . . . said, *The Spirit of the Lord spake by me*, and His Word was in my tongue."

Ps. xlv. 1. "My heart is inditing a good matter, I speak of the things which I have made touching the King; *my tongue is the pen of a ready writer*."

1 Cor. ii. 13. "Which things also we speak, *not in the words* which man's wisdom teacheth, *but which the Holy Ghost teacheth*."

2 Pet. i. 21. "For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but *holy men of God spake* as they were moved by the *Holy Ghost*."

John xiv. 26. "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost. . . . *He shall teach you all things*."

John xv. 26, 27. "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the *Spirit of truth*, which proceedeth from the Father, *He shall testify of Me*. And ye also shall bear witness."

John xvi. 13. "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will *guide you into all truth*." Cp. John xvii. 20; Acts i. 8. That the last named passages refer not merely to revelation, but to inspiration, follows from the fact that the *teaching activity* of the apostles is concerned.

From these passages, objectively considered, we are bound to obtain the following picture of the process of inspiration:

Scripture, inspired by God, God-breathed, is the expression coined by the Spirit of God. And the matter concerns writings, the production of the Holy Spirit intended for future generations, for men of all times. God wanted to present His eternal thoughts, the wholesome and saving truth to the world in inspired writings, in a form fashioned by Himself, in a form and appearance which would adequately reproduce the divine content. . . . Scripture is inspired by God. God breathed the Scripture, had it proceed out of Himself like breath, breathed it into the

men who wrote it, transmitted it to their minds. This God-breathing is the characteristic, the specific activity of the Spirit of God. God, the Spirit of God, breathed at, breathed into the prophets and apostles what they were to write. The Holy Scripture consists of words . . . If we do not accept verbal inspiration, then it is senseless, nonsensical, to speak of an inspiration of the Bible. The inspiration of the Bible as such is verbal inspiration and plenary inspiration.²⁰

The men selected for this work were chiefly prophets in the Old Testament, for David and Solomon also belonged to this class, and it seems that the majority of those who wrote had received some specific training, many of them in the Temple or in the so-called Schools of the Prophets. But it mattered little to the Holy Spirit whether the man whom He impelled to write was an Isaiah, of royal descent, or an Amos, the herdsman of Tekoa, whether his message might later comprise sixty-six chapters or only one: He chose these men as His instruments, and as such they acted in putting down the inspired message. The same is true in the New Testament. To the apostles the Lord has given the specific promise to lead them into all truth, and on the historical side we look for evidence showing that the writers of the New Testament were either themselves men to whom this promise was given, or such as were specifically singled out, as disciples of apostles, to pen the great truths pertaining to the salvation of men.

These men were not constantly inspired, as history amply shows, and for that reason many books written by these men were not received into the canon. David was not under the effects of inspiration when he committed the various sins which are charged against him, nor was Peter when he denied his Saviour and when he became guilty of Judaizing tendencies in Antioch. It was only when the Holy Ghost, by a direct command or impulse, bade these and other men to write that their message has value for the salvation of men. Solomon wrote much more than that which has been preserved in the Bible, and the same is undoubtedly true of Paul in the New Testament. Only those writings which were by God

²⁰ Dr. G. Stoeckhardt, in *Lehre und Wehre*, Vol. 38, Oct.-Dec.

intended for the canon of Scriptures were inspired by Him for that purpose. At the same time the concept inspiration excludes every form of forcible operation. It was gentle breathing of the Spirit; the human organs of the writers willingly opened themselves. It may even be said that, at least occasionally, the Spirit gave them His Word without their being aware of the extent of the influence which had come upon them. (Cp. 1 Pet. i. 10-12.) The writers were not only deeply moved by their subject, by the high and holy mysteries of faith, but they were fully possessed with the Spirit, pervaded by His power, elevated into the realms of the supernatural; the Spirit Himself was the Source and the Reservoir from which they drew, from Whom content and form, ideas and words flowed into their minds, into their pens, spiritual matters in spiritual words, and so they were in truth the pens of a ready Writer. In no way was their writing by their own will, no matter how great their historical information may have been; it was not a product of their own human philosophy, their own thinking. The inspiration of the Bible is that activity of God, that process by which the Holy Spirit gave to the holy writers, when they wrote at His impulse, all that they should write and that they did write, all the thoughts of Scripture and all the words of Scripture, so that the resultant product is in the truest and fullest sense of the word divine.

One of the most amazing facts, in this connection, is this that the Holy Ghost, in choosing and using the various writers for His purpose, made use of their natural gifts and talents, of the historical information which they possessed, of the result of their research in the field of human knowledge, of their entire mental and spiritual machinery, if that expression may be used. Many books of the Bible are largely historical in character, and we have numerous references to extra-Biblical sources as well as to the result of personal study and research.²¹ The knowledge of the inspired writers,

²¹ Cp. Num. xxi. 14, 15; Josh. x. 12-14; 2 Sam. i. 18; 1 Chron. xxix. 29; 2 Chron. ix. 29; Luke i. 14; Acts xvii. 28; 1 Cor. xv. 33; Titus i. 12; Jude 9 and 14, etc.

as it were, passed through the crucible and the furnace of the Spirit's omniscience, to be cleansed of all dross of human mistakes and to be presented in the inspired account without a mistake. On the other hand we have, sometimes in connection with such historical sections, but more often in chapters which reveal the deepest mysteries of the Godhead and of the plan of salvation, facts which the mind of no man can ever perceive or fathom by himself, by his own reason or strength, where every thought and word of the contents, as well as the form, is fully and entirely and alone inspired by God the Holy Ghost (revelation in the strict sense). As the leader of a great orchestra draws out and controls the individual instruments, in order to produce a perfect blending and harmony in the piece of music which is being rendered, just as an organist makes use of the various stops of his instrument, controlling also the swell organ and the echo organ as he deems it necessary for the best rendering of the composition, so the Holy Ghost made use of the various holy men as His instruments, in order to produce the perfect symphony of the Holy Scriptures, always with the one great theme sounded with persistent emphasis: Jesus Christ the Saviour of all mankind. To this end He employs and directs the sublime passages of Isaiah and Daniel as well as the homely comparisons of Amos, the sharp logic of Paul as well as the appealing depth of John.

The result was that perfect book which we call our Bible, a book of divine information concerning the way of salvation, and without a flaw or error in the documents as written by the inspiration of the Spirit. Not only is every word of doctrine true, but there is also no mistake in the historical data offered, nor in any other point of divine or human knowledge. The Bible is no textbook of history, and yet every statement concerning both the people of God and the other nations of the world is true. The Bible is no textbook of natural history, and yet every statement, even every incidental remark in the field of geology, cosmology, astronomy, and biology is true. The Bible is no textbook of psychology and pedagogy, and

yet the sum and substance of the highest, the only true pedagogical wisdom is contained in its pages. The Bible was written in the course of some fifteen hundred years, in sixty-six books, by approximately two score writers, and yet there is no contradiction, no real discrepancy in the Bible. On the contrary, the longer one studies the Bible, the more he must be impressed with its amazing unity, with the remarkable agreement of all its parts. Compare Zech. i. 4; vii. 12 with the pre-exilic prophets; the epistles of Peter with the synoptic gospels; Revelation with Ezekiel. Not only are the same great subjects brought up again and again, but the very expressions of language are the same. Just as a great composer, in spite of the many themes he develops, will time and again make use of the same phrasing, so the great Author of the Bible, working through His chosen instruments and employing the main motif of the salvation of mankind through the vicarious atonement of Jesus Christ, makes use of the same phrasing, though in varying combinations, so that everything is bound to move forward to the grand finale, the hymn of the ransomed souls before the throne of the Lamb.

St. Louis, Mo.

P. E. KRETMANN.

PRIMARY REQUISITES FOR THE SPEEDY EVANGELIZATION OF CHINA*

I

It was in answer to a prayer for a hard field of labor that the Lord sent Robert Morrison to Canton. There, in utter spiritual loneliness save for the presence of Him who wonderfully fulfilled His promise, "Lo, I am with you alway," and in the face of obstacles which gave every appearance to the human eye of being absolutely insurmountable, in the year 1807, he heroically entered single-handed upon the very hardest of tasks, one to which thousands of doughty successors have since given their lives and for which many have been privileged to shed their blood.

The evangelization of China is indeed the Church's most stupendous task; and it is a task which after one hundred and twenty-one years of heroic Protestant mission work is just begun. That great teeming land estimated to contain about one-fourth of the entire population of the globe not only leads the world in population, but comprises the largest block of homogeneous people to be found anywhere. Within the boundaries of China, probably one-sixth of the world's population speak the same language, at least one-fifth of the men now living in the world have worn a queue and one-fifth of the world's women are painfully hobbling through life on feet deformed by cruel binding. There are many more idolators in China than in any other land; and within sixty miles of my home in Shantung Province lies the grave of China's grandest sage, who can claim more followers to-day than can any other ethical leader in any other land. Surely to effect the permeation of this enormous solid human mass with a saving knowledge of our blessed Redeemer and to move it Christward require many times the energy which, in the his-

* Dr. A. B. Dodd was the "Students' Lecturer on Missions" at Princeton for the year 1928-1929. He delivered the course of five lectures provided for by this foundation on the afternoons of February 18-22, 1929. This article is the first of these lectures. [Ed.]

tory of Missions, has led to the speedy evangelization of many an isle of the sea as well as numbers of smaller lands or independent tribes.

Add to this the fact that China has for millenniums enjoyed a high degree of civilization which has developed in her a self-complacency and pride that has held her gaze inward and backward instead of outward and forward, as in the case, for instance, of her more progressive neighbor to the east, the fact that, due to her desperate struggle with poverty as well as to her philosophy inherited from the past, her point of view is grossly materialistic, and the further fact that her relationship with so-called Christian nations in the West has often been such as to prejudice her strongly against them and their religion; and perhaps we may be enabled to form at least some faint conception of the immense mountain of difficulty which stands in the way of the progress of the Gospel in the greatest of all mission fields. Surely we are justified in affirming that the evangelization of China is the Church's most stupendous task.

We believe we are equally justified in the assertion that it is a task which, after nearly a century and a quarter of Protestant missions in China, is barely begun. In saying this we are by no means unappreciative of the prodigious labors and remarkable achievements of the past. Thousands of God's true laborers have there abounded in the work of the Lord and their work has by no means been in vain in the Lord. There has been a very extensive proclamation of the Gospel message in thousands of churches and street chapels, on myriads of crowded fairs and markets and in as many wayside inns, and on hundreds of thousands of village streets. Throughout the length and breadth of the land, many more tracts and Bible portions have been sold or given away than there are persons capable of reading them. Probably, of China's million villages, those which have never had the Gospel preached upon their streets and which have never possessed in any of their homes a single dust-covered Gospel or tract, are exceptions, and in most parts of China rare exceptions. A large

amount of more *intensive* evangelization has also been accomplished. Inquirers and church members are gathered in convenient centers for days or even weeks of instruction and many Sabbath Schools and evening classes for the same purpose are carried on out in the villages. Then there are hundreds of thousands who have had the Gospel presented to them very practically, as well as theoretically, in our hospitals, and other hundreds of thousands who, in our Christian boarding and day schools and our Daily Vacation Bible Schools, have had regular Bible instruction for months or years at a time.

Nor have the preaching and the teaching of the Word been fruitless. A church of over four hundred thousand professing Christians, at least as evangelical in faith, as distinct from the surrounding world in life and as ready to suffer shame for Christ's name as is the church in America, has been built up with probably an equal number of inquirers and other adherents and several times that number who, though they have not dared or cared to acknowledge themselves as Christ's disciples, nevertheless believe in their hearts that Christianity is a true religion if not *the* true religion. Moreover, from what your speaker has gathered from the recent reports of missionaries from other parts of China as well as from personal observation, he is inclined to believe that, in spite of all the communistic and anti-Christian propaganda of the last few years, there is a more friendly and open-minded attitude toward the Christian message in China to-day than ever before.

Making full and thankful acknowledgment as we are very glad to do of all these triumphs which our God has given in China to the Gospel of His Grace, we must still admit that, as yet, only a beginning has been made in the great work of evangelizing China. As Rev. George T. B. Davis who has been doing such grand work in China in connection with the Pocket Testament League, says, "In spite of all the missionary effort in China for decades past, many people believe that probably three hundred million people in this land have never yet

clearly heard the Gospel message." This estimate quoted by Mr. Davis is certainly well within the facts; nor would it be fair to conclude that the possible one hundred million who once in a lifetime may have so heard the Gospel presented had been evangelized. Taking as our definition of the word evangelization such a presentation of the Gospel as to give to every individual an adequate opportunity to know and accept Jesus Christ as He is offered to them in God's Word, a definition which would doubtless meet with general acceptance in evangelical mission circles, one who knew China would hesitate to claim that that country was even as much as one per cent evangelized. While there may be several million of Chinese who take a more or less intelligent interest in Christianity, the average citizen of that Republic, owing to his dense ignorance and lack of interest in things above the material realm as well as to lack of opportunity to hear, probably has not much clearer an idea of what Christianity is than the average American has of what Theosophy or Russellism is, and, except for its supposed connection with politics, and its philanthropic works, cares as little about it. There are huge sections, often containing entire counties with hundreds of thousands of precious souls, for the evangelization of which no mission has ever assumed the responsibility. One such county of nearly half a million population lying between our own and an adjoining Presbyterian station had for years been left as a sort of spiritual no man's land, when it was picked up by a busy colleague of mine, who, in addition to his heavy teaching work, took upon himself the responsibility of its evangelization. This was but one of many such counties. The *World Dominion Press* which has been devoting much careful attention to a mission survey of the world is responsible for the staggering statement¹ that there are 333 counties in China, with 166,500 towns and villages, and a population of nearly forty million without a single evangelistic center, and gives the following account of some of China's great outlying districts which are almost wholly unevangelized, the efforts

¹ See their publication, *The World Vision*, pp. 8-10.

of the Church being feeble indeed "in face of the growing, spreading, commingling races":

Mr. R. W. Sturt tells us that in Mongolia, he has recently been preaching to tribes who have never been visited since Gilmour was there thirty years ago! This means that a generation has passed into eternity without the Gospel. . . . Dr. T. Cochrane, who succeeded Mr. Gilmour, said that when he was in Mongolia, a region which could hold twenty-seven Englands, he was the only medical missionary there, and to-day the situation was unaltered. . . . Tibet and vast regions in Central Asia are unoccupied. We have just had a visitor from Chinese Turkestan, who said: "Can results be expected there when people only hear about the Gospel for an hour or two once in their lives?" And Miss Cable, of the C.I.M., who, with two brave companions, travelled from Kansu across Sinkiang to Russia, writes to us as follows: "From Suchow, in Northwest China, to Chuguchak, on the Siberian border, is sixty marches, and on that journey we passed but one mission station, held by two men in the town of Urumchi. Large prosperous cities which collect merchants from all parts of Central Asia, as well as men from the eighteen provinces of China, were without any witness to Christ. Travelling west from Urumchi there are fifty-four marches to Kashgar, where the Swedish missionaries have their headquarters. Thus in a journey of ninety-four days, over the great main trade route of Central Asia from Suchow to Kashgar, Urumchi is the only mission station. When we entered Qazaqstan we found ourselves amongst a Moslem population of five millions which has recently been brought under the restriction of Soviet rule. This great territory of Turkestan has already been surveyed with a view to opening up motor communication which will eventually connect China with Russia and link her up with India. WHERE ARE THOSE WHO SHOULD HAVE THROWN UP A HIGHWAY FOR OUR GOD?"

Even where regular mission work in China has been carried on for decades, the fields of the individual evangelists are so large that very often a majority of the people never get to hear the Gospel message. The darkened minds of the vast majority of those who do hear it, even repeatedly, are so preoccupied or prejudiced or amazingly indifferent to eternal things that the preacher's words fall upon ears that are spiritually deaf. Twenty-five years of contact with the heathen mind have only deepened my amazement at the brute-like unconcern with which the multitudes look upon the hereafter. Turn to that old lady with the white hair who has been listening with every appearance of attention to the earnest words of the Chinese preacher as he has tried to tell her of the wrath of

God revealed from heaven and of the righteousness of God revealed in the Gospel which alone could save her from that wrath, and ask her if she is prepared for death, and she will probably reply without the least hesitation, "Yes, quite prepared," and point with pride to a fine new coffin lying across one end of the room, or tell of the elegant burial garments all neatly folded in that chest at the other end. Hand that soul-searching little tract entitled "Where Are You Going?" to those men chatting in front of the village temple and ask them, "Where are *you* going—after death?" They may reply with a chuckle, "To our graves, of course," or, more uncertainly, "Do we not go southwest?", but they will be more likely to try to dismiss the very unusual question with a careless, "Na ge, swei djih dao?", "Who knows *that*? ", or, if they happen to be scholars, they may smile condescendingly and quote the classic utterance of Confucius on the subject, "Wei djih sheng, yien djih sī?", "We do not yet know life, how *can* we know death?" God doubtless *has* put eternity within the heart of all mankind; but in the case of untold multitudes, it has been so covered up by the rubbish of this world that it scarcely ever comes to the surface of their consciousness. No, my friends, as Dr. Ellinwood,—was it not?—observed many years ago, we are not to think of the heathen as a lot of amiable folk standing around waiting to be converted. If it were so, their evangelization would be a comparatively simple matter; but, as a rule, there are deaf ears to be opened, blinded eyes to be restored, there are foolish and darkened minds to be informed and illuminated, there are misconceptions and prejudices to be removed and a thick hard crust of indifference to be penetrated,—before the Gospel story can so come in contact with their minds and hearts as to give them an adequate opportunity to accept Christ as their Redeemer. This can be accomplished only by the most prayerful, persistent and painstaking presentation of the one true Gospel in all its purity and power throughout all China, marshalling all the evidences necessary to make it credible to the hearers, and depending for guidance and results only upon

God's Spirit who is even now opening the hearts of scores of thousands of Lydias in China to receive His Word.

In pioneer mission work, the progress of the Gospel often is sadly retarded at first by the absence or insufficient quantity of the most striking evidence to unbelievers of its truth,—Christ living in those who by faith have been crucified with Him. It is hard to realize in a Christian land the extent to which the evangelist's words are confirmed and enforced by the living miracles of grace with whom the hearers are in close daily contact; but, in the case of the average hearer of the Word in China, where only one in a thousand is even a nominal Christian, there is not a single professing Christian in his village or for some miles around, and it may be that his closest if not his only contact is with some church member who by his inconsistent life is a stumbling block rather than a help to faith. How can such a hearer of the Gospel be said to have been given an adequate opportunity to accept it as God's only way of salvation from sin?

Surely, notwithstanding all that has been done and the wonderful way in which the Lord has blessed the labors of His servants in that great land, we can but consider the great work of the actual evangelization of China as still before us. A great amount of faithful foundation work has been done by heroic souls who have preceded us, but the building itself has still to be erected. How is this to be done? And how soon may we fairly expect the top stone to be put on with shoutings of "Grace, grace!" unto it?

To forestall misapprehension and vindicate the use of the word "speedy" in the title of these lectures, let us first give a brief reply to the second question, leaving the first for our subsequent more detailed consideration. When we say that the evangelization of China is a task which, after one hundred and twenty-one years of heroic mission work, is so far from completion that it may be said to be just begun, we do not mean at all to imply that it will take another longer or even equal period of time to finish the work. On the contrary, we believe it reasonable to expect such work, if on a sound

basis, normally to advance according to geometrical rather than arithmetical progression; for, with the blessing of God, every person won in the work of evangelization should become a recruit for the further prosecution of that work. In China, there has been, until recent years, a very marked progressive acceleration in the results and extent of the work of evangelization. When Robert Morrison, after twenty-seven years in that land, laid down his life-work, he could count his converts on the fingers of one hand. By 1860, it required three figures to enumerate the professed followers of Christ; but, by 1900, this small nucleus had grown to over one hundred thousand. Since that date, the rate of acceleration has rather disappointingly decreased, these twenty-eight years showing only about 300 per cent increase. Still it is significant to note that the Church, within the past twenty-eight years, has at least made three times the numerical growth it had made in the ninety-three years before the Boxer persecution in 1900.

There has also been a growing increase in the number of new fields occupied, in the missionary force, and in the number and quality of the Chinese evangelists. Not only so, but in many ways the present working forces are in a much better position to do effective work than were their predecessors. They have inherited much from the latter in the way of experience, the testing out of methods, the overcoming of suspicion and prejudice, and the gaining of the good-will of the people, the translations of the Scriptures and the provision of an evergrowing Christian literature, the establishment of training schools, and in many other ways; and the Chinese churches back of them have been growing in Christian knowledge and character and willingness to shoulder responsibility and to suffer for Christ, as well as in numbers.

After all, however, the controlling factor is not human but divine. "Not by might nor by power, but by My Spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts." Given a mighty infilling of the workers and the Church by the Holy Spirit in answer to importunate prayer, and His general preparation and opening of the

hearts of the people for the reception of the Gospel, who dares to set a limit to the speed with which China may be evangelized? In the day of His power, we may well expect numerical ratios, even those of geometrical progression to be marvelously transcended by the Almighty One who multiplied the five loaves and two small fishes to the satisfying of five thousand hungry men and who is able to save by many or by few, enabling five to chase a thousand and a hundred to put ten thousand to flight; we may expect many an anxious group of fishermen who may have toiled all night and taken nothing to hear and heed the divine command to launch out into the deep and let down their nets for a draught and suddenly to find the capacity of nets and boats taxed to the utmost. Yea, we may even look for a nation to be born in a day.

One must be blind indeed who cannot look beyond the present enshrouding darkness and discern upon the ancient hills of Tang clear indications of the dawn of such a day. The mighty hand of God has been laid with exceeding heaviness upon the entire nation and upon His own people within that nation. For the past few years, the people of China have been in the throes of a crushing series of tribulations that has been heartbreaking to all of us who have been called upon to witness it. Terrible floods, droughts, earthquakes and clouds of locusts have brought on one awful famine after another which, in spite of all that could be done to relieve them, have taken their toll of lives by the million and, through enforced sacrifice of land and borrowing of money at extortionate rates of usury,—as high often as four or five per cent a month,—have reduced many other millions to economic hopelessness, to prolong with their children after them a losing battle with poverty and hunger pangs. Many others have been driven to acts of lawlessness. Your speaker has not infrequently been disturbed at his studies by a great commotion and looked out of his window to see a mob of his neighbors in broad daylight waylay and plunder a row of grain barrows or carts just outside the suburb wall of his city. Many a mother, as an

act of supposed mercy to her starving baby girl, has left the tiny sufferer at the gate of some well-to-do family to be picked up by them,—or eaten by the dogs! Even more deplorable, many a parent, to escape starvation, has, for a paltry sum, reluctantly resorted to the sale of larger daughters into lives of shame and sadness. Words cannot describe the awfulness of one of these great famines to one who has never witnessed them and heard the insistent appeals of adults and the piteous cries of starving children so numerous that they are entirely beyond his power to help. In the wake of these famines, stalks deadly pestilence. Typhus, typhoid, tuberculosis, "flu," and other dread diseases find easy victims in the poor emaciated bodies of the famine sufferers.

Nor have the well-to-do escaped their tribulation. Desperate bandits abound on every side. Gathered in well-organized troops of hundreds or even thousands, they boldly lay tribute upon the villages within their easy reach and ply a lively trade in "flesh-tickets" as they callously call their captives. These are held for ransom at prices nicely calculated to exhaust the patrimony of the victim's families, and are often most cruelly treated. No man of any means whatever can lie down to sleep in safety unless indeed he flees from home and takes up crowded unsanitary quarters in a camp of refugees within the protecting walls of some large town or city. Even these retreats are by no means perfectly safe from sudden attack by larger troops of bandits. The suffering and abject terror of thousands of poor captives, the fearful anxiety of loved ones in the weeks or months of cruel suspense, and the constant dread which fills the lives of hundreds of thousands awaiting their own possible turns, all this constitutes another of China's present sorrows.

As if these distresses were not enough, tyrants great and small, utterly selfish and unspeakably cruel, have vied with one another in oppressing their suffering people, taxing them beyond endurance and often quartering upon them hordes of unpaid looting soldiery. Due to their oppressions and mutual jealousies, one revolution after another has swept across the

country, paralyzing trade, further impoverishing the people, and deluging the land with blood. The recent Nationalistic revolution has been the most thoroughgoing in its anti-imperialistic principles and has won the most signal triumph of them all. Many sweeping reforms have been inaugurated and hopes are high for the future, but few will dare to predict that an era of permanent peace is yet in sight for that distracted country. In all this fearful storm of manifold tribulations which has seemed to break all at once upon this great non-Christian land, who can fail to see the mighty purposeful hand of a faithful Creator who has willed to show this proud ancient people their absolute need of Him and His great salvation? May we not hope that in this time of deep distress they may be led to seek Him with their whole heart and find Him?

His hand has also been laid very recently with mighty force upon His own servants in China. After the terrible ordeal and bloodshed of the Boxer year, God, in His tender compassion, gave to His Church and mission body a quarter of a century of rest from bitter persecution, and a steady growth in influence and numbers. Instead of trying to destroy them, the people came to tolerate and often to respect and trust them. The missionaries were treated with courtesy and honor. Their compounds often became places of refuge from mutinous troops and bandits. Conditions of living gradually grew easier. Their cramped unsanitary native-style dwellings were replaced by roomy substantial residences of brick and stone. Stately churches, commodious schools, and modern hospitals followed. The amenities of social life among the missionaries increased, and great summer resorts were built up, where, on hillside or seashore, the missionaries would gather in the hot season for rest and relaxation. The usual result, alas, of all this followed. The spiritual life of the missionaries gradually declined. They came to depend too much upon the arm of flesh and its institutional creations rather than upon the Spirit of Almighty God. The intense burden for souls so characteristic of the pioneer missionaries was largely being lost in a

multitude of efforts at moral, social and industrial reforms. Attracted by this new-style mission work, there came from the many unsound and apostate colleges and theological seminaries of the West an ever-increasing stream of young men and women who not only neglected but belittled and obscured, and in some cases even denied the Gospel preached by the Apostle Paul and declared by him to be the only Gospel and the power of God unto salvation. These and others who abetted them by casting doubt upon the authority of God's Word were doing much to undermine the work of the majority of missionaries who were sound in the faith, but, for the most part, amazingly unwatchful, and neglectful of the Scriptural injunction to contend earnestly for it. Perhaps mere overtrustfulness and overwork on other things on the part of most of us, together with the prevailing world-wide spirit of easy toleration of even deadly error on the part of others, will account for this unfaithfulness, though it can by no means justify it. However that may be, the progress of the Gospel was being hindered and the future of Christianity in China seriously imperilled.

Then suddenly God acted. In severity and yet with the most loving care over His own, He applied the rod and drove us out! However unnecessary it may now appear to have been in view of the surprisingly pacific solution of the serious international complications and in view of the experience of the Roman Catholic missionaries and those Protestant missionaries who remained at their posts, most of the eight thousand Protestant missionaries, to save the Chinese Church from the added embarrassment and persecution which they feared their presence among them might involve, and to avoid complications between the Chinese government and their own, at the urgent advice of the legations of their respective governments, were led in agony of spirit, but with a remarkable degree of unanimity, to evacuate their interior stations before the advance of the Nationalists, then under the dominant influence of a bitterly anti-foreign and anti-Christian party. They suffered the spoiling of their goods, the destruction of

many of their homes, the ruin of much of their mission property upon the building of which they had expended years of trying labor, the serious disorganization of much of the work which was dearer to them than their very lives, anxiety about their Chinese friends and colleagues and the Chinese Church, uncertainty as to their future careers, and, last but not least, the most cruel taunts of their enemies and misunderstandings on the part of many of those for whose very sakes they had left their stations. All this has constituted a spiritual trial of crushing severity. It has been a chastening of the Lord which is not to be despised. It is leading to deep searchings of hearts and should not fail, in the mercy of God, to lay the missionary body in the very dust before Him with broken and contrite hearts such as *He* will not despise. If they but humble themselves under the mighty hand of God, He will without fail exalt them in due season. Have we not every reason to hope that He will *speedily* pick them up from the dust prepared for a greater, more glorious service than ever before,—the actual completion of their task?

God's mighty hand has also been laid upon His *Church* in China. As in the case of the missionaries, a quarter of a century of comparative freedom from persecution and an increasingly friendly environment had not proved conducive to a deepening of spiritual life. Less courage was required to take a stand for Christ. From its connection with the foreign missionaries, the Church had acquired a certain prestige in official circles which sometimes attracted men from unspiritual motives, such as the hope of protection from injustice and blackmail. In spite, generally, of the utmost care on the part of the Protestant missionary, these hopes were not always vain and many unregenerate people were led to seek membership in the Church very much as they would in some insurance lodge. An extreme case of this kind came to the notice of the speaker in a country congregation of some forty members connected with a distant mission station where he found it necessary to interrupt a protracted meeting by effecting the excommunication of eleven members for gross

sins. The deplorable situation was rendered more intelligible to him when he learned that the church at that place was in large measure the fruit of the unholy ministrations of a former unprincipled Chinese preacher who succeeded in persuading candidates for admission that it was worth their while from a business standpoint to pay him three strings of cash each for successful recommendation to the foreign pastor for baptism,—one string for each Name pronounced over him! Where less courage was required and other motives were becoming possible, it became the part of wisdom to make up in added vigilance and the substitution of other checks for the lack of the former automatic barriers to the entrance of the Church by those still strangers to the new birth. In many places this was done and in some places possibly carried to an extreme, but, on the whole, it was altogether too much neglected, with the result that the spiritual life of the Church was vitiated and weakened by the introduction of too much dead matter. It is generally admitted that in this respect the Church in Korea has been built up more soundly than that in China. While the Chinese Church has been growing in spiritual knowledge, that growth has been far too slow for the proper development of its life. We have to confess that it has suffered terribly from under-shepherding. Its spirituality has been injured too often also by an unwise use of mission funds. Indeed some of the most spiritually minded of the Chinese pastors have felt this so strongly that they regarded the withdrawal of the missionaries as providential that the Church might learn to stand alone and not depend so much on foreign money. While all admit the immense importance of education in the proper development of the Church an over-emphasis on education, and especially higher education has had an even more disastrous effect upon the Church's spirituality. One frequently hears the lament by Chinese of keen spiritual insight that the very coldest portion of the Christian Church is to be found in the mission colleges, and the next coldest, in the middle schools. As in so many of the higher educational institutions in the United States, many of the students were losing

their faith and putting selfish ambitions above their loyalty to Christ.

In fact, without disparaging any of those elements of strength and solid growth which we so gratefully recognize in the Chinese Church, we must admit that, in recent years, it, like the Church in our own dear land and indeed throughout the world, has been in deep need of a revival. One of the most encouraging features of the situation has been the widespread, deep conviction of this fact. As before the Boxer persecution, the Lord prepared His people for the fiery ordeal by calling them to seek His face in earnest importunate prayer, so did He prepare them for the present terrible testing of their faith and loyalty. Within the past five years, nothing has been more noteworthy than the steady deepening of the prayer-life of the Church. We have rejoiced to observe it in the North China Theological Seminary where, in addition to the morning watch which is faithfully kept by the students, it has been their great delight to gather in the early morning as well as in the evening to pour out their souls in confession of sin and in prayer to God for His blessing upon themselves, their institution, their beloved Church throughout China, and their own dear land. The movement for a daily morning prayer meeting has rapidly extended itself throughout all the surrounding country, until now a church which is unable to sustain such a meeting is looked upon as lacking in spiritual life as a church in this country which fails to keep up its mid-week prayer meeting. One had but to read the news items in the Church papers to realize that similar movements were simultaneously in progress all over China bringing blessed revivals and reaping precious harvests of souls in many places.

It was the loving hand of a Father laid in tender mercy upon His Church to draw it nearer to Him that it might know Him better and submit more trustfully and humbly to His mighty hand which in the anti-Christian persecution at the hands of the Communists was about to be laid so heavily upon it. And then the blow fell! All south of the Yangtze

and in many regions north of that river, the Christians, loaded down with heavy and unusual responsibilities, confronted with new and perplexing problems, and deprived of the counsel and protection of their missionary friends, were subjected to the worst kind of taunts, threats, insults, imprisonments and outrages, and some were even called upon to lay down their lives for their dear Redeemer.

Though there was not the extensive loss of life which characterized the Boxer persecution, the test was an exceedingly hard one to stand. At a time of deeply stirred Nationalistic feeling and resentment against foreign nations, to be jeered at, threatened, beaten, or paraded through the streets as traitors to their country, "foreign slaves," and "running dogs of the foreigners" were trials of loyalty to Christ under which many a Christian in America might falter. To make it harder, every effort was made by their persecutors to cause them to lose confidence in their so-called "shepherd-teachers" from the West, who, according to the gross misrepresentations of their enemies, by their precipitous and unseemly flight before the slightest possibility of danger to themselves, had clearly demonstrated the fact that they were but heartless hirelings, now departed possibly never again to risk their cowardly necks beyond the reach of foreign gunboats! Is it any wonder that some denied their Saviour? The wonder and the glory of it all is that so large a proportion of the Church remained true,—according to estimates of our Presbyterian missionaries, over five-sixths even in Hunan, the very hardest place of all.

Thus, through the mighty acts of God, we see, on the one hand, a people mellowed by intense sufferings and keenly conscious of its need of help, an immense field of human souls made white unto the harvest: on the other hand, we see a missionary body and a church made meet by their sufferings for the Master's use, ready as never before to be sent forth as divinely equipped laborers unto the harvest.

We see closed doors again swinging open before the glad tread of His servants as they return to their great work. We

see the hearts of all classes of the people deeply impressed by the witness the missionaries and Christians have given to their Lord and by the Christian spirit with which they have taken their tribulations and abuses. In a letter from my friend, Rev. Frank Brown of the Southern Presbyterian Mission, written just before the final victory of the Nationalists and quoted by Rev. Egbert W. Smith, D.D., one of their Foreign Mission Secretaries, he speaks of his resumption of work at his station in Kiangsu Province as follows: "The Lord has opened a door to the hearts of the Southern soldiers. We have access to all the military hospitals in the city and to some of the camps. We talk to the wounded, use a little phonograph (that escaped the loot), preach the good news, hand out Gospels, pictures, etc., and write home letters for them. It is a new experience to minister to the same armies that have looted our property and are still despoiling it." From numerous reports which come from all over China, we may well take this letter as typical of the spirit of the missionaries and the Church and typical also of the attitude of the non-Christians, even former enemies, toward them. It is no wonder that clear-headed Chinese statesmen, such as Dr. C. C. Wang, Assistant Director of the Peking-Mukden Railway and Delegate from the Republic of China to the recent International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, see in this attitude a unique opportunity for Christian missions, especially those from America. In an address printed in the *China Sphere* of Tsingtao last November, Dr. Wang thus describes the aim of the Nationalists: "What we are aiming at now is to remove all defects in law or custom, to do away with all that dwarfs knowledge or stifles the freedom of thought, as well as to clean away all unworthy elements in pride of race. We want to remove all these obstructions to progress, and change the past supercilious contempt for Western learning and Western help into enthusiastic eagerness and genuine respect. In short, we want to make a complete 'house-cleaning' so that we may be able to enjoy our own inheritance as well as to contribute our share to the world." Speaking of

the American missionaries, he says: "The Christian efforts of these self-sacrificing men in leaving their own homes and coming over to China to preach the Gospel and to diffuse knowledge, as well as their help during the Revolution itself, have contributed no small share in making the Revolution so sane and bloodless. The good results of their efforts have won not only the confidence, but also the good-will of the Chinese people and there is not the slightest doubt that these Americans will exert even a greater influence in the future."

After long years of waiting, cannot the ear of faith detect in all this a distinct sound of marching in the mulberry trees over there in China, and does it not constitute an imperative call to arise and follow our Divine Captain to a final and speedy triumph?

Indeed, the stupendous task of China's evangelization, viewed in the light of the present unexcelled opportunity, presents a challenge to the Christian Church of our day which is unique. From the standpoint of actual missionary accomplishment, it is still a day of small things, but by no means a day to be despised. There are many adversaries, and manifold difficulties tower mountain high before us but should not in the least dismay us; for, if the Lord be for us, He can and will turn the mountain into a plain. We have nothing to fear from that which is without. Let the communists rage against us to their hearts' content and the anti-Christians imagine a vain thing! What is that to Him who sitteth in the heavens, or to us who have gone forth under His marching orders? What should concern us is that which is within. It should be with us as it was with the Chinese pastor of our local church when the Nationalists were pushing their way northward toward our city and we knew not what vicissitudes a single day might bring. To inquiries about any news which might have sifted through from the battle front, he would reply with a calm smile, "Oh, I have ceased to bother about the news. I believe we are prepared for all eventualities. Material circumstances are of little concern to us; our one great circumstance is *God*." He was right. Our one great circum-

stance *is* God, and He is the supreme factor in the accomplishment of our great task. "Except Jehovah build the house, they labor in vain that build it: except Jehovah keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain. It is vain for you to rise up early, to take rest late, to eat the bread of toil; for so He giveth unto His beloved in sleep." If we *be* His beloved, if we, like the grand old hero of Hebron, fully follow Him and He delight in us, He will not only bring us into the land, but He will *give it to us*. So, in China, our primary interest is not with the "small things" of our present accomplishment as compared with the hugeness of our task. It is not with the inadequacy of force, nor the insufficiency of funds; nor is it with the height or breadth of mountains in our path. It is rather with those holy, searching eyes like a flame of fire which are ever upon us; and our one concern is that, by the constant, accurate use of the plummet of His will, we cause those eyes to *rejoice*. From our point of view, then, the primary requisites for the speedy evangelization of China should be taken to be those factors most essential to the bringing of our Lord's laborers in China into the very center of His will and keeping them just there in that privileged place of abounding blessing and overcoming power.

Tenghsien, Shantung, China.

ALBERT B. DODD.

IS CONSCIENCE A SAFE GUIDE?

The problem of conscience is one for serious minds. It does not appeal to the superficial and careless, with whom "the wish is father to the thought," and life is but an occasion for the display of vanity and the pursuit of pleasure or gain. With them the question, "Is conscience a safe guide?" admits of a ready answer. "Of course it is!" and they go on in their selfishness and sin. But it will take something more than this to justify them before God and man. They will find at last either that they have not followed conscience or it has proved a false guide.

Conscience has been defined as the moral sense; meaning the sense which dictates a man's course in questions of right and wrong. A more intelligent definition would be, that it is the moral judgment reinforced by feeling. To particularize: the judgment is the *directive* power and feeling the *impelling* power of conscience; and when the former points the wrong way the urge will be that way. What we call the *moral* judgment is simply our thinking regarding moral questions with its ethical reaction of feeling.

So, then, when one says he is doing what his conscience dictates, he really means that he is doing what his moral judgment approves, with more or less of feeling. That is, he does what he thinks is proper and right. But suppose he thinks wrong; would any amount of feeling cure the wrong? Would sincerity make it right or atone for the consequences? The fact is, as men are accustomed to act in this matter, conscience is the most unsafe guide in the world. Jesus told His disciples that "the time cometh that whosoever killeth you shall think that he offereth service unto God." And there is scarcely an error or superstition that has darkened the world and oppressed mankind, which has not owed its origin and strength to the mysterious force called conscience.

Ruskin, one of the most illuminating teachers of his generation, exposed the pretense of people who justified themselves lightly on this ground. He thus reasons with an interlocuter:

"I must do what I think right." How often is this sentence uttered and acted on—bravely, nobly, innocently; but always—because of its egotism—erringly. You must not do what *you* think, but, whether you or anybody think, or don't think it, what *is* right.

"I must act according to the dictates of my conscience."

By no means, my conscientious friend, unless you are quite sure that yours is not the conscience of an ass.

"I am doing my best—what can man do more?" You might be doing much less, and yet much better;—perhaps you are doing your best in producing, or doing, an eternally bad thing.¹

¹ *Fors* ii., p. 420.

Conscience, then, left to itself, is not an unerring guide. It is not, indeed, the creature of education, but it is largely formed by it. Heredity and environment are powerful influences in determining its assertion. Unless, therefore, light and help come from without, there is no reason to believe its possessor will find the path of God or accomplish His blessed will. Undoubtedly, in the period of unsophisticated simplicity, this sense makes itself strongly felt for right. In childhood, its notes sound clearly and distinctly in the soul. But even then how much depends upon correct teaching and pure influences, to preserve it from a false bias and make it reliable amid the multiplying experiences of life! However much the forces of self and sin may have perverted conscience and weakened its authority, it is still the throne-room of the soul. But so long as self usurps the throne, darkness will fill the room and the soul will grope at midday. The Lord of the conscience must be enthroned before its dictates will accord with the voice of truth.

How, then, can this be done, and by what agency may conscience become a true guide? Since God has made Jesus "both Lord and Christ," the true Regulator of the conscience is Christ crowned within. To abnegate self and to extinguish every desire and inclination which would color thought and bias the judgment, is to give the right of way to Him whose word becomes the law and whose Spirit the power of an acceptable life. Not the Word apart from the Spirit nor the Spirit apart from the Word, but the Word understood through the Spirit and the Word illumined and applied by the

Spirit, is the guarantee of safety amid the babel voices of this world. The Inspirer of the Word will never contradict Himself, and since the Word "abideth forever," it is the standard by which every voice must be tried. "He will guide you into all truth." But what is that truth? "Thy word is truth." "He will bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you"—whatsoever He "began to teach" (Acts i. 1), and continued to teach through His inspired Apostles until the canon of Scripture was complete. Therefore, every impression and every teaching must be tested by this criterion.

An English doctor has illustrated conscience by the sundial which tells the time by the sun. In this light it never makes a mistake. But at night by a lamp or candle or even by the moon, it tells any sort of time. The right seems to be wrong and the wrong right. The guidance of the sundial is thus seen to depend upon the light that shines upon it.

So is it with the conscience, the sundial of the soul. The light that enables it to give true direction with the sequence of emotional urgency is from "the Father of lights with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning." And since Holy Scripture is the revelation of His mind, there can be no true guidance inconsistent with its teaching and influence. "The entrance of Thy words giveth light; it giveth understanding unto the simple."

Only in the rudiments of ethical conduct can the light of nature make known the way of duty. In the great essentials of religion, involving sin and its remedy, and the soul's eternal destiny, there is no light within until it enters through the written and living word of God. Without this, man may become the victim of a thousand delusions.

Fanaticism no less than worldliness is the result of yielding to impulses or acting upon impressions that originate with the carnal self or some spirit of error.

The instances in which this occurs are legion. A Christian woman was once misled by the specious doctrine and apparent spirituality of a certain sect until her eyes were opened to its fanatical pretensions. Walking one day with the leader of this

sect, she heard him say, "We do not need any longer to read the Bible." She was inexpressibly shocked; as soon as possible she got alone, kneeled down and thanked God that she was undeceived, and promised Him that she would henceforth live by His Word.

Dr. Arthur T. Pierson relates that in the early part of his ministry in the State of New York, he found a most devout and godly woman in his congregation, a leader in prayer and faith and good works, had been entangled in spiritualism and had frequented seances. He asked her how it was possible that she ever got thus entangled and she replied that she had been induced to attend spiritualist meetings by the report that her husband, then deceased, was appearing night after night and calling for his wife. She went and gave the test, that if that were her husband he should tell her something which nobody knew but herself. The answer through the medium gave the fact and seemed to convince her that her husband was communicating with her. "She forgot," says Dr. Pierson, "that she knew the fact, and that, if there was any subtle and unknown law of communication between her mind and the mind of the medium, it was very easy for the medium to tell her what she knew already." He then said to her: "How did you come to leave that circle, when all this glamour of supposed communication with your husband was attracting you to the seances?" She answered, "I found they were teaching doctrine contrary to the Holy Scriptures. And I said to myself, I cannot explain these mysteries and wonders but I can test them by the Scripture principle,—if a prophet shall perform a sign or wonder in your eyes, either by utterance, predicting future events, or by action, performing some inexplicable wonder, if he teaches error, anything contrary to the truth, as already revealed and sanctioned in the word of God, then you are to consider he is worthy to be put to death, rather than to be followed by you."

This principle is the touchstone for detecting falsehood. Isaiah applied it to the spiritualists of his day. "And when they shall say unto you, Seek unto them that have familiar

spirits and unto wizards that peep and mutter: Should not a people seek unto their God? On behalf of the living should they seek unto the dead? To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them" (Is. viii. 19-20). Camp Meeting John Allen, when told by a spiritualist that he ought to have wisdom, replied: "The Bible says, 'If any man lack wisdom let him ask of God,' but you say 'Let him ask his dead relations.'" You cannot fool a man who knows his Bible and walks in its light.

There are persons who excuse indulgence in various forms of worldliness, on the ground that their conscience does not condemn them for so acting. They do not reflect that their conscience is not in harmony with the Scriptures which inculcate self-denial for the sake of others; which teach that the Christian life imposes respect for another's conscience, and that those who wound his conscience and cause him to go astray, "sin against Christ." If their conscience will allow them thus to sin against Christ, it is a false guide. The world is full of offenses through the selfish practices of such people, yet they take refuge in a perverted conscience and continue to exert their baneful influence on souls and "sin against Christ."

Take another case. The man who says he does not believe in "foreign missions" is either ignorant or insincere. If the former, his conscience needs light before it can be trusted; if the latter, he is a hypocrite, or a rebel against God, and is not entitled to consideration in deciding the missionary question. Well might the words of the Lord Jesus be re-spoken, "Why call ye Me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?" The very heart of the Gospel is the spirit of world-wide evangelism, and the command especially emphasized, as revealing the supreme purpose of the same, was, "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature."

An instance of conscience that must be regarded as sadly perverted or deficient in light, is that of men who obligate themselves to preach certain doctrines and then, in after years, advocate views diametrically opposed to those doc-

trines, while holding on to the position which the obligation, solemnly taken, secured to them. Certainly this is not to "provide things honest in the sight of all men." Neither the word nor Spirit of God presents such a standard of morals. It is as cowardly as it is ethically unsound to enjoy the honors and emoluments of a place created by a creed which one no longer believes or maintains. The plea that creeds are a matter of indifference and one ought to preach his convictions, is not true as to the first member of this proposition nor relevant to the question as to the second. For creeds are the foundations of institutions and to subvert the foundation while sheltered by the institution is a betrayal of the trust imposed and assumed. And though one should preach his convictions, he is bound to observe the law of righteousness in doing so. The path of honor and self-respect for him lies outside the pale of the church whose creed he disowns. His place is in the camp of its enemies instead of in that of its friends. True courage would cause him to go where his change of creed properly identifies him, or secure a following, if such he seeks, by launching his own enterprise. Those who fail or refuse to see this, or to act in accordance with the ethics of Scripture, do violence to the truth and evince the need of a better conscience.

Other instances of the application of the principle stated could be given, showing that no supposed dictate of the conscience, no impression, however seemingly justified or strong, can be safely followed, unless in harmony with the Scriptures. Any inner light that does not blend with them is hell's false glare. Every system, every movement, claiming to be of God, should be put to this test. If it seemingly accords with the Bible in some respects, but plainly contradicts it in others, it must be rejected, for revealed truth is a consistent whole.

It is wrong to surrender one's judgment in religion to any individual or organization. The obligation to search the Scriptures is personal and specific, and cannot be transferred. If every man is answerable to God, he must see whether the teaching he is asked to accept, be of God, and is bound to take

no man's word for it. But having personally attended to the matter, he must not be deterred by personal considerations from acting in accordance with the convictions so formed. The example of the Bereans, in searching the Scriptures daily to find whether their preachers were giving them sound doctrine, should be more in evidence among God's people. The counsel of John "not to believe every spirit but to try the spirits whether they are of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the world," was never more necessary than in these times when so many substitutes for the Gospel and counterfeits of its power, are producing infidels on one hand and fanatics on the other.

It is important in this connection to inquire concerning the authority of the Church. The Church in the Scriptural sense is a company of people united by a common faith in the worship and work of God. Its authority does not extend to the conscience of its members, but only to the conditions under which anyone shall enter and remain in its communion. Its mission is to "preach the word" and guard the faith (by which the apostle meant the system of truth) "which was once for all delivered unto the saints." Whatever conditions of membership are laid down must be in the interest of harmony and efficiency and not with a view to suppress the right of private judgment. The command of Christ to search the Scriptures is applicable not to corporate bodies as such but to the individuals who compose them. And every man is bound to satisfy his own conscience in the light of those Scriptures that he may fill the place God wills in the economy of His Kingdom.

The keys of the Kingdom were not meant for Peter alone as is evident by the fact that Christ committed them, after His resurrection, to all the apostles and to the Church as a whole (John xx. 19-23; Matt. xxviii. 18-20; Acts i. 2-8). Peter was chosen to open to the Gentiles the door of the Gospel, but he remained to the last "the apostle of the circumcision." The pre-eminence passed to Paul, "the chief of the apostles," who reproved Peter himself for deferring to the legalists. Concerning these perverters of the Gospel Paul de-

clares he "gave place to them in the way of subjection, no, not for an hour, that the truth of the Gospel might continue with you," and he resisted Peter "to the face, because he stood condemned." The great apostle charged that Peter "feared them that were of the circumcision" and by his example influenced other Jews, "insomuch that even Barnabas was carried away with their dissimulations." Now mark the burning words of this contender for the faith: "But when I saw that they walked not uprightly *according to the truth of the Gospel*, I said unto Peter before them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest as do the Gentiles and not as do the Jews, how compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?" (Gal. ii. 4-16, R.V.).

The keys, then, were simply the commission to preach the Gospel and maintain its truth in the face both of opposition and compromise. And Paul seemed to handle these keys very well when even the first apostle became timid in the presence of Judaizing brethren. To him, above all men, it was given to explain the mystery of the dispensation of grace (Eph. iii. 1-11).

One prerogative of the keys has been mentioned. There was another. Not only was the truth of the Gospel to be preached, but the duty of seeing that corrupters of that truth should not be allowed to carry on their work in the church was enjoined. The ministry of the Word of God and the exercise of Church discipline were to go together. The latter has become almost entirely obsolete, while the former has been so diluted with the vain theories of men that it has become "another gospel," which is not "another" (Gal. i. 6-7). The Master gave direction for the exercise of Church discipline and His apostles enforced the command (Matt. xviii. 15-20; 1 Cor. v. 1-13; 1 Tim. i. 18-20; Titus iii. 10-11; 2 John 9-11).

Thus by preaching and teaching sound doctrine and by keeping the Church pure through discipline were consciences to be dealt with and "the binding and loosing," the "remitting and retaining of sins" to be effected. The sanction of heaven would be upon such a ministry. Souls would be awak-

ened and led to Christ for the forgiveness of their sins or in their obduracy given over to sin and spiritual death. And every one would be the arbiter of his own destiny in these respects.

Now in all this arrangement there is no coercion of belief, no violence done to freedom of opinion. Every man is free to remain with those whose faith he shares and is pledged to maintain or to withdraw when he is no longer in harmony with it. But if he insists on declaring sentiments contrary to the doctrines of the church to which he belongs, every sound principle of ethics and religion demands that he be excluded. Yet where is the obligation to such discipline carried out?

The simplicity of Scripture is such that an honest mind cannot long remain in doubt as to the course to pursue amid the varying views of individuals touching any passage. Common sense and the comparing of scripture with scripture, with a humble dependence upon the Author of the Word, will make clear the way of duty to one who seeks guidance.

An illustration may serve a useful purpose at this point. In telling it, the writer, who stood related to the incident, begs to employ the direct form of speech. At the time of its occurrence I was dean of a school of high ideals in a certain State. The student concerned was in bondage to a habit from which, with an awakened conscience, he sought release by self-mutilation. His roommate discovering what had been done summoned a doctor who did what was necessary to save his life. When the matter was made known to me, I hastened to his room and, sitting by his bed, asked for an explanation. He told me that he had read in Matthew's Gospel that there were some who had made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake, and he had concluded that was his way out of his bondage. I said, "God made your body and meant to sanctify it and make it an instrument for good, but you thought by mutilating His handiwork you could get rid of sin. The Devil in the beginning sought to mar God's creation and he has been at this business ever since. You have been deceived. Had you read further you would have got the true

interpretation, that some men have chosen to live unmarried for the sake of their work." "O, I see now," he said, "but it's too late!" I advised him as soon as he was able, to return home, wait on God for guidance as to his future, and believe that God would yet bless him and make him a blessing. But think of such a tragedy in a life misled by ignorance of God and the failure to coordinate scripture!

Now while an objective standard not subject to the possibilities of error incident to human impressions and opinions, is essential to a safe Christian walk, it avails nothing apart from the spirit of intelligent obedience that transmutes into action the knowledge thereby obtained. Hence the need of an attitude that will enthrone Christ in the heart and make it a privilege to exemplify the virtue of fidelity. The spirit of Christ is the spirit of obedience, and wants only the opportunity to evince its devotion to the will of God.

"I am come down from heaven not to do my own will, but the will of Him that sent me and to accomplish His work." "My teaching is not mine, but His that sent me. If any man willetteth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself." "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give His life a ransom for many."

By such statements our Lord disclosed the secret of His unique career, stressed the divinity of His mission, and exalted the royal road of self-sacrifice. "Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His." That Spirit, in whomsoever dwelling, is loyal to the will of God as revealed in the Bible, and says: "Every word of God is pure." He will not accept a substitute for any principle or method imposed by Him on the Church. Despite the clamor of custom and opinion, and regardless of impressions that others may think divine, the obedient disciple abides by the evident teaching of God's word and "lifts up a standard" for the people.

Now this spirit of obedience is far removed from censorious criticism on the one hand, and cold, perfunctory service on the other. It does not stickle for mere form. God will no

more accept the work of a formalist than He will that of a hypocrite. What is the deed without the will? the gift without the giver? "Who hath required this at your hands?" The spirit in which one complies with a requirement determines the quality of the action. "The Lord loveth a cheerful giver."

We are exhorted to be "sound in faith, in love, in patience." Some are orthodox in the letter of Scripture, but heterodox in spirit. The truth is to be spoken in love; but it is the *truth* that must be spoken. Hence the sin of those who, while stressing love, ignore the demands of truth, claiming it does not matter what one believes, if he be good. But the command is to be "sound in faith." A goodness that has no controversy with error, cannot stand the scrutiny of a holy God. True love is faithful to the souls of men, and can say, "I have kept back nothing that was profitable unto you."

Upland, Ind.

NEWTON WRAY.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Christianity In Science. By FREDERICK D. LEETE. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. 1928. Pp. 376. Price \$3.00.

This is neither a book which attempts to set forth Christian doctrines and to defend a particular theological position, nor a book which tries to present the teachings of science in a popular form. It is rather a book which endeavors to show that scientific truth and Christian truth are parts of a single whole and therefore do not need to be "reconciled." As the author says: "A 'reconciled' Christianity would have as little beauty, fragrance, or life as an artificial flower, while a 'reconciled' science would be a mere falsehood" (p. 18). The author also endeavors to show that scientists as a whole have rendered a great service to Christianity, and that their attitude has been in the main Christian, while the vast majority of leading scientists have been Christians themselves. He also shows that science owes a great debt to Christianity, and that Christianity has never been an enemy of true science, but that science has flourished best in Christian environments and in Christian lands. "The progress of science has not only been coincident with that of Christianity but is to a large extent the outgrowth of the environment which Christianity creates" (p. 19).

Chapter I is entitled, "The Spirit and Service of Science," and endeavors to show that the aim of all scientists has been not only the discovery of truth, but the relation of that truth to the service of mankind, so that "the service of science is closely allied in principle and practice with the Christian effort and aim" (p. 25). Chapter II, on "The Human Ministry of Science," gives a bird's-eye view of the realm of the applied sciences to show the vast achievements of scientists and the great benefit which their work has been to mankind. Chapter III, on "The Logic of Science," endeavors to discover the "deepest meaning and message of science" (p. 77) and finds that meaning in a spiritual conception of the universe with Christian implications. "Those who can read aright the revelations which nature is gradually making of its own transcendent depth and meaning, of its order, unity, development, and inherent purpose are strengthened in their faith in the spiritual ground and atmosphere of the universe. . . . In its profound meaning and testimony science is more Christian than in any former period of history" (pp. 97f). Chapter IV, on "Science and Truth," says that "He who seeks truth in any realm becomes thereby, even though unconsciously, at least a far-off worshipper of the God of Truth" (p. 100). The author does not deny that there is and has been in the past, a vast amount of error taught by scientists, and that at times scientists have opposed new ideas

which proved to be true at a later time, but claims that on the whole scientists have endeavored to discover only the truth, and in so doing have been rendering a service to true religion, for truth is a unity, and Christians must welcome and do welcome truth from any source. Chapter V, on "Science and Christian Ethics," endeavors to show that on the whole the ethics of scientists is Christian ethics. A large number of examples are cited to prove this point. Chapter VI, on "Science and Faith," shows that the general principle of faith (i.e. faith in what has not yet been proved) underlies the workings of science, and that most discoveries and inventions are based on that principle, while all scientists are forced to have faith in fellow scientists' honesty and testimony. "Science often helps theology to clarify its statements" (p. 173) and gives religion "firmer ground and added facts on which to rear the structure of its doctrine and confidence." The author shows that in numbers of cases religious faith has been of service to scientists in the discovery of scientific truth. Chapter VII deals with "Heroes and Martyrs of Science," and shows that there is a parallelism between "the ideals and deeds of these eminent characters and those of Christianity" (p. 187). Both have had numbers of those who have laid down their lives, consciously and unconsciously, for the cause in which they labored. A large list of the martyrs of science is given.

Chapter VIII, on "Christian Men of Science," and Chapter IX, on "The Present Situation," deal with men of science who have personally been Christians in the past, and are Christians in the present. A vast array of famous names is here presented. In Chapter IX the author endeavors to show that the whole underlying current of present-day science is Christian in its implications and outlook, in spite of the scientists who teach otherwise. Chapter X, on "Science and Immortality," shows that not only is there no basis for the belief that modern science has disproved immortality, but that in spite of the Leuba questionnaire which claimed to show that believers in immortality amounted to only 50 per cent of the men of science questioned, the vast majority of scientific men to-day do believe in immortality. It is also claimed that there is an impressive argument for immortality from evolution, and the conservation of energy. The author apparently believes in evolution, though he doesn't teach it in this book.

One is impressed with the prodigious labor expended by the author in collecting the facts and quotations given in the book. It offers a vast fund of information about the religious attitudes of the scientists of the past and present, and should be of great service to Christian ministers as a source of sermonic illustrations along this line. On the whole the book produces a favorable impression on the reviewer, and the author seems to have established his main theses that science has done a great service to Christianity, that the fundamental meaning of science is not anti-Christian, but that it rather accords with the Christian interpretation of the universe, and that men of science have been in the past and are in the present either Christians or sympathetic to Christianity. The author has rather successfully concealed his personal religious position, though there are indications that he inclines to moderate Liberalism.

However, he nowhere opposes the orthodox position, nor advocates the Liberal theological views, so that one need not hesitate to recommend the book on account of the author's personal views about religion.

In spite of its many admirable features, however, there seem to be two main faults in the book. In the first place in his endeavor to establish his theses the author presents what seems to be too rosy a picture of the religious beliefs and attitudes of many scientists of the past and present. If one were to believe him one would get the impression that most of the scientists are certain of eternal salvation because of their attitude toward truth, and toward Christianity, or because of some favorable quotation from their writings. The fact that a scientist acted according to the standards of Christian ethics, or that he gave his life as a martyr to science or even that he was a member of some church, does not prove that he was a Christian, or that the sum total of his influence was not anti-Christian in the truest sense. Undoubtedly large numbers of scientists have been and are true Christians, but equally beyond a doubt large numbers of scientists possessing many admirable personal qualities have not been true Christians, nor has their influence been on the side of true Christianity. Moreover many scientists who were professing Christians, have in reality held views which were opposed to true Christianity, and have had an anti-Christian influence.

The second main fault in the book is that the author seems to confuse theism and Christianity. The fault just mentioned is probably due to this confusion of thought. If the author's purpose had been to show that scientists are nearly all theists, we would have little criticism to offer of the book, but facts and quotations which prove a man's theistic beliefs do not prove that he is a Christian. Of course theism is at the basis of Christianity, but belief in theism does not make one a Christian. Trust in the atoning merit of the crucified Saviour is what makes one a Christian, and beyond a doubt many of the men cited in this book as Christians or as having an attitude favorable to Christianity, have in reality been opponents of true Christianity, in spite of the fact that they were or are theists.

However, the book is well worth reading and can be read with profit and enjoyment by all.

Pyengyang, Korea.

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

The Philosophy of Personalism. A Study in the Metaphysics of Religion.

By ALBERT C. KNUDSON, TH.D., LL.D., Dean of the Boston University School of Theology. The Abingdon Press. Pp. 438. Price \$3.50.

This excellent work is a study of the Personalism of Borden P. Bowne, as his theory has been developed by his disciples, since his death, and as it has been used to meet the current problems of philosophy. The author is a disciple of Bowne and was once a student under him. That Bowne was the greatest philosophical thinker of America is more and more the opinion of a growing group of the saner thinkers of the present day. His work in combating the materialism, evolution, and pantheism of his time was of abiding value. The stress he laid upon "personality" as the form

of ultimate and absolute existence has caused his doctrines to receive their present name. Considering the immense importance of "personality" in the thinking of the early Christians who formulated the doctrine of the Trinity,—"There are three *persons* in the Godhead, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory"—it is somewhat strange that the meaning and importance of "personality" itself, have not received special and separate attention. To Bowne, it was a central and fundamental point, in whose meaning were to be found the solution for the questions of philosophy as well as theology and life. That Trinitarians find the defence and proof of the "personality" of the Holy Spirit a central element in sound theology is another evidence of the importance the doctrine holds.

Dr. Knudson's book is a study of all important questions of the present and recent past in philosophy,—an endeavor to show that "personality" holds the best explanation for all of them,—that it is in harmony with all central dogmas of Christianity, such as the Trinity, the Atonement, Immortality,—that it offers the best defence of the whole theistic position,—and to his thesis he brings quite adequate scholarship, unusually wide reading, and fine ability. The book will give to any reader an unusually clear study of all matters now under discussion in philosophical circles, presented fairly, simply and ably. Time would fail, of course, to discuss all of them in full. One might add that the historical summaries and the studies of earlier efforts at solutions, running back to the Greeks, are of very great value.

On one point, however, it seems to the reviewer that Bowne's disciples are abandoning a once important position, without sufficient justification therefor. At present, it is the prevailing method to regard Reality as Force, Activity, Events, etc., and no longer as Substance. Science, for example, hardly anywhere speaks nowadays of the stuff of which Matter is made,—there is no "stuff,"—all is energy, force, points of electricity, etc. Dewey, for example, though in the mind of the reviewer, one of the shallower writers, declares that there is no such thing as "essence"—there is only a stream of events. Objects are now considered as "events." The whole modern Relativity School takes this view. It is true that Bowne in his Metaphysics makes "activity" the mark of Being, but in this, he was at one with all the preceding thinkers of Christianity, who had long before perceived that "pure matter," matter with no powers, qualities, etc., could not exist. The question as to whether there *was* any "substance," "stuff," was not discussed by Bowne. It is practically certain that he would never have denied its existence. But his present day disciples, yielding too much to the trend of the times, it seems to the reviewer, if they do not yield the point, at least do not defend it. Brightman, for example, refuses to say whether there is any such thing as a "soul" considered as an entity, with substantial existence. But Bowne too often speaks of substantial existence to leave any doubt we think as to what his position would have been. And whatever he might have said

were he living today, it is also equally certain,—and on this point, his disciples would also agree,—that there is nothing in the theory of Personality which in any way disagrees with the belief in Substance, as truly existing, as a spiritual entity.

The book is well worth the reading of all interested in the best Theistic thinking of today.

Fulton, Mo.

DANIEL S. GAGE.

The Moral Self. By CHARLES L. SHERMAN, Professor of Philosophy and Education in the Willamette University. Boston: Ginn and Co. Pp. x, 365. Price \$2.60.

This is intended as a text in Ethics. The author states in the preface that most texts are too difficult for the beginner. It would be difficult to find a text more difficult than this work. While the author's views are, as far as can be ascertained, much more wholesome than those of many present-day writers, while his reading is unusually extensive, and while the book contains many valuable and very practical thoughts, and while one already versed in ethical and philosophical literature could find much here of large interest, yet its faults as a text are manifest. The author's general theory of the moral life, and of moral progress, is that it is a unified and synthesized life. Growth in morality is a growth in unity, synthesis. The moral self is the highest of the various phases of the unified self,—higher than the intellectual, the emotional. The growth in unification is described in all its stages and in all these pages there is much that is of real value. But, all this is but saying in many pages that as one's knowledge widens, he will, in all elements of life, frame for himself a better general theory of existence.

The weaknesses of the book are several. The author has read widely. He knows the views of almost everybody of any importance. But his own views are rarely stated clearly and positively. Just what his own position is on many points is often impossible to ascertain. He frequently quotes approvingly on both sides of a question. For example on p. 127: "Perhaps those who advocate war and eternal strife are in the right. Yet the World War does not seem to have made the world much better mentally, morally, or spiritually." He accepts the existence of a "self," as a unifying principle of life, yet it is hard if not impossible to find out what he regards the self to be. Also, he quotes freely, too freely, from numerous authors, in such fashion that while one who knew those writers already, could understand the point of the quotation, yet a student, a beginner, often would have no clue to the point of the reference. Further, the writer's thought is far too rambling and desultory for a text for beginners. Many a topic is alluded to because it has some bearing on what is being discussed, only to be dismissed with a brief mention,—the student naturally being left to wonder why the main discussion was so interrupted by a paragraph which was left with such loose ends. Diverse theories are often stated with as much approval, apparently, for one as the other, and one is left to wonder what the author is really teaching.

Finally, the goal of the whole moral life is left undetermined, unless it be the perfection of the moral self or of the moral personality. But what is to be achieved by the attainment of this unity or perfection is not stated.

Fulton, Mo.

D. S. GAGE.

Relativity and Religion. An Inquiry into the Implications of the Theory of Relativity with respect to Religious Thought. By H. DOUGLAS ANTHONY, PH.D. University of London Press. Pp. xv, 260. Price, six shillings.

This book is a thesis for the Doctorate in Philosophy at the University of London. It contains a considerable amount of information but has the characteristic of most theses for that degree,—the author under the compulsion of university demands has written a book before he was really ready to add anything of permanent value to our knowledge. One often wonders why universities still insist on the lines of effort they do ask for these higher degrees, and especially the degree of Ph.D., which is peculiarly afflicted with waste of effort.

The author has, however, put forth a more worth while book than is usually the case in such thesis-books. His study is chiefly given, of course, to the writers who have attempted to apply Relativity, as formulated, mainly, by Einstein, to the problems of philosophy,—Wilton Carr, Whitehead and Eddington. In each case, his study results in showing that so far, Relativity has not affected the real problems of Philosophy. It is necessitating many consequences in the field of Science, but it has not as yet compelled any alteration of value in the problems of Knowledge, the Existence or Nature of God, nor, as the author shows, in the field of Religion. That his proof of this is not very clear must be said. It rather consists in such quotations as indicate that the authors he has read in the religious field do not find themselves compelled to alter their fundamental beliefs because of any insight which Relativity has brought us. But it is well that this should be pointed out. So many are hastily led to believe from newspaper and magazine articles that our whole religious creed must be altered or swept away by these newer physical doctrines, that it is important that men realize that religious concepts and those of pure philosophy lie much deeper than the fields in which Einsteinian Relativity works.

Fulton, Mo.

D. S. GAGE.

First Steps in the Philosophy of Religion. By CHARLES HARRIS, D.D. Milwaukee, Wis.: The Morehouse Publishing Co. 1927. Pp. xvii, 138.

This brief manual is a treatise on what is sometimes called "fundamental apologetics." It is written from the "Anglo-Catholic" standpoint, which means, so the author explains in his preface, firm adherence to the "objective and authoritative revelation given to the world through the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth," and "generous recognition of the complementary principle of development and progress in the spheres both of doctrine and of religious practice." In our mind there

is great doubt whether this combination is logically possible in any sphere, and we are completely convinced that nothing can be developed into its contradictory and still remain the same. A reading of the book, however, will prove that the Anglo-Catholic does not differ from the Romanist and the Protestant in his understanding of what the fundamental philosophy of Christianity should be. He defends, that is to say, the theses that all Christians in all ages have considered necessary to the basic metaphysics of their faith: that our knowledge is of objective reality; that the theistic arguments are valid; that God is the first cause, personal, and morally perfect; that the soul is immortal; and that pantheism in all its forms and materialism are untenable hypotheses. But if the book considers the usual topics of such treatises, it is distinctive in its clear and cogent analyses of present day antitheistic theories. It is fresh and simple and may be recommended to all who feel the need of an introduction to the philosophy implied by the Christian religion.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Great Men and Movements in Israel. By RUDOLF KITTEL, Professor at the University of Leipzig. Authorized Translation by Charlotte A. Knoch and C. D. Wright. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1929. Pp. xiv, 465.

More than thirty years ago in introducing a translation of Professor Kittel's *Geschichte der Hebräer* to English readers, Professor Cheyne stated that "the deliberateness of Professor Kittel's procedure and the comparative conservatism of his conclusions" should insure his work a cordial reception in England, where, as he confessed, "long and arduous efforts" had been required to "naturalise Old Testament criticism"; and, while clearly considering Dr. Kittel over-cautious, he expressed the opinion that perhaps no book would be more helpful in making what he considered "the inevitable transition" from the traditional to the modern view of the Old Testament than the *History of the Hebrews*.

As Professor Fullerton points out in his Introduction to the present volume, Dr. Kittel while himself a "higher critic" has been from the outset an opponent of the Wellhausen hypothesis. Dr. Kittel himself alludes to this in striking fashion. In speaking of the Priests' Code he declares that "It is a much-revised collection of groups of laws and separate laws that originated in very different periods. . . . The interpreters of the law gave it its present form during the exile and the early post-exilic period" (p. 324). Then he continues:

"This fact has often led people to believe that the book originated at this period and was compiled at the time of the Second Temple. Count Wellhausen's entire theory, which the scientific world had accepted and used in text-books for the past half century, is based upon this belief. Speaking for all branches of science, we may say that a hypothesis which has stood for half a century has done its duty. Measured by this standard,

Wellhausen's theory is as good as the best; however, there is increasing evidence that it has had its day, and that those scientists who, from the first, expressed serious doubts of it are right."

This is a remarkable statement. It is singular, to say the least, that Professor Kittel should pronounce a theory which he has combated for years "as good as the best" simply because it has "stood for half a century." If it is wrong, and Professor Kittel plainly intimates this, and if those who opposed it from the first were justified in their opposition, the fact that the theory, though wrong, has enjoyed so long and so great popularity, does not entitle it to be called good. It simply means that it was particularly subtle and plausible and consequently very difficult to disprove. To estimate the *goodness* of a theory by the length of time it has succeeded in escaping exposure is equivalent to saying that the more subtly error is stated the *better* it is. Of course Dr. Kittel does not mean this. He is simply speaking of the Wellhausen theory as a theory; and he compliments it as a theory despite the fact that he regards it as inconsistent with ascertained facts. Yet the statement is an interesting one especially because of the bearing which it has on Dr. Kittel's own position.

It may be that, in the statement just quoted, Dr. Kittel is merely endeavoring to compliment and in a sense placate the numerous advocates of the "higher criticism" who regard themselves as Wellhausians, while at the same time asserting that history has vindicated him and others in their rejection of certain of Wellhausen's distinctive positions. But a stronger reason lies in the fact that Dr. Kittel's own position is in general so theoretical and as a theory so similar to the one which he rejects that he is not justified in pronouncing a very severe judgment of it. Driver was certainly in the main a Wellhausian. Yet Driver's remarks regarding the "double aspect of the Priests' Code" (*Introd.* p. 142) do not differ essentially from the position defended by Kittel. Driver held that "the chief ceremonial institutions of Israel are *in their origin* of great antiquity; but that the laws respecting them were gradually developed and elaborated, and *in the shape in which they are formulated in the Priests' Code* that they belong to the exilic or early post-exilic period." And Dr. Kittel says practically the same thing. It is merely a question of degree, a question as to the amount of legal data in the admittedly *late* document P which is to be regarded as early and to how early a date it is to be assigned. From the standpoint of the "critics" this may be a burning question. It is not without interest, even great interest for conservative scholars. The nearer the critics approximate the express claims of the Old Testament as to the Mosaicity of these laws the better the conservatives will be pleased. But the conclusions of the critics can never be satisfactory to them as long as the critics insist that the document P which contains the bulk of these laws is *late* and *unreliable*.

It is this which makes Dr. Kittel as a critic of the so-called "modern" view of the Old Testament such a disappointment to the conservative student of the Old Testament. In his *Die Psalmen* (1914), Dr. Kittel pointed out in an elaborate introduction that psalmody appeared in very early times in Babylon and Egypt. This was calculated to lead the reader

to expect that he would do more justice to the "Davidic tradition" regarding the psalmody of the Old Testament than is usually done by the critics. Instead he reached the negative conclusion—a marked anticlimax to his whole discussion—that most of the Psalms are post-exilic (p. xliv). So in the present volume Dr. Kittel occasionally makes statements which would seem to justify the expectation that he would reach conclusions much more conservative than are usually held in "critical" circles. But this expectation is only very imperfectly realized. Thus, Dr. Kittel is confident that "Moses or some of his associates were familiar with the old Hebrew alphabetical writing, and that they were in a position, if they so desired, to have a competent scribe record in writing certain laws or whatever else they considered worthy of noting" and he adds "perhaps a song of victory like Miriam's, or the account of a battle like that with Amalek" (p. 182). But this does not mean that he regards Moses a thoroughly historical figure. On the contrary he tells us that Moses is "still half merged in legend" (p. 29). Our author is convinced that the history of Israel demands "a person of truly superhuman power." He regards the Decalogue of Exodus xx in its "original lapidary form" as "a real monument to Moses' greatness." He argues that this Decalogue must be Mosaic because "Only the ten sentences do justice to a man of Moses' gigantic mind" (pp. 36f.). He believes that "the whole of the large book of laws that we have to-day in a part of the second one, all of the third, fourth, and fifth books of Moses" would not be attributed to Moses by posterity "if in some way it were not fundamentally connected with him" (pp. 41f.). But he considers it "out of the question" that it is really Mosaic. This is of course the old familiar argument which is used by those who cannot accept the Old Testament record as reliable. There are great deeds and words in Israel's history which demand an adequate cause. Many of these are attributed to Moses. Consequently there must have been a man *like* Moses, whether the Moses of the Bible actually existed or not. And this man must have done something to justify his great fame. But just what he did is largely a matter of conjecture. This sceptical attitude on the part of Dr. Kittel is explained by the fact that as his earliest extensive source for the early history of Israel [certain chapters in Judges and Samuel he considers to be earlier] Dr. Kittel mentions the Yahwist, whom he apparently assigns to a date somewhat later than that of Elijah. Regarding him he says: "The Yahwist had before him legendary material, a part of which had had a long history and which had circulated in a form which had been much revised" (p. 197). Consequently it is small wonder that "Moses is still half merged in legend." And if this is the case with Moses we are not surprised that Abraham should be all but completely merged. Dr. Kittel thinks Abraham may have been the name of the head of a migrating clan. That is all he knows about him.

Herein lies the great defect in Dr. Kittel's work. His attitude toward the Old Testament is as thoroughly rationalistic as is that of the critics whose positions he opposes. We are glad to have him argue for the early date of the Decalogue. But we feel that his argument rests on sand when

he exchanges for the express words of Ex. xx. i: "And God spake all these words saying" the "gigantic mind" of an admittedly half legendary Moses. We are glad that he thinks that at least part of the Book of the Covenant may be traced to Moses (p. 314). But when he defends it because in the prohibition against *lifting a tool* (lit., sword) against the altar or *going up by steps* unto it we have ideas which go back of Moses to the stone age ("This altar law assumes that the stone had life, or rather that it was the dwelling place of a deity. To hew the stone might injure the deity; to mount it might injure its feelings"); and concludes that "The law originated in a pre-Mosaic time; Israel adopted it and transferred its application to Yahweh," we feel that he is simply indulging in speculation, and that his argument is of a piece with the theory, which is held by many critics, that the God of Jacob's dream dwelt in the stone which he used as a pillow. The narrative gives a very different explanation of the command against the mounting up by steps to the altar, an explanation which Dr. Kittel completely ignores; and several explanations of the prohibition of lifting a tool against it may be given without assuming that the deity actually dwelt in it. Similarly when Dr. Kittel tells us that the Book of the Covenant contains "an agreement between Israel and Shechem, i.e., between the Israelite and the Canaanite law" (p. 318) in the days of Joshua, we feel that his argument for its early date rests upon an alleged ignoble compromise between Israel and the Canaanites which is contrary to the express teachings of the Pentateuch as to the distinctness required of Israel.

Other examples might easily be cited. But these will suffice to establish our contention that while Dr. Kittel may be willing to do more justice to the "Mosaic tradition," for example, than the more extreme among the critics, his attitude is essentially the same as theirs. His position is not half way between the "traditional" and the "critical" views. He is rather to be regarded as a "critic" who is only a little more independent and less radical in his views than the thoroughgoing Wellhausian.

Princeton.

Oswald T. Allis.

Towering Figures Among the Prophets. By L. O. LINEBERGER, Pastor of Main Street Methodist Episcopal Church, Rutland, Ohio. Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Co. 1928. Pp. ix, 181.

The author states that his aim is "to make the chief prophets, those rare spirits of early Hebrew story, better known and better loved"; and he adds, "It is written in the light of the latest Biblical knowledge." By this is meant that the viewpoint is that of the most widely accepted school of higher criticism. Thus in speaking of Micah, we are told: "In Micah the Old Testament reaches a sublime peak. It had been a long weary climb from the capricious bargain-driving tribal war god of the first Hebrews to the just and ethical God of Amos, the holy and righteous God of Isaiah, the seeking, merciful God of Hosea, the justice-loving God of Micah, to the universal and world-embracing God of Jeremiah and the Book of Jonah. It was a far cry from Jacob's God to the God of Jesus Christ, but from the God of Jeremiah, Jonah, and Micah it was but a

single short-step" (p. 42). This will suffice to indicate the viewpoint of the author. Mr. Lineberger writes well and has an attractive style. His major interest seems to be practical and the homiletic note is prominent. It is perhaps too much to expect of one who has but recently completed his seminary training that his views will differ very perceptibly from the teaching which he has received. But in view of the literary and homiletic ability indicated by this little volume, we cannot but express the hope that before writing other books on the Old Testament Mr. Lineberger will test the conclusions of the critics, which he apparently now wholeheartedly accepts, by the express teachings of the Word of God, and give some attention to the opinions of those who do not accept these conclusions but believe that the explanation which the Bible gives of itself and of its "towering figures" is the best, and the only really satisfactory one, because it is the only one which is in harmony with the facts.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

3 Enoch or The Hebrew Book of Enoch. Edited and Translated for the First Time with Introduction, Commentary and Critical Notes. By HUGO ODEBERG, Ph.D. (London.) Cambridge: The University Press. 1928.

This Apocalypse which, with the approval of Dr. Charles, is called "3 Enoch" by Dr. Odeberg is to be carefully distinguished from both *The Book of Enoch* (1 Enoch) and *The Book of the Secrets of Enoch* (2 Enoch). It is a much later book than either of these. It purports to give the revelations made by Metatron (Enoch) to Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha the High Priest, who (supposedly) suffered martyrdom at the beginning of the second century A.D. But Dr. Odeberg assigns the book to the latter half of the third century. The Hebrew text is that of a Bodleian Ms. of the early sixteenth century; but the various readings of other Mss. are noted in the margin. The English translation is accompanied with very full explanatory notes. In the Introduction which occupies about a third of the volume the sources and literature; the origin and date; relation to 1 Enoch, 2 Enoch and Mandaic literature; the origin, use and meaning of the word *Metatron* (Enoch); the angelology of Enoch, etc., are discussed. It is evident that Dr. Odeberg has made a very careful study of Enoch and that the present volume is the result of much painstaking research. It should be of great value to all who are interested in the Apocryphal and especially the Apocalyptic literature of the Jews.

The book of 3 Enoch is extremely fanciful. Thus Chap. xxiv describes the "numerous chariots" of the Holy One; twenty-three different classes are listed and each is supported by a reference to Scripture. For example, "He has the 'Chariots of the Wind,' as it is written: 'and He flew swiftly upon the wings of the wind'"; "He has 'chariots of the altar,' as it is written (Am. ix. 1): 'I saw the Lord standing upon the altar'"; "He has the 'chariots of Shout' as it is written (Ps. xlvi. 6): 'God is gone up with a shout'"; etc. The next Chapter deals with 'Ophanniel the prince of the 'Ophannim and gives a description of the 'Ophannim

('Ophannim literally means "wheels." It is used of the wheels in Ezekiel's vision. These wheels are personified and 'Ophanniel is the prince who has charge of them.). As this chapter is a brief one and illustrates well the extremes to which the writer or writers of this book go in their endeavors to describe the heavenly world, we will quote it in full in Dr. Odeberg's translation :

"R. Ishmael said: Metatron, the Angel, the Prince of the Presence, said to me :

(1) Above these there is one great prince, revered, high, lordly, fearful, ancient and strong. 'OPHANNIEL H' is his name.

(2) He has sixteen faces, four faces on each side, (also) hundred wings on each side. And he has 8466 eyes, corresponding to the days of the year.¹

(3) And those two eyes of his face, in each one of them lightnings are flashing, and from each one of them firebrands are burning; and no creature is able to behold them: for anyone who looks at them is burnt instantly.

(4) His height is (as) the distance of 2500 years' journey. No eye can behold and no mouth can tell the mighty power of his strength save the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, alone.

(5) Why is he called 'OPHANNIEL?

Because he is appointed over the 'Ophannim and the 'Ophannim are given in his charge. He stands every day and attends and beautifies them. And he exalts and orders their apartment (DE: runnings) and polishes their standing-place and makes bright their dwellings, makes their corners even and cleanses their seats. And he waits upon them early and late, by day and by night, to increase their beauty, to make great their dignity and to make them diligent in praise of their Creator.

(6) And all the 'Ophannim are full of eyes, and they are all full of brightness; seventy-two sapphire stones are fixed on their garments on their right side and seventy-two sapphire stones are fixed on their garments on their left side.

(7) And four carbuncle stones are fixed on the crown of every single one, the splendour of which proceeds in the four directions of 'Araboth even as the splendour of the globe of the sun proceeds in all the directions of the universe. And why is it called Carbuncle (*Baréqet*)? Because its splendour is like the appearance of a lightning (*Baraq*). And tents of splendour, tents of brilliance, tents of brightness as of sapphire and carbuncle inclose them because of the shining appearance of their eyes."

Princeton, N.J.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Abraham Kuyper, een Levensschets. By J. C. RULMANN. Kampen, Nederland: J. H. Kok. 1928. Pp. 261.

He who would know the history of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands of the last fifty years, must study the life of that great religious and political genius, Dr. Kuyper. It may be said that, in more than one respect, the history of his life was the history of his time in

¹ At this point a phrase occurs which is given in Ms. A as follows: "2190—and some say 2116—on each side," while MSS. DE read: "2191 (E: 2196) and sixteen on each side."

Holland. He was an eloquent preacher, a great scholar, an inspiring teacher, a versatile journalist, an eminent statesman, an incomparable leader, and withal a man of God, the secret of whose strength lay in his unwavering faith. He was a conundrum to most of his contemporaries, who did not understand the hidden springs of his many-sided life. They were all amazed at the amount of high-grade work that was done by him, as leader of an important political party, professor in two university faculties, editor of a religious weekly and of a daily paper, and writer of numerous scholarly and popular works,—all at the same time. He was greatly admired and venerated by his followers, and most heartily hated by those who were at cross-purposes with him. Speaking of him as a theologian the late Dr. Warfield once said to the writer of these lines: "If you have Dr. Kuyper with his wonderful grasp of theological truth and his ability to systematize it, and Dr. Bavinck with his immense erudition and great historical knowledge, you have a team that is hard to beat."

Due to the fact that Dr. Kuyper's life was so many-sided, so rich and full, and that the great importance and wide bearing of his work in Church and State can only be fully understood in the light of subsequent history, it is generally felt that the time has not yet come for a real biography of this great man. The author is also of the opinion that it would be premature to attempt, at the present time, a psychological analysis of the personality and character of Dr. Kuyper, and therefore in his work aims at giving nothing more ambitious than a general chronological sketch of his life with special emphasis on its most important and most striking moments and features. For this task he is well qualified, being an historian of no mean ability, the author of three works which cover the history of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century, and also of two volumes of a very elaborate Kuyper-bibliography.

This work on the life of Dr. Kuyper is well done and very interesting an instructive. It pictures the youth of Kuyper, including his academic training, his pastoral labours at Beesd, Utrecht, and Amsterdam, his professorial work at the Free University of Amsterdam, and finally his career as prime minister of the Netherlands. The last part of the work is devoted to an evaluation of the work of Dr. Kuyper for the religious life of the Netherlands, for primary and higher education, for Dogmatics and scientific study in general, for social and political life, and for journalism. It is a fascinating narrative from the beginning to the end, having special charm in that it permits us to see and hear Dr. Kuyper in some of the most dramatic moments of his life, gives us glimpses of his more intimate and family life, and clearly evinces the secret of his superabundant life and work,—his unwavering faith and intimate personal communion with his God. One cannot help but thank God for the great gift of Dr. Kuyper to the Reformed people of the Netherlands and of the world at large. The book is beautifully illustrated

with many striking photographs. We are grateful to the author for this illuminating and inspiring volume.

Grand Rapids, Mich.

L. BERKHOF.

Jean Amos Comenius (Komensky). Sa vie et son oeuvre d'éducateur.

Par ANNA HEYBERGER, Professeur au College Coe, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Docteur de l'Université de Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion 5, Quai Malaquais, VI^e. 1928.

Miss Heyberger of Coe College, an evangelical patriotic Czech, had interviews in Paris with Ernest Denis, the historian of Bohemia. He intended to publish biographies of leading Czechs, especially Comenius, but his death intervened. Miss Heyberger contributes to this part of the plan; and as Comenius never had contact with French educators, she presents her work to French readers. Comenius wrote over 140 works; and she gives a descriptive catalogue of them, with fuller summaries of notable ones in her chapters. She adds a bibliography of Comenius and one of the Bohemian Brethren, of whom he was a representative and their last bishop. She is acquainted with English, French, German and Bohemian authorities. In the First Part she narrates quite fully the vicissitudes of his exile, from an early period of the Thirty Years' War, which began with the "defenestration of Prague"; his sojourns in Poland, Sweden, Germany, Hungary, an interesting visit to England, by invitation of Parliament, and his happier final residence in Holland. In the Second Part she expounds mainly his educational principles.

Comenius is the father of modern pedagogy. The greater part of the progress in schools for the last three centuries is due to him. There is no book on pedagogy in our times which does not plainly show his impress. Others have described the ideas and influence of Comenius as an educator; but Miss Heyberger believes that hers is the first attempt to present his humanitarian and religious works as organic parts of his system of education. This aspect deserves emphasis by those of the Presbyterian and Reformed faith. His *Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart* has been to evangelical Bohemians what *Pilgrim's Progress* is to Britain and America. His treatise concerning the afflicted shows that he knew how to touch the soul of his people; and Miss Heyberger adds that three centuries have not weakened his message. In his *Will of the Dying Mother*, a last testament of his Church, occurs the famous prophecy, "O Bohemian people, I trust in God, that the reign of thy cause will be restored," quoted by President Masaryk, an admirer of Comenius, in his first message to the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia. Comenius personified the history of his own time and reflected the sentiments and hopes of Czechs or Bohemians in the World War. The similarity of Slav languages as spoken gives to the tongue of John Huss some of the advantages of a world language. There are more evangelicals in Czechoslovakia, and they are gaining more rapidly, than elsewhere among the two hundred millions of Slavdom, unless we credit vague, exaggerated estimates of the evangelicals in Russia under Soviet repression. The successful establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic,

and the progress of the Presbyterian Czech Brethren Church in Bohemia and Moravia, remarkably fulfil the aspirations of Comenius, and his works will furnish inspiration to our Slav brethren in future. English-speaking Christians should hear his voice again.

Pittsburgh, Pa.

CHAS. E. EDWARDS.

Young Luther. The Intellectual and Religious Development of Martin Luther to 1518. By ROBERT HERNDON FIFE, PH.D., L.H.D. Professor in Columbia University. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 232. Price \$2.

This study of the development of Luther recalls Professor Henri Strohl's *L'Évolution Religieuse de Luther Jusqu'en 1515* (estimated in this REVIEW, October, 1923, Vol. XXI, pp. 670-672). Dr. Fife makes frequent use of Professor Strohl, with whom he is in substantial agreement. He dwells on the peculiar popular thought and superstitions of peasants and intellectuals in the Germany of the early sixteenth century, facts not without their influence on the young Luther. The place which mysticism, music, dialectics and disputation played in his early development is also noted. Luther's sense of fear, his constant consciousness of unseen forces which must be reckoned with, his regard for the saints and the always imminent miraculous, were determinative factors in his young life. Behind all this, however, the author sees a cumulative set of subconscious impulses.

Much in explanation of Luther's career is found in his lectures on *Psalms* in 1513-15 and those on *Romans* in 1515-16, said to occupy "a critical position in his religious development" (p. 170) and to these two chapters (VI and VII) are devoted. Here Luther's debt to Augustine becomes so very apparent. "What he found in Augustine and quoted from him were the rapturous and beautiful passages which glorify the invisible and sing the praises of the transcendent realities of the life of the spirit." "It is really on Augustine that Luther reconstructs his conception of the will" (pp. 176, 190). Here he finds the true meaning of the *iustitia dei*. "The only salvation then is in the broken will and humbled heart, ready to accept what God imposes. Works avail naught, for the supreme will of God has decided to save us, not by our own righteousness, but by the imputed righteousness of Christ" (p. 193: cf. pp. 169, 176-180).

Next to Augustine's influence on Luther, the lectures on Romans reveal also that of the German mystics (p. 196), especially Tauler of Strassburg and the winsome *Theologia Germanica*. This influence helped to shape his thought, colored his language, flavored his religious fervor (cf. pp. 210-214). Attention is also directed to Luther's sermons and disputations. The "transformation from the academic scholar to the public protagonist" began in 1518 and culminated in the summer of 1520 (p. 219). Though "a rough opponent," "expressions of violence and intolerance" do not appear marked in his letters and writings until after 1517 (p. 221). As we should expect, "The Ninety-five Theses are a natural corollary to the lectures on Romans and Galatians" (p. 227).

Dr. Fife does not share the oft-noticed view of Luther's ignorance of Scripture in his student days, and the story of his discovery of a Latin Bible in the University library at Erfurt, and his reading it as something he had never seen before, is believed to be traceable to error in the sources, because it is quite inconsistent with Luther's later facility in quoting Scripture (pp. 80-82, 117). Of this period Dr. Fife well says: "As life developed within the walls, it was indeed a fierce struggle against sin; and the God-sworn monk, his inward vision sharpened by fear, constantly examined his soul for the mortal sins which might undo the justification of the sacraments" (p. 107).

Thus Luther made his way from a personal conviction of the reality of sin, via Gerson and Bernard, "to the God-intoxication of Augustine and the self-surrender of the mystical Fathers" on to St. Paul and the God of love (p. 228). Literature on this subject is growing. Now that psychology is turning to Luther, it may also study the other Reformers, whose inner development was equally fascinating and noble. Soon, then, we may have a sound psychological history of the Reformation that will surely make it real to the thought of our time and prove the permanent value of that mighty movement.

This study of Dr. Fife's grew out of his course of lectures given at the University of Upsala in April, 1927, the text being revised and re-written in English. The chapters are compact and exceedingly well-written. They are a little mine of facts, and while the sources are very carefully noted, there is a welcome absence of burdensome foot-notes. Every reference has its *raison d'être*, and not one is a work of supererogation. If the title misleads any into expecting merely the biography of a lad, it should be read in connection with its sub-title. A man should think these days before he attempts to write on this subject, but if he can write as interestingly and informingly as Professor Fife has written here, let him write on.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

The Crisis in American Lutheran Theology. A study of the Issue between American Lutheranism and Old Lutheranism. By VERGILIUS FERM, M.A., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the College of Wooster (Ohio); recently Professor of Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Albright College (Penna.); Member of the Ministerium of the Lutheran Augustana Synod. With a Foreword by Luther Allan Weigle, Ph.D., D.D., Litt.D., Sterling Professor of Religious Education in Yale University. New York and London: The Century Co. 1927. 8vo. Pages 409. Price \$3.

Briefly, this study gathers round the special labors of the Reverend Dr. Samuel S. Schmucker in his "Definite Synodical Platform," by which he attempted a revision of the unaltered Augsburg Confession and sought to set up a distinctive type of "American Lutheranism." A long and bitter controversy was thereby precipitated which the author very properly calls "The Crisis in American Lutheran Theology." It was Old School Lutheranism vs. American Lutheranism (Chap. 4). Dr.

Schmucker (1799-1873), who graduated at Princeton Theological Seminary in the Class of 1820, had the deeply-rooted conviction that nineteenth century Lutheranism in America was not the generic Lutheranism of the early sixteenth century as laid down in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, at least not without certain omissions and exceptions or explanations. Accordingly, in 1855, he published the famous "Definite Synodical Platform," as a confessional basis for a united Lutheran Church in America. In this document there are "five points," rather "errors," alleged by Dr. Schmucker to remain in the *Augustana*, these errors being really a remnant of Romanism. They were: The Approval of the Ceremonies of the Mass, Private Confession and Absolution, Denial of the Divine Obligation of the Christian Sabbath, Baptismal Regeneration, and The Real Presence of the Body and Blood of the Saviour in the Eucharist (p. 195). These, with some other alleged errors (pp. 222-35), he and his colleagues felt, necessitated an American recension of the *Augustana*. The opposition, however, was too great. Dr. Schmucker's plan ended in complete and final repudiation. It was the old question of "confessional laxity" or "confessional conformity," and the latter won (pp. 343-344). And the triumph was not weakened or compromised by the doctrinal basis of the merger (in 1918) of three bodies, General Council, General Synod, and the United Lutheran Church in the South, into The United Lutheran Church in America (p. 344, note 39; p. 372).

This book is an enlargement of the author's Ph.D. thesis at Yale Divinity School. It is quite detailed, almost minute; the proof-references and footnotes exceedingly numerous and explicit, revealing the painstaking, indefatigable researches of the genuine historical investigator. There is also a valuable Appendix, section B of which sets forth in parallel columns the *Confessio Augustana* of 1530 and its "American Recension" of 1855; also twenty-two pages of a well-distributed Bibliography. On the inside of the back cover is a chart by the author depicting the development of the Synodical Organizations of the Lutheran Church in America from 1742 to 1867. We have here, therefore, a very thorough study of an outstanding crisis in the Lutheran Church in America.

The colossal labors of Dr. Schmucker in the General Synod of the Lutheran Church and in the College and Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, Penna., and his eminent leadership for so many years, can never be minimized at the bar of historic justice. From the standpoint of our Reformed Theology, his exceptions to the Augsburg Confession were far from heresy. But the Lutherans of his day very clearly felt that it was for them a perilous step to take. And, as often happens, the hero became almost the villain. Dr. Ferm, himself a Lutheran, has documented this cross section of Lutheran Church history with the thoroughness, intellectual composure and judicial self-restraint of the student who sets out to discover the true status of a situation, and writes history as it is corroborated by legitimate and sufficient sources.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

Philosophical Theology. By F. R. TENNANT, D.D., B.Sc., Fellow of Trinity College and Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Vol. I, "The Soul and its Faculties." The Macmillan Company, Agents.

This is a great book and deserves to take high rank. The following represents a summary:—

I. *Purpose.* This first volume is intended to be propaedeutic to the study of theology. Most students coming to this task have too little groundwork in psychology, epistemology and philosophy. This lack lessens their interest in theology and especially their effective mastery of the subject. This first volume is not theological, but psychological and philosophical, presenting the prolegomena for a second in which a theistic and theological *Weltanschauung* will be presented. The student requires some familiarity with outstanding systems of metaphysics, theories of knowledge, systems of philosophy, and the limitations as well as the implications of scientific theories and methods. All this is deemed needful for the proper valuation of the grounds on which theology rests. The purpose, as thus conceived, is altogether commendable; and if the work bears out the promise of its prospectus it will be welcomed by all teachers of theology.

II. *Method.* The author's method in psychology is empirical, like that of the Scottish School, recognizing the value of observation and induction. There is but one way of inquiry into the nature of self, and that is to set out from observable facts concerning the mental. But the facts must be real, and *a priori* assumption must not be a determinative influence. Facts must precede theory, science comes before philosophy, and empirical knowledge before science. Sense data are the *ratio cognoscendi* of the physical world. If the physical be not the ontal, but only phenomenon thereof made by our minds, our whole philosophy will be affected by that postulate. If to set out from fact, and to keep in touch with fact, be called empiricism, then whatever else is necessary, the empirical method is a *sine qua non* for knowledge of any sort. The facts established by psychology concerning individual experience must be the first question. We consider the author's position sound. Empiricism cannot be ruled out as a datum of philosophy. But the whole tune cannot be played on one string.

III. *Datum.* The starting-point of psychology is consciousness. The primary datum is the fact that there are selves aware of their own existence and mentality. Whatever selves may be found to be, the *analysanda* simply are. *Cogito ergo sum* expresses the ground of belief in a self. Doubting it only reinstates the fact. *Cogitatio*, even when *dubitatio de cogitatione*, is an actual occurrence involving a *res cogitans*. It is a further question what this *res* is, but it cannot be non-existent. To be conscious is to be. It is awareness of consciousness, technically called self-consciousness, that Descartes laid down as foundation-fact, and that common sense offers as knowledge-datum. Consciousness involves a subject. *What* it is, is another question, but we assert *that* it is. Whenever

consciousness exists, that experience involves an experient. A state which is not a state of some being, or *res*, an act which is not the act of an agent, are not actualities. Awareness is a meaningless term, a non-sense word, unless it be awareness of something by something. Although the distinction between subject and object may not be known to the subject, it nevertheless exists. Sensitivity, even of the *amoeba*, must be sensitivity of some being to some being. No one has ever dispensed with the subject of consciousness, whatever terms he may have used to hush up its existence. A subjectless experience is both an absurdity and a contradiction. In the Serial Theory, where the thoughts are considered the thinkers, obviously *they* are subjects. If objects play the rôle of subjects that is but to say they *are* subjects. But the impossible has been attempted and 'psychology without a subject' has been the result. Presentationism, as this theory is called, supplies an object lesson as to what scientific method in psychology is not. Our *prima facie* facts, our data, could not be what they are unless (1) there is a unique kind of *erleben*, viz. consciousness, which (2) involves an existent subject that (3) has determinate states and activities.

IV. *Distinctions*. Distinguish between *sensatio* and *sensum*, perceptual act or state, and perceptual object. *Sensa* are objects presented as objects, not as feelings, which feelings are subjective states consequent on presentation of objects. Descartes bequeathed to Locke and Leibnitz the assumption that *sensa* are changes in the subject, and so gave to early modern philosophy a bias toward idealism. *Sensa* are not formless. The mind does not impose all form on the matter of perception. In this radical sense the Kantian teaching that 'the mind makes nature' is untenable. *Sensa* have form and character quite independent of our subjectivity. Subjective activities are involved in perceiving, but no more make all relations between *sensa*, than they create the *sensa* themselves, though they are indispensable factors of knowledge.

What is meant by the assertion of reality turns on the difference between the impressional and the imaginal. This part of the discussion is a case of analytical psychology. There are different kinds of analysis. Water can be analysed into H and O, separated and combined again. But when we make a conceptual analysis of tone into pitch, loudness, and timbre, the elements cannot exist apart. Therefore analysis and abstraction are not the same. Abstraction is attending to one conceptually isolable factor, concentrating on one and ignoring others while leaving them there. Useful enough when its limits are recognized, it becomes a vicious method when these are forgotten. If mass, length, and time be abstracted, so-called bodies, describable solely in terms of these dimensions, will not be actualities of experience. Abstraction, unlike partition, does not increase our data, but expunges them. Analytical psychology, faithful to the empirical method, must derive its conceptual analytica straight from experience of the perceptual kind, not indirectly by constructive imagination and arbitrary fiction. The approach to psychology, nowadays common, called the logistic, is devoid of relevance or fruitfulness. The

impressional has an actuality refused to the imaginal. This shows a difference between impression (or percept), and image. The differences between impression and image are observable. Impressions are independent of each other and also of impressions and images presented the moment before. Impressions are primary, images are secondary. We cannot image what we have not previously sensed. There is nothing in an image of a non-actual thing that was not previously in the senses. Though we may afford to ignore the imaginal in the conduct of life, yet it is important to psychology, especially in the formation of ideas and also the memory-thread.

The memory image is not the original percept. What persists in memory is the effect of the impressional presentation. Repetition of events is not what is meant by remembering; but recalling of experiences. Memory involves some contrast of past and present. The memory image is in the present, yet has the mark of pastness. Psychologically it is an immediate knowledge of the past, as the original percept was of the present, though conditioned by the original perception. It has been asked: How do we know that the memory-image, which is a presentation now, is verily a *re-presentation* of a past presentation? It is a matter of consciousness, and otherwise there could be no knowledge such as science. Besides we have the confirmation of individual parallel testimony, which latter is not a psychological proof but nevertheless valuable to the apologist. Memory differs from imagination. A reminiscence is concrete and circumstantial. Its elements are fixedly grouped, while in the ordinary image they change uncontrollably.

V. *The Ego*. Can the ego, as a substance, know itself? Is the ego as a knower distinguishable from the ego as known? The *I* describable as 'now aware of red,' and the *I* describable as 'aware of that awareness of red,' cannot logically be identified; yet this identification is necessary if the *I* is to know itself by description. But the bridge which abstract logic cannot throw, actuality does throw. For the second *I* could not be described as it has been were it not identical with the first. Unless the 'awareness of red' were experienced (*erlebt*) by it, the second *I* could have no inkling of red being sensed, or of sensation having occurred.

Psychologists should not allow themselves to speak of presentations as 'given,' and yet suppress reference to that to which they must be given in order to be given at all; or to call the mind a stream of phenomena while declining to specify to whom or what the phenomena, or the stream as a whole, appear; or to describe it as a series of 'events' in forgetfulness that every event involves a subject.

Partitioning a mental life into momentary lives, or replacing the abiding ego by a series of subjects, is rendered impossible by the fact that actual experience is not divisible into discrete portions, though it is resolvable into distinguishable phases. The abiding ego is the precondition, not the result, of the distinguishable experiences. Those who repudiate this ego can point to no actual discrete (separate) elements, a series of which would yield a mental life. They resort to conceptual

or supposed elements in an imaginary $\beta\acute{\imath}\alpha\sigma$. They discuss mathematics not psychology.

The soulless serial theory is negated by the following considerations:

- (1) A continuing subject is essential to memory.
- (2) A continuing subject is required to validate the fact of recognition. How could I recognize the man I saw today as the man I saw last year unless there be a perduring self?
- (3) An abiding ego is necessary to consciousness of personal identity. I know myself to be the same person I was at the time of my earliest memory. Something has remained through all changes.
- (4) Without an abiding self there could be no such thing as responsibility.
- (5) The theory is wrecked on the fact of obliviscence. Psychosis A possesses knowledge of name or event. That knowledge has vanished from psychoses B, C, D, &c. and appears at M. The preceding psychoses could not contribute to M what they did not possess. Unless there be an abiding subject from A to M the familiar fact is inexplicable.
- (6) Thinking and volition are conscious acts. An act requires an actor. In the serial theory the thought is the thinker; act and actor are one and the same.
- (7) Feeling is a conscious state. There must be something of which it is a state.
- (8) The unity of life and its acts and experiences are fatal to the theory. If psychosis number one sings the first bar of a solo why should psychosis number two take up the strain and number twenty end it, unless there is an abiding purpose in an abiding subject?
- (9) If there be no continuing subject throughout the series how does the last member possess the contents of the first or all the preceding members?

Professor James sought to save the situation by suggesting that each term "absorbs" its predecessor; each is born an owner (subject) and dies owned (object) so that the latest up to date "contains" all its forebears. But we are conscious that our present experience does not contain all the experiences of our past lives. It is extravagant imagination to suppose that in any one psychosis of a person's life all the previous psychoses are "contained" or even known; and to talk of appropriation, by a momentary self, of countless dead selves, is but to invoke the miraculous. Actual experience does not seem to admit of explanation otherwise than in terms of the permanent ego. Every man's life is a more or less ordered and purposed life, explicable on the basis of an abiding ego, but inexplicable without it. Why should a subjectless life arrange itself in a definite plan and exhibit a determined purpose through long years?

Some maintain that the body is the ego. But consciousness is not material change. If heat is a mode of motion, it is necessary to invoke mind to get from heat to warmth, which is an experience. Quality means nothing without a substance; the adjectival is nothing without the substantival; the phenomenal does not exist without the noumenal. The soul cannot be phenomenal. It is that to which phenomena appear. The soul is a substance, not substance in the abstract. It is (1) substantival, (2) permanent, (3) active.

Substance is through and through causality, and the two categories of substance and cause are at bottom one, each implicating the other. Im-

manent causation in continuing substance seems to be the indispensable explanation of that stable nexus in change without which regular determination in things would be impossible. Without it our world would be one in which anything may succeed on anything. We are authorized to see in the abiding ego, a substance or continuant to whose immanent causation, or activity, is to be referred the connection between passing states constituting them one *Bios*.

VI. *Valuation.* Many interesting topics are discussed by the author such as: The Empirical Self and Personality, Time, Space, Substance, Cause, Theories of Knowledge (e.g. Rationalism, Empiricism, Realism, Idealism, and Phenomenalism), Religious Experience, Limitations of Scientific Knowledge, &c. These topics awaken interest but much of the discussion will prove extremely difficult to the ordinary student of theology. One sighs for the simplicity of Dr. McCosh. The difficulty lies somewhat in the author's style, a certain parenthetical propensity, the use of rare terms the meaning of which is not always clear; and a descent to the extreme minutia of analytical and genetic psychology.

The book is of great value to the expert in psychological discussion, but as prolegomena or propaedeutic to the study of theology the ordinary student would find it difficult. In a personal letter to the reviewer the author says: "My volume is not addressed so much to the theological student in general, but rather to those engaged in the study of natural theology which dogmatics, etc., presuppose; and I fear it is inevitable that the former class, to whom I hope it will be also useful, will find new and difficult conceptions to be mastered."

The author deserves great credit for his ability and achievements in psychological analysis, which are quite extraordinary; and also chiefly for his strong defence of an abiding soul, which is by far the best part of the book. It is amusing as well as gratifying to observe how deftly Professor Tennant demolishes the Serial Theory of Professor James. Under his dissecting analysis, and remorseless logic the theory in question goes down like a house of cards.

In a few particulars perhaps the author's theology will diverge from the historic position of Princeton Seminary; but in the main range of psychological and philosophical discussion the work deserves high commendation, and will challenge the mettle of the best scholars.

Philadelphia, Pa.

DAVID S. CLARK.

New Horizons of The Christian Faith. The Bishop Hale Lectures for 1927-1928. By FREDERICK C. GRANT, S.T.D., Dean of the Western Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois. Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1928. Pp. xxix, 287. Price \$1.

These lectures present a strange mixture of "Modernism" and "Orthodoxy," "Liberalism" and "Catholicity." To be a good Catholic, one must be something of a modernist, and to be a good modernist, one must have the Catholic viewpoint (p. xi). Yet the author thinks his views are in harmony with "the main tenets of the Evangelical school" (p. xiii). One

can only wonder whether Dean Grant would be satisfied with such an anomalous theology, were it to be discovered.

The fundamental difficulties which our author encounters seem to us to be quite insuperable. We seriously question some of the philosophical presuppositions which underlie his theological ideas. His case is not easy to diagnose. He appears to be suffering from a "complication" of theological misfits and maladjustments. At times he seems an out and out monist (cf. pp. 65, 73). He is a decided individualist. "Each man must discover, or create, a theology for himself, certainly if he is to preach and teach, yes, if he is even to think satisfactorily and constructively in the privacy of his own mind" (p. ii). Then, too, he is a thoroughgoing empiricist. "Religious experience is the only stuff of which religious knowledge is made—just as our experience of the external world provides the sole material for our knowledge of it" (p. 157). This empiricism saturates the author's thinking, vitiates his argument, and drives him to the extremes of subjectivism. Thus, even the doctrine of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ is traced to antecedents in Christian experience (p. 216)! The Bible and its doctrine are, then, in the last analysis, only a transcript of human experience (p. 215). Distinguishing between "Christian doctrine" (which is "in substance a divine Revelation") and "the particular doctrines," the latter are "only the intellectual formulation or expression of the data or presuppositions of religious experience. Therefore doctrine varies, at least in emphasis, with the variations of religious experience" (pp. 242-243). Doctrinal authority rests not in Scripture alone or in tradition, but "in immediate spiritual experience" (p. 244), in "the normal, everyday experience of believers" (cf. pp. xxviii, 248). This whole procedure is plainly arbitrary. The distinction between "doctrine" and "particular doctrines" is not sufficient base on which to erect such a heavy superstructure as religious authority. If you think clearly, you cannot consider "doctrine" without serious reckoning with "particular doctrines," for all truth is a narrowing and differentiating process. Moreover, by what authoritative guide are you going to decide what experiences of believers are "normal" and what are not? This extreme empiricism, of course, issues in the dogmatism of modern pragmatism and Ritschianism, a view which Dr. Grant elsewhere in this book rejects (pp. 195-199). It is not that religious experience is not an invaluable factor in the Christian system. It is. But the Christianity of the Bible is something deeper than individual experience. It is this power that explains and authorizes and validates the experience, not vice versa. Christianity is true whether you and I experience it or not. It is not dependent on shifting experiences, however "normal" they may be. Just because it is normative and dynamic, we have the experience. But the experience is an effect, not the cause. A religion based solely on the authority of religious experience will not stand. You must explain and base the experience.

Another charge which must be made against these lectures is that they assume altogether too much. They pronounce as final what is still more

or less debatable. Here the author's language is not so well chosen. Evolution, for instance, is now a settled matter. Only backward and ultra-conservative circles question it (pp. 29, 72 note). The so-called modern view of the Bible is accepted *in toto*, as if there were now only *one* side to this big question. Chapter VI is on "The New Bible," that is, the Bible as understood by modern criticism, we should add, of a certain school or type. Yet the Bible must continue in some sense to be the same old Book, the place of which no other book can take (pp. 184-185). This looks as if somehow we can have it and yet throw it away. The world-creation in Genesis is an ancient poem, speculation or myth, a "sublime guess," which the author believes has "the objective value of revelation" (p. 81). Dr. Grant espouses also the doctrine of a continuous creation. The Fall is also a legend that must be given up (pp. 83-84, 263-265). Yet here also he adds that "As a construction or interpretation of actual religious experience we shall never, I believe, get beyond the need for some kind of doctrine of a 'fall,'" thoroughly purged, however, of all "legendary elements" and "made to stand purely for a fact of the religious consciousness" (p. 265). Of course, this is a bit of wanton individualism that comes dangerously near to intellectual caprice. To be sure, we know what Dr. Grant means. The Fall is not an historic event. It is legendary, a sort of relic of the religious consciousness, "a reading back of individual guilt into the past," a piece of heredity (p. 264), and as such we may let it stand. But this sounds to us quite as legendary as the so-called legendary account of the Fall in Genesis. Strange how some prefer the up-to-date vaporings of speculation to simple history! Miracles are to be treated in the same way. They are religious, but not scientific (pp. 45 f.). The ideas of unforgivable sin, original sin, eternal damnation, second death, and the fall of man, are "certain grotesque and abhorrent emphases in our theological inheritance" and are to be abandoned as "irreconcilable with the gospel of infinite divine Love" (p. 141). Chapter VII, on "Theology and Modern Philosophy," appears to us to be the best and, in general, the least inconsistent and eclectic of all. Here the author argues against the futile claims of the pragmatic philosophy and the Ritschlian theology. Christianity must remain a "philosophical religion" and offer "a reasoned and defensible theology" (p. 198; cf. p. 54).

As a *plea*, Dr. Grant's lectures really ask for a restatement and reformulation of traditional Christianity, but such a revamping as amounts to a virtual abandoning of the historic creedal position (pp. xxviii, 231). These are the "new horizons" now before the Christian Faith. Here again the author is not at all sure of himself. He sees difficulties in trying to restate Christian truth in terms of "modern thought," since the latter has almost "as many varieties as there are individual modern thinkers" (p. 18). Still, he consoles himself with the reflection that with such a reconstructed maximum of Christian doctrine a thoroughgoing Modernist, a thorough Catholic, and a thorough Evangelical could really get along without suffering undue privation (p. 249)! Somewhat over-

sanguine, we think, not to mention the overstraining of some good English words, such as "thorough," "Catholic," "Evangelical"!

To some, these "new horizons" of the Christian Faith may seem disturbing. The fatal error of studies of this kind is a determined prejudice against anything that is static. Everything must be in a state of flux. Heraclitus comes to his own in such attitudes. Nothing abides. Nothing is "once for all delivered," either to the saints or to anybody else. Nothing is ever settled and decided. Admitting the value there is in the gradual disclosure of truth and life, with consequent improvement in our thinking and living, the solid gains of all true research in science, philosophy and theology, it still remains true that the great facts of our Faith are unalterable verities. Not everything that appears on one's horizon turns out to be final reality or ultimate truth. No, we have not yet discovered all truth. Far from it. There is much that we do not know. But we do know a few things. And what we know we know, and we know that we know. Some things are definite and settled here and now. More things than we fear Dean Grant's Hale Lectures recognize. Evangelical Christianity is today giving a perfectly good account of itself. It is a soldier scarred but hardened by many battles. Yet there is enough evidence to prove that they who still hold to it have not followed "cunningly devised fables." "The grass withereth, the flower fadeth; but the word of our God shall stand forever" (Isa. xl. 8). "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away" (Matt. xxiv. 35).

It should be added that the references show that the author has consulted a fairly wide range of recent works germane to his subject. He gives also a good synopsis of the contents (pp. xvii-xxix), and a scant index of subjects and a larger one of persons. The book is neatly bound, presenting an attractive appearance.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Church in the World. Collected Essays. By WILLIAM RALPH INGE, Dean of St. Paul's. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1927. Pp. xii, 275. Price \$2.00.

This book contains eight essays. One (The Quakers) is almost entirely new; five (The Condition of the Church of England, The Crisis of Roman Catholicism, Hellenism and Christianity, Science and Theology, and The Training of the Reason) are reprints of articles previously published in magazines and books; and two (Science and Ultimate Truth, Faith and Reason) are lectures or addresses. In them, notwithstanding that there is no discussion of politics and sociology, the Dean gives us his views on a surprisingly large number of topics, and, we may add, in so genial a way that it is difficult to understand how he could ever have deserved his journalistic sobriquet of "gloomy."

The following is what the Dean thinks on a variety of matters of

present interest: that the blindness of the Apostle Paul at his conversion was probably due to auto-suggestion (p. 63); that Calvinism has been no advantage to Christianity, but rather the reverse (pp. 63, 74, 219, 237); that Christian missions have had no success in any Asiatic country (p. 109); that science is the eldest and dearest child of the Greek spirit (p. 119), but that the Reformation checked and obscured it (p. 154); that Darwinism has not injured the Christian faith (p. 158); that the Modern Churchman believes that the Spirit of Truth guides and blesses honest enquiry, and that the "Bible of the race" is still being written, God is still revealing Himself (p. 229); that the Modern Churchman rejects the two infallibilities, the infallible Church and the infallible Book (p. 230); that Faith is belief in the objective existence of a realm of values which religion connects with the name of God (p. 238); that the progress of the spiritual life is measured by the extent to which our faith rests not on authority but on experience (p. 248).

The tone of the book may be gathered from the foregoing statements. Meagre as they are and chosen somewhat at random they show how Dean Inge understands the effort of the "Modern Churchman" to join the thorough-going scientific rationalism of the day with the sacramental service of God in Christ. The limits of a brief review preclude any attempt to prove the impossibility of any logical combination of these two contradictories. Nevertheless we commend the book to those who desire a lucid, interesting and uncompromising statement of this particular point of view.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

A History of Christian Missions in China. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOUR-ETTE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1929. Pp. 928, 4°.

The author of this volume was born in Oregon, educated at Linfield College and Yale, and later became a secretary of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. In 1910 he went to China as a teacher in "Yale-in-China," an educational institution established by Yale University at Changsha, in Hunan Province. Returning to America after a comparatively short stay in the Orient, the author became a professor in Denison University, Ohio, and was ordained a Baptist minister. In 1921 he was elected professor of Missions and in 1927 Missions and Oriental History in Yale University, which position he now occupies.

The book is attractively printed and bound: its paper and type are excellent. There are abundant explanatory footnotes, and few errors, like the repetition on page 425, mar it. The author's style is clear and pleasing: his narrative is full of information and holds the reader's attention. He deserves credit for the industry displayed in consulting many authorities, and for the literary skill in selecting, arranging and presenting his material. Authorities are given for nearly all the important statements made, though some of them the reader may not find convincing (as "Reports" of the National Christian Council and editorials of the *Chinese Recorder*.)

The work is divided into thirty-one chapters, the first being a brief Introduction. Beginning with the religious background of the Chinese,

the author gives what he conceives to be the leading characteristics of Christianity, and traces the course of Missions in China both before and during the Mongol Dynasty (A.D. 1271 to 1341). Next the resumption of Roman Missions during the period of the Reformation, and their retarded growth are taken up. Chapter XI follows with an account of the beginning of the Missions in China of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Chapter XIII sketches the beginning of the Protestant Missions, together with the wars of China with European powers, and the treaties which followed. A chapter is allotted to the great Taiping Rebellion which continued for about 14 years (1850 to 1864). In this rebellion the fairest provinces of China were devastated, the rich silk and tea regions around the famous cities of Hangchow and Soochow, and the great Yangtze Valley in which the rebel capital, Nanking, was situated. In this catastrophe 20 million people are supposed to have perished.

Four chapters (XVII to XX) present the gradual penetration of China by missionaries during 41 years, from 1856 to 1897. Then comes the period of Reform attempted by the unfortunate Emperor Kwanghsü and crushed by the reactionary movement inaugurated by his aunt, the Empress-Dowager, which culminated in the Boxer uprising of 1900. Eight chapters describe the years 1901-1926 as the period of Reorganization; tracing not only political, social and commercial changes, but also the progress of Protestant, Roman and Russian Missions. Allusion is made to the World War of 1914-1918 and its effect on Protestant Missions; the whole narrative closing with a summary, and general appraisal of results. A small, uncolored map is appended, too small to give any adequate idea of the immense Empire and its outlying dependencies.

Regarding the volume in general, it may be said that the parts which treat purely of Chinese history, and of Russian Missions, are very good; but the account given of Roman Catholic Missions is rather rose colored and not so good. Some of the serious faults of Romanism and failures of its Missions are touched upon, but much too lightly. Consideration and desire for impartiality are fine things if they do not ignore or obscure the facts of history. The narrative of Protestant Missions while in the main good, lacks the enthusiasm to which the subject is entitled; the contrast between the tone of this narrative and that describing Roman Missions cannot fail to strike the reader, and to produce an impression somewhat unjust to Protestant Missions.

When theological questions are discussed, one regrets the author discloses a rationalistic bias. In treating of the origin of Chinese religion, he refers often to Animism (pp. 7, 11, 14, 17, 19, 23, 42) and to religion as a gradual development of human origin. On account of the author's brief stay in China, he was perhaps not able to examine thoroughly the Chinese Classics and see for himself that ancient Chinese religion was undoubtedly monotheistic, as brilliant scholars like Legge, W. A. P. Martin and others clearly show.

Concerning Buddhism, the author fails to bring out clearly that genuine, or Hinayana, Buddhism is a gloomy, repellent belief, and that the

Mahayana teachings which later became popular, are not Buddhism at all, but a clumsy imitation of Christianity. So-called Mahayana Buddhism was not heard of until Christianity entered India: it first appeared in the northwest, the part of India which first came under Christian influence, for the Nestorian missionaries entered India from Persia as early as the 3rd century, some say even earlier.

In accounting for the extinction of Nestorianism, the author also fails to indicate the main cause—one which menaces Christian Missions today, viz.: compromise with heathen faiths. The Divine Evangel was altered to suit the prejudices and wishes of converts or rulers, error was mingled with saving Truth, the “offence of the Cross” was minimized, the flickering Light failed, and the Candlestick was removed (Rev. ii. 5).

One would prefer to pass over in silence Chapter III, on the Characteristics of Christianity, which from the viewpoint of evangelical Christianity is painfully defective. Too apparent are the earmarks of German rationalism, which bore fruit in the philosophy of Nietzsche and the tragedy of the World War. The well-known tiresome phrases, “tribal divinity,” “conception developed by long, painful stages,” “emancipation from beliefs of primitive days” are repeated (p. 26 *et al.*). When one comes to the heart of Christianity, does the author indicate his belief that Christ was God, and that His death on the Cross was the only Atonement for the sins of the world, or does he state the impressions of Christ’s immediate followers, who may or may not have been mistaken? Did our Saviour “teach as He did” merely because “He felt in His own life the certainty of what He spoke,” or was it because He was “God manifest in the flesh,” who alone was “the Way, the Truth, and the Life”? Was it His “integrity that cost Him His life” (p. 30), or was it by sovereign power that “He laid it down and took it again” to atone for the sins of mankind? The author’s statement leads one to wonder, how much of the Divine Record he considers valid. Is Christianity an eternal reality, founded on historic facts, or is it largely subjective, consisting of certain ideas and states of mind which pious men of old entertained, but which now may be reckoned untenable or out of date?

Evangelical Protestants will reject with indignation the author’s implication regarding the great Protestant Reformation, that it was simply an outgrowth of Rome, largely due to political and economic causes (p. 35 *et al.*). Indeed he ignores the term Protestant Reformation in his heading of Chapter VI and calls it the “Age of European Discoveries.” True there were discoveries, but the surpassing fact of the age was the Religious Revival and the return to the saving Truth of Apostolic days. Unlike Macaulay, Green, Carlyle and nearly all historians, he ignores the great work of Luther, Calvin and Knox, to which the world owes so much, while at the same time praising Roman leaders. The Protestant faith was the original Christian faith taught by the Lord and His Apostles, a faith which in spite of persecutions had continued from generation to generation, the “Bush which burned and was not con-

sumed." Even while Rome was dominant, it still remained, for God did not leave Himself without witness. Rome was not the Mother Church. Rome was a usurper which seized power and introduced false teachings. The Apostolic Church was the Mother Church, and the teaching of Protestants was simply a return to its doctrines, a return to the living Word of God, and to dependence on the power of the Holy Spirit; a sweeping away of the noxious rubbish of saints and idol-worship, penances, and sacerdotal oppression and corruption, and the exaltation of the crucified and risen Saviour as the only Head of the Church, the only Mediator and Advocate of sinful men.

Protestant Missions had nothing to do with commerce: in India they were opposed by commerce; nor did they depend on or draw their influence from leading commercial powers (p. 36). Protestant Missions were based solely on the Divine Command, "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature"; "Lo, I am with you alway!" One wishes that fewer references were made to mere machinery centered in Shanghai, to Committees and Council and Conference (pp. 799-812), which had little to do with the real spread of the Gospel, and more space were given to that noble man of God, Hudson Taylor, and to the self-sacrificing work of the organization he founded, the China Inland Mission. These have been an inspiration and example to all missionaries, who gladly acknowledge the debt of gratitude they owe. Too brief mention is made also of Jonathan Goforth, and men like him, who have rendered splendid service in Evangelism, and have exerted an immense and abiding influence not only on Mission work, but on the native Church of China.

The author makes reference to the Bible Union of China (p. 795), a society organized in 1920 to witness for the absolute trustworthiness of God's Word and for the great essential Truths of salvation. This society grew rapidly, with God's blessing, and soon numbered over 2,000 members. It has rendered a great service not only in witnessing for the true Faith which all Christians had held for nineteen centuries, but also in strengthening the Chinese Church. Concerning it the author remarks, "the result was discord" (p. 796). Others complained the movement was "divisive." But to be fair, who is responsible for division and discord—those who keep the Faith, or those who depart from it and introduce different teachings? The author acknowledges there was good reason for the Movement. "No one who knew the facts could deny that many missionaries had departed widely from the theological positions of their predecessors." He mentions by name a Y.M.C.A. secretary who publicly declared that "he did not believe the Bible to be infallible, nor Christianity the final religion, nor Christ perfect!" (p. 795). There were probably not a few others who shared his views, but lacked his boldness in declaring them. Friends of the Y.M.C.A. who had formerly contributed regularly out of their slender means to its support, could not but deeply regret the change; for 25 years before its leaders were men of earnest, evangelical faith and at that time many of the best tracts on Christian life, on prayer, and on the study of God's Word,

were written by Chinese secretaries. While some men of the old type were still left, and were valued workers, they were too few. One remembers with admiration the Student Volunteer Movement of a quarter of a century ago, and its battle cry "The Gospel over the whole world in this generation!" May we not pray that ere long this battle cry will sound again, and there may be a return to the virile faith of former days?

Ventnor, New Jersey.

HENRY M. WOODS.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Church Monthly, New York, January: ROBERT S. CHALMERS, Diversified religion; J. H. KEMMIS, A glimpse of the Church in Ireland; EDMUND L. SOUDER, Some implications of Catholicism; G. NAPIER WHITTINGHAM, Anglo-Catholic Pilgrimages to the Holy Land. *The Same*, February: CHAUNCY B. TINKER, A word for the extreme position; FREDERICK S. ARNOLD, James II and Mr. Belloc; CHARLES C. EDMUND, The new Bible commentary; EDWARD C. BRADLEY, Begsonian philosophy and the Catholic religion. *The Same*, March: FRANCIS J. HALL, Organic antecedents of the Incarnation; FREDERICK S. ARNOLD, A great Anglican; BESSIE R. BURCHETT, A thought on Comparative Religion.

American Journal of Philology, Baltimore, January: HERBERT C. LIPSCOMB, Horace and the poetry of Austin Dobson; EVAN T. SAGE, The text-tradition of Petronius; EDWARD W. NICHOLS, The Semantics of the termination—Ario—; JOHN A. SCOTT, Plural verbs with neuter plural subjects in Homer.

Anglican Theological Review, Lancaster, January: B. W. BACON, Pauline elements in the fourth gospel; FLEMING JAMES, Is there pacifism in the Old Testament?; LEONARD HODGSON, Compromise, Tension, and Personality; DUBOSE MURPHY, The lighter side of Paul's personality; F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON, The Apostolic age of Church History.

Biblical Review, New York, January: ALBERT D. BELDEN, George Whitefield—his influence on his times; H. H. McQUILKIN, Parable of the Talents; ROBERT E. SPEER, Some recent criticism of Foreign Missions; S. D. CHOWN, Church Union in Canada; W. H. T. DAU, Luther and the Turkish invasion of Western Europe.

Bibliotheca Sacra, St. Louis, January: CHARLES F. THWING, Education and religion—their correlation; M. G. KYLE, The Bible in its setting; C. NORMAN BARTLETT, Deity of Jesus as set forth in the epistles; FRANK G. BEARDSLEY, The revival of the future.

Canadian Journal of Religious Thought, Toronto, Jan.-Feb.: RICHARD DAVIDSON, The Bible the church's book; H. F. LEACH, Scientific method and the idea of God; W. D. MAXWELL, Silence—a neglected feature in public worship; C. MELVILLE WRIGHT, The youth programme of the church; F. G. VIAL, The Greek element in the gospels; H. L. MACNEILL, Course of Buddhism in India.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, January: FRANCIS S. BETTEN,

The adoption of the Roman Easter calculation by the island Celts; JOHN M. LENHART, An important chapter in American Church history; M. RAMONA, Ecclesiastical status of New Mexico.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: NICHOLAI ARSENIEW, Our redemption; CLAUDE JENKINS, Sudbury's London register; S. ADDLE-SHAW, Pilgrims' Progress; F. R. MONTGOMERY, St. Paul's malady; ERNEST CLAPTON, Coverdale and the Psalter; W. O. E. OESTERLEY, Old Testament criticism; G. B. VERITY, Gospel according to St. Paul.

Crozer Quarterly, Philadelphia, January: D. L. RITCHIE, Function of a Theological College; ALLAN HOBEN, What the Church does; OWEN C. BROWN, Curriculum of religious education; HENRY P. VAN DUSEN, What do we expect to happen in worship; FRANK GAVIN, Place of ritual in worship; GEORGE F. FINNIE, Place of the sermon in worship; EDWIN E. AUBREY, Is God made real to men in worship?

Evangelical Quarterly, London, January: CASPAR W. HODGE, The Reformed faith; W. M. ALEXANDER, The Resurrection of our Lord; A. P. GOLD-LEVIN, Deuteronomy—whence and why?; HAROLD C. MORTON, Evolutionary Dogmatism; EMILE DOUMERGUE, What ought we to know about Calvin?

Expository Times, Edinburgh, January: J. K. MOZLEY, Leaders of theological thought—Bishop Gore; JULIUS J. PRICE, Bible quotations and Chinese customs; W. J. LIMMER SHEPPARD, The Resurrection Morning. *The Same*, February: J. H. LECKIE, Books that have influenced our epoch—John McLeod Campbell's *The Nature of the Atonement*; W. S. URQUHART, Hindu doctrine of Scriptural authority; J. S. MACARTHUR, On preaching from texts; G. J. INGLIS, Problem of St. Paul's conversion. *The Same*, March: J. M. SHAW, Resurrection of the body; WILL SPENS, Leaders of theological thought—George Tyrrell; JAMES MOFFATT, The new Anglican commentary.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, January: JAMES T. ADDISON, The Ahmadiya movement and its Western propaganda; ROBERT P. BLAKE, The Athos Codex of the Georgian Old Testament; ROBERT P. BLAKE, The Georgian text of the Fourth Esdras from the Athos MS.

Homiletic Review, New York, January: WARD ADAIR, When I will repudiate the Church; WILLIAM OLNEY, Spiritual training; W. SCOTT STRANAHAN, Vitalizing the Bible; A. C. ZENOS, Some great Christian thoughts; LEWIS H. CHRISMAN, Parable of the Sower; W. E. ORCHARD, Man's thirst for God. *The Same*, February: W. E. BARTON, Abraham Lincoln as we know him now; J. L. MADDOX, Why imperfection and suffering; A. C. ZENOS, Some great Christian teachings; G. G. ATKINS, Concerning the fourth soul. *The Same*, March: ERIC LEWIS, Is man an immortal being?; MIRIAM Z. BATTEN, The case for the parents; R. C. MCADIE, Church History in the pulpit; JOHN BARLOW, A sheaf of good books.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, January: LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, The Birkat Ha-Mazon; SOLOMON ZEITLIN, Asmakta or Intention; ISAAC HUSIK, Studies in Spinoza; The Jew in Early English literature.

Journal of Biblical Literature, New Haven, XLVII: 2 and 3: B. W. BACON, Jesus and the Law; S. E. BASSETT, 1 Corinthians 13:12; H. J. CADBURY, Odor of the Spirit at Pentecost; F. C. PORTER, Does Paul claim to have known the historical Jesus?; C. E. PURINTON, Translation Greek in the Wisdom of Solomon; The problem of Deuteronomy; C. C. TORREY, Sanballat "The Horonite."

Journal of Religion, Chicago, January: ARCHIBALD G. BAKER, Jesus Christ as interpreted by the Missionary Enterprise; B. H. STREETER, The Broad Church and the Modernist Movement; E. BOYD BARRETT, Can there be tolerance without understanding?; Can philosophy progress without the framework of the Christian faith?; JOHN W. JOHNSON, Baltasar Hubmaier and Baptist historic commitments; WILLIAM C. GRAHAM, The second rescue of the second Isaiah; WILHELM PAUCK, Luther and Butzer; HENRY J. CADBURY, Egyptian influence in the Book of Proverbs.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, January: C. H. TURNER, Eduard Schwartz and the *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*; J. H. MOZLEY, The *Vitae Adae*; J. E. L. OULTON, Rufinus's translation of Church History of Eusebius; W. EMERY BARNES, Teraphim; H. ST. J. THACKERAY, A Papyrus scrap of patristic writing; A. A. BEVAN, Origin of the name Maccabee.

London Quarterly Review, London, January: JOHN TELFORD, John Wesley in training; FRANK BALLARD, 'Where are the Dead?'; VINCENT TAYLOR, Professor Windisch and the fourth gospel; A. MARMORSTEIN, Primitive and higher ideals in religion; G. D. HENDERSON, A Scottish diary of the seventeenth century; WILBERT F. HOWARD, Foreign books on the New Testament.

Lutheran Church Quarterly, Gettysburg and Philadelphia, January: L. FRANKLIN GRUBER, Inaugural address; EARL BOWMAN, Efforts to Christianize the Indians of Pennsylvania in Colonial times; JOHN ABERLY, German Missions in India during the War; PAUL J. HOH, Practical possibilities of Luther's Small Catechism; M. HADWIN FISCHER, Finding and facing facts in Religious Education; J. A. FAULKNER, How Rome tempted Melancthon; C. M. JACOBS, John Wyclif.

Missionary Review of the World, New York, January: LUCY STARLING, A century of missions in Siam; MIDDLETON S. BARNWELL, The challenge of the West; ROLAND J. ALLEN, New Testament missionary methods; W. REGINALD WHEELER, First impressions of Africa; THEODORE BURTT, After slavery in Africa—what?; W. T. REID, Spiritual remedies for physical ills. *The Same*, February: ROWLAND M. CROSS, A forward looking conference in China; GEORGE T. B. DAVIS, New hope for China; SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, Canon W. H. T. Gairdner of Cairo; ROBERT A. HUME, The Supreme Person and the supreme test; JOHN A. SUBHAN, Why I became a Christian; WALTER AND MAUDE WILLIAMS, Christian Krus who have stood the test. *The Same*, March: CLELAND B. McAFFEE, A strategic center in Central America; WILLIAM A. MATHER, Signs of

progress in China; MAX YERGAN, African youth of tomorrow; GEORGE T. B. DAVIS, A remarkable invalid in Shanghai.

Monist, Chicago, January: EUGENIO RIGNANO, Outlines of a system of morality based on the harmony of life; HENRY N. WIEMAN, Philosophy of Worship; GEORGE A. WILSON, The search for the concrete; HOMER H. DUBS, The psychophysical problem—a neglected solution; ROBERT P. RICHARDSON, Relativity and its precursors.

Moslem World, New York, January: The patience of unanswered prayer; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, South Arabia and Islam; L. E. BROWNE, Religion in Turkey today and tomorrow; E. F. BROWNE, Mind of Moslems in India; A. F. BADSHAH HUSSAIN, English Shiah Koran Commentary; ALFRED NEILSEN, Difficulties in presenting the Gospel; J. C. HEINRICH, Clinic on Moslem evangelization; E. BRETSCHNEIDER, Chinese Medieval notices of Islam; S. KHUDA BUKHSH, Islam and the Modern World.

New Church Life, Lancaster, January: Gleanings from New Church history; GILBERT H. SMITH, Is churchgoing an obligation?; R. J. TILSON, The Sacraments: their use and power. *The Same*, February: Gleanings from New Church history; T. S. HARRIS, How I was brought to the light; GUSTAF BAECKSTRÖM, Three missionary journeys. *The Same*, March: L. W. T. DAVID, The sharp two-edged sword.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: CHARLES S. GARDNER, Relation of the individual to society; CHARLES H. NASH, the thrice-born of the spiritual kingdom of God; H. J. FLOWERS, Election in Jesus Christ—Ephesians 1:3-4.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, January: WALTER L. LINGLE, The Bible and war; R. B. WOODWORTH, Salaries and livelihood of ministers; DAVID S. CLARK, Ritschlianism; WILLIAM T. RIVIERE, Is the Church older than Pentecost?; A. A. LITTLE, The objective of the Sermon; CHARLES D. HOLLAND, The Master's bequest.

Yale Review, New Haven, December: WILLARD L. SPERRY, Art, Science and the Good Life; Y. C. JAMES YEN, New Citizens for China; AGNES REPLIER, The town and the suburb; MORRIS FISHBEIN, Medicine in our changing world; MARJORIE NICOLSON, The real scholar gypsy. *The Same*, March: HAROLD J. LASKI, England in 1929; BERNARD FÄY, Course of French-American friendship; CHARLES A. BEARD, The political heritage of the twentieth century; G. H. PARKER, The mind and its growth; ARTHUR SALTER, The coming economic struggle.

Biblica, Roma, Jan.-Mar.: F. STUMMER, Einige Beobachtungen über die Arbeitsweise des Hieronymus bei der Übersetzung des Alten Testaments aus der hebraica veritas; P. JOÜON, Notes philologiques sur le texte hébreu de II Rois; K. PRÜMM, De genuino Apocalypsis Petri textu; F. DIEKAMP, Neues über die Handschriften des Oekumenius-Kommentares zur Apokalypse.

Bilychnis, Roma, Gennaio: U. MORICCA, Il Codice Casanatense 1338: ii. Ventiquattro omelie inedite di Massimo di Torino. *The Same*, Febbraio: R. FEDI, Lo spiritualismo di Enrico Bergson; L. PIGNATO,

L'estetica mistica del Bergson; P. CHIMINELLI, Il debito della Riforma all'Italia.

Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, Toulouse, Nov.-Dec.: GERMAIN BRETON, Les Deuils de l'Institute Catholique; LOUIS DESNOYERS, Renan historien d'Israël; Chronique de l'Institute Catholique. *The Same*, Jan.-Fev.: FERDINAND CAVALERRA, La doctrine de la Pénitence au III^e siècle; XAVIER DUCROS, Chronique de Philosophie.

Ciencia Tomista, Salamanca, Enero-febrero: M. CUERVO, El deseo natural de ver a Dios y los fundamentos de la Apologética inmanentista; LUIS URBANO, La Sociedad de las Naciones y los principios tomistas del Maestro Fray Francisco de Vitoria; VICENTE BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Valor de las Lecturas del P. Báñez. *The Same*, Marzo-Abril: ELOY SUÁREZ, Mesianismo integral; PASCUAL BROCH, La preparación moral para la fe.

Etudes Theologiques et Religieuses, Montpellier, Jan.-Fev.: PH. BRIDEL, La philosophie sociale et politique d'Alexandre Vinet; JEAN BERNAUD, La jeunesse et la conversion de Guillaume Farel; JEAN BERTON, Civilisation occidentale et religions asiatique.

Estudis Franciscans, Barcelona, Gener-Marc: ANTONI MARIA DE BARCELONA, La definitiva solució de la questio romana; THOMAS VILLANOVA, Familia veteris foederis; MODEST DE MIERES, Jesucrist, Cap de l'Església; DAMIANUS AB ODENA, De quiescentia iuris.

Foi et Vie, Paris, Janvier: TATIANA SOUKHOTINE-TOLSTOÏ, La figure religieuse et morale de Tolstoï; PAUL DOUMERGUE, Le service social et l'Eglise "communaute chretienne"; PAUL ARBOUSSE-BASTIDE, Enquête; Pour un nouvel Humanisme; PAUL DOUMERGUE, Métaux bons conducteurs de l'électricité, âmes bonnes conductrices de l'esprit. *The Same*, Fevrier: TATIANA SOUKHOTINE-TOLSTOÏ, La figure religieuse et morale de Tolstoï; PIERRE CHAZEL, Trois romans languedociens; W. A. VISSER'T HOOFT, L'Eglise et la jeunesse cultivée; P. DOUMERGUE, Un passant qui court les rues: l'égoïsme collectif; I. LAGOWSKI, L'athéisme russe. *The Same*, Mars: WILLIAM MARTIN, La réconciliation de l'Eglise et de l'Italie; W. A. VISSER'T HOOFT, L'Eglise et la jeunesse cultivée. J. BOIS, La distinction du "sacre" et du "profane"; PAUL DOUMERGUE, La cité vaticane, cité de Dieu.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Aalten, Januari: J. G. WOELDERINK, De beteekenis van het geloof; K. SIETSMA, Een greep uit het godsdienst-wetenschappelijk-relativisme. *The Same*, Feb.: J. S. POST, De Christelijke doop; K. SIETSMA, Een greep uit het godsdienst-wetenschappelijk-relativisme. *The Same*, Maart: W. VAN GELDER, Over de "dagen" van Genesis I.

Kirjath Sepher, Jerusalem, January: H. ROSENBERG, Unpublished works of Hayyim Joseph David Azulai; B. SCHOCHELMANN, From the correspondence of Ahad Haam.

Logos, Napoli, Ottobre-Dicembre: A. ALIOTTA, Francesco de Sarlo; F. MONTALTO, Il formalismo etico e l'individualismo politico di E. Kant; F. GUASTELLA, Le idee morali di Antonio Genovesi; N. ABBAGNANO, La filosofia di E. Myerson e la logica dell' identità.

Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, Wageningen, Jan.-Febr.: W. J. AALDERS, Brunner en de mystiek; H. M. VAN NES, De zending in boek en tijdschrift; A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, Een reuzencommentar in één deel!; J. DE ZWAAN, Boeken en meeningen op Nieuwtestamentisch gebied; TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEIJN, Voor onze Oud-testamentische studie. *The Same*, Maart: A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, Memoria; A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, De voordracht van de preek.

Nouvelle Revue Théologique, Paris, Janvier: E. MERSCH, Religion, Christianisme, Catholicisme; E. ROCHE, Une introduction à l'Évangile; L. HONORÉ, Une Église servante de l'État. *The Same*, Fevrier: M. LEDRUS, La science divine des actes libres; E. HOCEDEZ, La foi trinitaire au second siècle. *The Same*, Mars: J. MARÉCHAL, Sur les cimes de l'oraison; E. MERSCH, Religion, Christianisme, Catholicisme, iii^e partie.

Onder Eigen Vaandel, Wageningen, Januari: J. G. WOELDERINK, Genadeverbond en bevinding; A. H. DE HARTOG, Woord en Geest; TH. L. HAITJEMA, Natuur en schriftuur; geloof en wedergeboorte.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Fevrier: GUY DE BROGLIE, Science politique et doctrine chrétienne; ALBERT CONDAMIN, Strophes Babylonniennes et Assyriennes; JEAN CALÈS, Psaume cxxiii.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Louvain, Janvier: J. LEBON, Les citations patristique grecques du *Sceau de la foi*; M. LANGLOIS, Madame de Maintenon et le Saint-Siège.

Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, Strasbourg, Nov.-Dec.: LYDÉE BRUN, Le contentu religieux de la croyance à la résurrection du Christ dans le christianisme primitif; J. PANNIER, Une première "Institution" française dès 1537?; AUGUSTE BILL, Christianisme primitif et historie des religions. *The same*, Jan.-Fev.: A. CAUSSE, La Bible de Reuss et la renaissance des études d'histoire religieuse en France; CH. HAUTER, Essai sur l'objet religieux; M. GOGUEL, Quelques ouvrages récents sur Jésus.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Oct.-Dec.: HUGO GRESSMANN, La religion manichéenne d'après les découvertes de Toufan; ARTHUR GRAF, L'archéologie, l'histoire et la géographie de la Palestine; ROBERT CENTILIVRES, Ouvrages récents sur Calvin, DAVID LASSEUR, L'histoire de l'Église réformée du Pays de Vaud sous le régime bernois, par Henri Vuilleumier.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Janvier: M. S. GILLET, Justice et Charité; P. GLORIEUX, Un Mémoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia; A. FOREST, Montaigne humaniste et théologien.

Scholastik, Freiburg, 4:1: ARTUR LANDGRAF, Studien zur Erkenntnis des Übernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik; HEINRICH LENNERZ, Das Konzil von Trient und theologische Schulmeinungen; KARL PRÜMM, Das Prophetenamt der Sibyllen in kirchlicher Literatur mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Deutung der 4 Ekloge Virgils.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Gotha, 101: 1: JULIUS KAFTAN,

Das Gewissen; KARL THIEME, Zu Luthers Anschauung von der Seligkeit in den Katechismen.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, 53:1: FRANTZ DANDER, Gottes Bild und Gleichnis in der Schöpfung nach Thomas von Aquin; J. A. JUNGMAN, Praefatio und stiller Kanon; A. LANDGRAF, Handschriftenfunde aus der Frühscholastik.

Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Gotha, 47:4: P. RASSOW, Der Kampf Kaiser Heinrichs IV mit Heinrich V; E. KOHLMAYER, Die Bedeutung der Kirche für Luther; H. LÜTHJE, Melanchthons Anschauung über das Recht des Widerstandes gegen die Staatskewalt; E. FOERSTER, Liberalismus und Kulturkampf.

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, 10:1: TORSTEN BOHLIN, Die Reich-Gottes-Idee im letzten halben Jahrhundert; GERHART KUHLMANN, Zum theologischen Problem der Existenz; THEOPHIL STEINMANN, Aus der dogmatischen Arbeit.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Henri Bergson. By JACQUES CHEVALIER, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Grenoble. Authorized Translation by Lilian A. Clare. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1928. Pp. xxi, 351.

Undergraduates. A Study of Morale in Twenty-Three American Colleges and Universities. By R. H. EDWARDS, J. M. ARTMAN, GALEN M. FISHER. Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1928. Pp. x, 369. A study "undertaken by the Institute of Social and Religious Research upon the suggestion of the Association of American Colleges."

Child Nature and Nurture According to Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf. By HENRY H. MEYER, PH.D. (Yale). The Abingdon Press. 1928. Pp. 229.

The Jewish Marriage Contract. A Study in the Status of the Woman in Jewish Law. By LOUIS M. EPSTEIN, A.M., D.H.L., Rabbi Congregation Kehillah Israel, Brookline, Mass. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America. 1927. Pp. xvii, 316.

Across the World of Islam. Studies in Aspects of the Mohammedan Faith and in the Present Awakening of the Moslem Multitudes. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, F.R.G.S., Editor of "The Moslem World." Fleming H. Revell Co. 1929. Pp. 382.

The Fiery Crags. By F. W. BOREHAM. The Abingdon Press. 1928. Pp. 285.

The Jewish Library. First Series. Edited by LEO JUNG. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1928. Pp. 369. Published under auspices of Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. Contains a dozen "pamphlets" of which "a quarter million" copies are already in circulation. The writers are prominent Jews in America and Europe.

Early Church Portraits. By JOHN HESTON WELLEY, PH.D., S.T.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1927. Pp. 253.

Preaching in the New Era. Edited by ELMORE MCNEILL MCKEE, Pastor of the Church of Christ in Yale University. Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1929. Pp. xviii, 270. A volume of 14 sermons by leading liberals, including Fosdick, Coffin, Fitch, Wicks, Hugh Black and F. J. McConnell.

If I Had Only One Sermon to Preach. English Series. Sermons by Twenty English Ministers. Edited by SIR JAMES MARCHANT. New York & London: Harper & Brothers. 1928. Pp. 307. The list includes such well known liberals as, Orchard, Inge, L. P. Jacks, F. W. Norwood and James Moffatt.

Japan in the World of To-Day. By ARTHUR J. BROWN, D.D., Senior Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 322.

Eustathius of Antioch and His Place in the Early History of Christian Doctrine. By R. V. SELLERS, Vicar of Mytholmroyd, Yorkshire, late Scholar of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1928. Pp. ix, 124.

Die Mystik und das Wort. Der Gegensatz zwischen moderner Religionsauffassung und christlichem Glauben dargestellt an der Theologie Schleiermachers. Von D. EMIL BRUNNER, ord. Professor der Theologie in Zürich. Zweite, stark veränderte Auflage. Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Tübingen 1928. Pp. viii, 399.

Frankness in Religion. By ROBERT J. HUTCHEON, Professor of Philosophy and the Psychology of Religion in Meadville Theological School (Unitarian), Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1929. Pp. vii, 307.

Where Wisdom Hides and Other Studies. By HENRY HOWARD, Pastor of Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1929. Pp. 255.

Biblical Allusions in Poe. By WILLIAM MENTZEL FORREST, John B. Cary Memorial Professor of Biblical History and Literature, University of Virginia. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1928. Pp. 208.

The Evolution of the English Hymn. An Historical Survey of the Origins and Development of the Hymns of the Christian Church. By FREDERICK JOHN GILLMAN. With a Foreword by Sir H. Walford Davies. Illustrated. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 312.

The Influence of Gezenius on Hebrew Lexicography. By EDWARD FREDERICK MILLER, M.A., PH.D., Columbia University Fellow in Semitics 1924-25. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Pp. 105. (Contributions to Oriental History and Philology, No. 11.)

Al-Bâbu l-Hâdi 'Ashar. A Treatise on the Principles of Shî'ite Theology by Hasan b. Yûsuf b. 'Alî ibnu' l-Mu'tahhar al-Hillî. With Commentary by Miqdâd-i-Fâdil al-Hillî. Translated from the Arabic by WILLIAM McELWEE MILLER, M.A., B.D., Meshed, Persia. London: Published by the Royal Asiatic Society, 1928. Pp. xiv, 104.

An Egyptian Grammar with Chrestomathy and Glossary. By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, M.A., PH.D. D.D., Professor Semitic Languages and

Egyptology in Trinity College, University of Toronto. London: Luzac & Co. 1927. Pp. vii, 184.

Hippolyte de Rome: Philosophumena ou réfutation de toutes les hérésies, Vol. I, II. Première traduction française avec une introduction et des notes. Par A. SIOUVILLE. Paris: Les Éditions Rieder, 1928. Pp. 212, 249.

The Apocalypse of Jesus Christ—A Reappearance. Being the first of four companion volumes devoted to the exposition of "The Revelation" made to the Apostle John on the Island of Patmos—with Introduction, Notes, Lectures, Bibliography and Indices. Vol. I. "John to the Seven Churches." By WILLIAM J. MCKNIGHT, D.D., Pastor of the First Reformed Presbyterian Church, Boston. Boston: Hamilton Brothers, 1927. Pp. xxxviii, 321.

D. L. MOODY: HIS MESSAGE FOR TODAY

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D., LL.D., New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1928. Pp. 156. Price, \$1.50.

"The substance of this volume was given in the form of lectures delivered on the Smyth Foundation at Columbia Theological Seminary, Decatur, Georgia, in March, 1928. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the honour conferred by the faculty of the seminary in their appointment to this lectureship; and further, it is desired to express deep appreciation for being permitted to present these lectures in this more permanent form."—(FOREWORD.)

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE GOSPELS

By J. RITCHIE SMITH, D.D., Professor of Homiletics in Princeton Theological Seminary. Author of "The Teaching of the Gospel of John"; "The Wall and the Gates." New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.

"Throughout the entire volume one finds unmistakable evidences of broad and accurate scholarship, a courageous facing of difficulties and objections and a determination to think things through, a catholicity of spirit even where the widest differences of convictions enter, and a deep and vital devotion to Jesus Christ. It is with an inexpressible satisfaction one rises from the reading of such a work."—*The Presbyterian*.

WHAT IS FAITH?

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, Pp. 263. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

"If we had the resources we should provide a copy to every minister and lay preacher in the British Isles."—*The British Weekly*.

"Professor Machen has written a strong and courageous book . . ."—*Christian World* (London).

CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.

"This is a book that should be read by every thinking man, whether he calls himself a conservative or a liberal. While evidently the product of a thorough scholar, it is written throughout in simple, non-technical words."—S. G. Craig in *The Presbyterian*.

The Selected Writings
of
BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE
WARFIELD

*Late Professor of Theology in Princeton
Theological Seminary*

IN TEN VOLUMES

At the time of his death in 1921, the late Dr. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield was the leading Calvinistic theologian in the English speaking world. An Editorial Committee proposes to publish through the Oxford University Press, in a series of volumes, Dr. Warfield's contribution to theological thought by reprinting the important articles which he contributed to the various Bible Dictionaries and Encyclopedias and to the theological reviews, especially The Princeton Theological Review.

The first volume, entitled *Revelation and Inspiration*, contains two articles on the Idea of Revelation, and a number of exegetical and critical articles on the Biblical idea of Inspiration and the grounds of belief in the plenary inspiration of Scripture.

The second volume, entitled *Biblical Doctrines*, contains Dr. Warfield's major articles on several Biblical doctrines, such as The Trinity, Predestination, Faith, The Person of Christ, etc.

The third volume will comprise the historico-critical articles on the Person and Work of Christ.

Volumes four, five and six will contain articles on Historical Theology. They will include the articles on Augustine, Calvin, and The Westminster Confession. These articles are authoritative on their respective subjects.

The seventh and eighth volumes will contain the articles on Perfectionism.

There will be a ninth volume of miscellaneous articles and a tenth volume containing the most important of Dr. Warfield's book reviews.

Volumes I and II, now ready, may be ordered through your bookseller, or direct from the publisher. They are bound in cloth, 8vo ($9\frac{1}{2} \times 6\frac{1}{4}$). Price: Vol. I (pp. xiii, 456) \$3.00; Vol. II (pp. v, 660) \$4.00.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMERICAN BRANCH **NEW YORK**